Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

LaSal Oil Company, Inc. v. Chicago Insurance
Company (Interstate Insurance Group); Omaha
Indemnity (Frank B. Hall): Zurich Insurance
Company; and Utah Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association : Amicus Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Michael Hansen; Claudia F. Berry; Suitter, Axland & Hanson; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant;
Scott W. Christensen; Mark J. Williams; Hanson, Epperson & Smith; Attorneys for Omaha
Indemnity.
Aaron Alma Nelson; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley; Of Counsel: Laura A. Foggan; Dennis
A. Tosh; William A. McGrath; Wiley, Rein & Fielding; Counsel for Amicus Curiae.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, LaSal Oil v. Chicago Insurance Company, No. 930536 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5460

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

<3ltt tttfye p t a t j (ttnurt nf a p p e a l s
LaSAL OIL COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. 930536-CA
v.
CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY
(INTERSTATE INSURANCE GROUP);
OMAHA INDEMNITY (FRANK B.
HALL); ZURICH INSURANCE
COMPANY; and UTAH PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION;
Defendants/Appellees

Priority No. 15

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge
Civil No. 88-0907028

BRIEF AND EXHIBITS OF AMICUS CURIAE
INSURANCE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION ASSOCIATION

h" F U
CO
.A*
DC
J. Michael Hansen, Esq."
Claudia F. Berry, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
LaSal Oil Company, Inc.

W 5 H 0(\

Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Mark J. Williams, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Attorneys for Omaha Indemnity

Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379)
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 364-3627
Of Counsel:
Laura A. Foggan
Dennis A. Tosh
William A. McGrath
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-7000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Insurance Environmental
Litigation Association

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

FEB 0 1 1994
•/•
Y

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

<3ftt t&Ip JBtalj (Ksurt nf ^ p p s a l s
LaSAL OIL COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff/Appellant
Case No. 930536-CA
v.
CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY
(INTERSTATE INSURANCE GROUP);
OMAHA INDEMNITY (FRANK B.
HALL); ZURICH INSURANCE
COMPANY; and UTAH PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY
ASSOCIATION;
Defendants/Appellees

Priority No. 15

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge
Civil No. 88-0907028

BRIEF AND EXHIBITS OF AMICUS CURIAE
INSURANCE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION ASSOCIATION
Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379)
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 364-3627
J. Michael Hansen, Esq.
Claudia F. Berry, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
LaSal Oil Company, Inc.
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Mark J. Williams, Esq.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Post Office Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Attorneys for Omaha Indemnity

Of Counsel:
Laura A. Foggan
Dennis A. Tosh
William A. McGrath
WILEY, REIN & FIELDING
1776 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 429-7000
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Insurance Environmental
Litigation Association

Tim Dalton Dunn, Esq.
Carlton R. Ericson, Esq.
DUNN & DUNN
230 South 500 East, Suite 460
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Utah Property and Casualty
Insurance Guaranty Association
Robert G. Gilchrist, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esq.
PAULSEN, LAUCHNOR & MICKELSON
CSB Tower, Suite 500
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company
Donald V. Jernberg, Esq.
Orest Dachniwsky, Esq.
OPPENHEIMER, WOLFF & DONNELLY
Two Illinois Center
233 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2400
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Attorneys for Chicago Insurance Company
Allan T. Brinkerhoff, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Attorneys for Zurich Insurance Company

PARTIES
The parties to the action below were:
Plaintiff:

LaSal Oil Company, Inc.

Defendants;

Allianz Insurance Company
Carriers Insurance Company
Chicago Insurance Company
(Interstate Insurance Group)
Midland Insurance Company
Omaha Indemnity Company
(Frank B. Hall)
Pacific Employers Insurance Company
(CIGNA)
Travelers Insurance Company
Zurich Insurance Company
Utah Property & Casualty Insurance
Guaranty Association

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

I.

II.

THE WORD "SUDDEN" IN THE "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL"
EXCEPTION TO THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CONTAINS A
TEMPORAL ELEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BARRING COVERAGE
FOR THE GRADUAL "DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR
ESCAPE" OF POLLUTANTS

5

THE GRADUAL "DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR ESCAPE" OF
GASOLINE FROM A CORRODED UNDERGROUND PIPE CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED "SUDDEN."
23

III. IGNORING THE PLAIN MEANING OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
DISSERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY DESTABILIZING THE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND HARMING ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS. . 29
CONCLUSION

31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Case

Page

ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook
Property & Casualty Co., 17 Cal.
App. 4th 1773, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
206, 214 (1993), review denied.
(Cal. Nov. 17, 1993)

passim

A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co.,
933 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1991)

13

Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General
Dynamics Corp.,
968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992)

12

American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General
Host Corp.f
120 F.R.D. 129 (D. Kan. 1988)

20

Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller
Chem Co.,
990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993)

12, 14

Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Ins. Co.,
53 Wash. 2d 404, 333 P.2d 938
(1959)

27-28

Auto Leasing Co. v. Central Mut. Ins.
Co. ,
7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264
(1958)

7, 23

Barmet of Indiana, Inc. v. Security
Ins. Group.
425 N.E.2d 201 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981)

26

Bergera v. Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
524 P. 2d 599 (Utah 1974)

6

Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v.
Salt Lake City,
740 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987)

7

- ii -

Bituminous Casualty Co. v. Tonka Corp..
9 F.3d 51, 1993 WL 461825 (9th Cir.
Nov. 26, 1993)

12

Borq-Warner Corp. v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am. .
174 A.D.2d 24, 577 N.Y.S.2d 953,
review denied. 80 N.Y.2d 751,
600 N.E.2d 632, 587 N.Y.S.2d 950
(1992)

26

Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe.
799 P. 2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
Bureau of Engraving. Inc. v. Federal
Ins. Co..
5 F.3d 1175, 1993 WL 382626
(8th Cir. 1993)
Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Ass'n.
589 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1979)

7

12
7

Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co..
259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686
(1989)

14

Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Casualty
Co. .
136 N.H. 402, 618 A.2d 777 (1992)

17

Dimmitt Chevrolet. Inc. v.
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co.,
No. 78,293, 1993 WL 241520 (Fla.
July 1, 1993)
FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co..
897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.),
cert, denied. 498 U.S. 911 (1990)

9, 12, 16, 28

13

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laudick.
859 P.2d 410 (Kan. 1993)

25-26

Fawcett v. Security Benefit Ass'n,
99 Utah 193, 104 P.2d 214 (1940)

8

- iii -

Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0
Corp..
702 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich.
1988)

9

G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis,
773 P. 2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

15

Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. ,
48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (Cal. 1989)

30-31

Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v.
CNA Ins. Co.,
905 F.2d 9544 (6th Cir. 1990)

13

Great Lakes Container Corp. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984)

13

Gridley Associates, Ltd. v.
Transamerica Insurance Co. ,
828 P. 2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W.
Harp & Sons, Inc.,
305 S.C. 492, 409 S.E.2d 418
(App. 1991), cert, dismissed, 419
S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 1992)
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
962 F.2d 1484 (10th
Cir.), cert.deniedf 113
S. Ct. 411 (1992)
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake
Ins. Co. f
64 Ohio St. 2d 657, 597 N.E.2d
1096 (1992), cert, denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1585 (1993)
Julius Hyman & Co. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co.,
136 F. Supp. 830 (D. Colo. 1955)

- iv -

passim

26

7, 10-11, 12

12, 16

27

Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd.,
155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570
(1990)
Lower Paxton Township v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
383 Pa. Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393
allocatur denied, 93 M.D.
Allocatur Dkt. 1989 (Pa. 1989)

14

11, 26

Lumbemtens Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Belleville Indus., Inc.,
407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568
(1990), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct.
969 (1992)

12, 16, 25

Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Belleville Indus., Inc.,
938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991)

13, 24, 25

Marriot v. Pacific Nat'l Life Assur.
Co. ,
24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981
(1970)
Mays v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
103 Or. App. 578, 799 P.2d 653
(1990), rev, denied, 311 Or. 150,
806 P.2d 128 (1991)
Morton International, Inc. v. General
Accident Insurance Co.,
134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993),
motions for recons. pending
NLRB v. Federbush Co.,
121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941)
Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs.,
942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991)
Qgden Corp. v. Travelers Indent. Co.,
924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991)
Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
414 Mass. 747, 610 N.E.2d 912
(1993)

- v -

7, 23

26

13, 14, 15-16
10
13, 28
13

12, 15-16

Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co. ,
74 N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 1301,
549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989)
Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
974 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1992)

12, 25, 28
12

Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd.,
618 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980)

8

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v.
Commercial Union Assur.,
606 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1980)

7

Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co.,
12 Cal. App. 4th 715, 15 Cal
Rptr. 2d 815 (1993)

25

Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
No. 91-16758, 1993 WL 485275
(9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1993)

12

State of New York v. AMRO Realty Corp.,
936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991)
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820
(1984), rev, denied, 338 E.D.
Allocatur Dkt. 1985 (Pa. Oct. 31,
1985)
Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American
Home Ins. Co.,
74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048,
544 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989)
Terminix Int'l Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co.,
956 F.2d 270, 1992 WL 34557
(6th Cir. 1992)

- vi -

13, 25

26

12, 25, 26

13

Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes,
77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212
(1985), rev, denied. 301 Or. 76,
717 P.2d 631 (1986)

26

Truck Ins. Exchange v. Pozzuoli,
17 Cal. App. 4th 856, 21 Cal. Rptr.
2d 650 (1993), rev, denied, (Cal.
Nov. 17, 1993)

20, 25

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Morrison Grain Co.,
999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993)

12

United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.
v. Star Fire Coals, Inc.,
856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988)

13

Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
438 Mich. 197, 476 N-W.2d 392
(1991)

11, 12, 16, 26

Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S. Life
Title Ins. Co.,
776 P. 2d 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

2

Waste Management of Carolinas. Inc. v.
Peerless Ins. Co.,
315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374,
reh'cr denied, 316 N.C. 386,
346 S.E.2d 134 (1986)

12, 26, 28

Williams v. First Colony Life Ins.
Co. ,
593 P.2d 534 (Utah 1979)
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am.
Title Ins. Co.,
749 P. 2d 651 (Utah 1988)

7,

8, 14

2

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (k)

1

Miscellaneous
Warren G. Brockmeier, Pollution — The
Risk and Insurance Problem, 12
For The Defense 77, 79 (1971)

- vii -

20

G. R. E. Bromwich, Pollution and
Insurance. 1971 Risk Mgmt. 15

20

10A G. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d §
42.385 at 496-98 (rev. ed. 1982)

27

Bernard J. Daenzer & Edward Zampino,
Environmental Liability and the
Pollution Exclusion Why Some
Courts Find Coverage, 46
Chartered Property & Casualty
Underwriters Journal No. 2, 84
(June 1993)

17-18, 21

EPA, "Superfund Response Action
Contractor Indemnification," 54
Fed Reg 46012, 46013 (October 31,
1989)

30

Victor C. Harwood III, A Case of
Misplaced Reliance: Anderson &
Middletown Lumber Company
Revisited, 7 Mealey's
Litig.Reps.: Ins. No. 33 at 12
(July 1, 1993)

28

Victor C. Harwood, III, Brian J. Coyle
& Edward Zampino, The "Frivolity"
of Policyholder Gradual Pollution
Discharge Claims. 5 Mealey's
Litig. Reps.: Ins. No. 40 (Aug.
27, 1991)

18-19, 21-22

Insurance Liability for Cleanup Costs
at Hazardous Waste Sites: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Policy
Research and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 50 (1990)

29

J. Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety
Through Insurance-Based
Incentives: Financial
Responsibility for Hazardous
Wastes, 96 Yale L.J. 403, 423
(1986)

30

- viii -

Page
Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glassf 74
Geo. L.J. 1237, 1241-53 (1986)

- ix -

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Bernard J. Daenzer & Edward
Liability and the Pollution
Find Coverage, 46 Chartered
Underwriters Journal No. 2,

Zampino, Environmental
Exclusion Why Some Courts
Property & Casualty
84 (June 1993)

Victor C. Harwood, III, Brian J. Coyle & Edward
Zampino, The "Frivolity" of Policyholder Gradual
Pollution Discharge Claims. 5 Mealey's Litig. Reps.:
Ins. No. 40 (Aug. 27, 1991)
G. R. E. Bromwich, Pollution and Insurance, 1971 Risk
Mgmt. 15
Warren G. Brockmeier, Pollution — The Risk and
Insurance Problem. 12 For The Defense 77, 79 (1971)
Affidavit of Melvin L. Summerhays
Victor C. Harwood III, A Case of Misplaced Reliance;
Anderson & Middletown Lumber Company Revisited. 7
Mealey's Litig.Reps.: Ins. No. 33 at 12 (July 1, 1993)

- x -

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993 Supp.).
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Insurance Environmental Litigation Association
("IELA") is a trade association of major property and
casualty insurers.

IELA was formed, in part, to appear as

amicus curiae in environmental insurance coverage cases and
to assist courts in the determination of important insurance
coverage questions presented in such litigation.

IELA

members have entered into insurance contracts in Utah and
throughout the nation containing provisions similar to the
pollution exclusion at issue in the instant case.

IELA is

therefore vitally interested in the judicial interpretation
of these coverage provisions.1

1

IELA files this brief as amicus curiae on behalf
of IELA member companies Allstate Insurance Company, American
International Group, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies,
Continental Insurance Company, Crum & Forster Corporation,
Hanover Insurance Company, Hartford Insurance Group, Home
Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Royal
Insurance, Prudential Reinsurance Company, St. Paul
Companies, Selective Insurance Group of America, State Farm
Fire & Casualty Company, and United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company. IELA members CIGNA Property and Casualty
Companies, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Maryland
Insurance Group and The Travelers Insurance Companies, or
their affiliates, are parties in this matter; accordingly,
IELA's brief is not filed on their behalf. Additionally,
IELA's brief is not filed on behalf of member Aetna Casualty
and Surety Company.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court correctly hold that the word
"sudden" in the "sudden and accidental" exception
to the pollution exclusion at issue unambiguously
contains a temporal element?

II.

Did the trial court correctly hold that the
gradual, ongoing discharge of gasoline from a
corroded underground line cannot be considered
"sudden"?
A.

Standard of Review

The interpretation of an integrated, unambiguous
insurance contract is a matter of law, with the trial court's
conclusions of law to be reviewed for correctness. See,
e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v.
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IELA hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the
Statement of the Case set forth in Appellant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
LaSal Oil Companyf Inc. ("LaSal") filed this declaratory
judgment action against nine insurance companies which issued
general and excess liability policies to LaSal.

In this

action, LaSal seeks a declaration that the various insurers
2

have a duty to defend and indemnify LaSal against claims
arising from the leakage of gasoline from a corroded
underground pipe over a period of approximately eighteen to
twenty-four months at a service station owned by LaSal.
The trial court ruling currently under review stems
from LaSal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against
Omaha Indemnity ("Omaha") and two other defendants filed
September 10, 1990 (R. 491-495), and from Omaha,s Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Among the issues raised in those pleadings

was the interpretation of the language of the pollution
exclusion contained in the Omaha policies.

Under that

exclusion, coverage does not apply
to bodily injury or property damage arising out of
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or other water course or
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental . . . .
(R. 2416, 2067).
The court, after reviewing the parties' briefs and
hearing oral argument, held an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the leakage from the underground gasoline
line at the LaSal station was "sudden" under the terms of the
policy.

Both Omaha and LaSal presented expert testimony at

that hearing.

The two experts agreed that the leakage from

LaSal7s gasoline line was caused by corrosion of the
pipeline.

(R. 3234-3235, 3238-3239, 3271-3272, 3277).
3

They

disagreed, however, as to whether the discharge of gasoline
from a corroded pipe was "sudden" under the policy language.
(R. 3254, 3271-3272).
In a January 21, 1993 memorandum decision, the trial
court, following this Court's decision in Gridley Associates.
Ltd. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), held that the term "sudden," as used in the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion
in the Omaha policy, unambiguously contained a temporal
element, and that a leak caused by corrosion could not be
considered "sudden."

The court therefore ordered that

judgment in conformance with the evidence presented be
entered in favor of Omaha.

(R. 1886-1893).

The trial court

filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 11,
1993.

(R. 1894-1906).

This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The insurance policies at issue expressly exclude
coverage for pollution unless "the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape" of contaminants is both "sudden" and
"accidental."

These critical words are clear and

unambiguous, especially when read together and in context.
"Accidental" means "unexpected and unintended."
means "quick" or "abrupt."
"sudden" and "accidental" —
and abrupt —

"Sudden"

If the discharge is not both
i.e., unexpected and unintended

then the exception to the pollution exclusion
4

cannot come into play.

As this Court recognized in Gridley

Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 524 (Utah
App. 1992), the "sudden and accidental" exception cannot
restore coverage for the gradual, long term leakage of
gasoline from LaSal's corroded underground line.
Well-settled rules of contract interpretation prohibit a
court from considering extrinsic evidence to "construe"
unambiguous contract terms.

But even if such evidence were

relevant and admissible, an even-handed review of the socalled drafting and regulatory history of the pollution
exclusion would support the application of the plain meaning
of the word "sudden."
Further, sound public policy dictates that the plain
terms of the insurance contract should be enforced.

The

risk-allocation system that is the basis of liability
insurance will function effectively only if unambiguous
contract terms are enforced as written.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE WORD "SUDDEN" IN THE "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL"
EXCEPTION TO THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CONTAINS A TEMPORAL
ELEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BARRING COVERAGE FOR THE GRADUAL
"DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR ESCAPE" OF POLLUTANTS.
The liability insurance policy in question contains a

"pollution exclusion" which precludes coverage for any
liability "arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release
or escape of . . . fumes, . . . toxic chemicals, liquids or
5

gases, . . . or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon land, the atmosphere or other water course or
body of water."

The only exception to this exclusion of

pollution-related coverage is for a "discharge, dispersal,
release or escape" that is both "sudden and accidental."
This Court, in Gridley Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica
Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), held that
the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion is unambiguous.

Id. at 527. In a case of first

impression in Utah, the Gridley Court stated that "xsudden'
within the xsudden and accidental' clause cannot be defined
without reference to a temporal element, specifically
immediacy, abruptness and quickness."

Id.

This Court found

that a "clean break" in an underground gasoline line fell
within the exception, contrasting it with a break "caused by
corrosion or deterioration which would have resulted in a
gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the line."

Id.

Well-established principles of contract interpretation
under Utah law require that the term "sudden" be construed
temporally.

An insurance policy "is merely a contract

between the insured and the insurer.

Its language should be

construed pursuant to the same rules as are applied to other
ordinary contracts . . . . "2 Thus, a contract of insurance,
like any other contract, must be enforced according to its

2

Bergera v. Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 599,
600 (Utah 1974).
6

terms.3

The terms of the policy must be construed as a

whole, and each of its terms should be given effect where
possible.4

In determining whether a contract is ambiguous,

the first source is the language of the contract itself.5

"A

[contractual] term is not necessarily ambiguous merely
because one party seeks to endow it with a meaning different
from that relied upon by the drafter."6

Nor will this Court

find a provision to be ambiguous "because a party may get a
different meaning by placing a force[d] or strained
construction on it in accordance with his interest."7

3

See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v.
Commercial Union Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah
1980)("Unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty in the
language of an insurance policy, the policy should be
enforced according to its terms."); Hartford Ace. & Indem.
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484,
1486 (10th Cir.) (,nan unambiguous insurance contract, like
any other contract, should be enforced as written'")(applying
Utah law), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992)
4

Marriot v. Pacific Nat'l Life Assurance Co., 24
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970)(court is "obliged to
assume that language included therein was put there for a
purpose, and to give it effect when its meaning is clear and
unambiguous"); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake
City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App.) (all parts of
contract "should be given effect insofar as that is
possible"), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
5

Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d
534, 536 (Utah 1979).
6

See, e.g., Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 589
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe,
799 P.2d 716, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
7

Auto Leasing Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah
2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958).
7

Ultimately, any rule requiring insurance policies to be
strictly construed against the insurer is to be applied only
after application of the other rules of construction.8

Most

fundamentally, "[a] court will not . . . make a better
contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves."9
Consistent with these principles, the word "sudden/1 as
coupled with the term "accidental" in the exception to the
pollution exclusion, must be accorded a temporal meaning,
denoting an event that occurs quickly, hastily, immediately
and abruptly.

To interpret the term "sudden," as LaSal asks,

to mean "unexpected or unintended" would render it
coextensive with "accidental," ignoring basic tenets of
construction and rewriting the bargain between insurer and
insured.

The contract provision says "sudden and

accidental," not "accidental and accidental."
LaSal asks this Court to find that the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is
8

E.g., Fawcett v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 99 Utah
193, 104 P.2d 214, 218 (1940)("Even though a particular
provision of a contract of insurance be susceptible of more
than one meaning, the construction of such provision more
favorable to the assured will not be adopted if other
provisions of the entire contract clearly resolve the
ambiguity in favor of the contrary construction."); Williams,
593 P.2d at 536 ("in determining the intent of a contact the
language of the instrument itself should first be looked to,
and unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is
no justification for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or
parol evidence").
9

Rio Alcrom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505
(Utah 1980).
8

ambiguous, and therefore should be interpreted to provide
coverage.

In attempting to convince this Court to overturn

its prior precedent in Gridlev, LaSal seeks to point the
Court to dictionaries, extrinsic "evidence" purporting to
reflect the "drafting history" of the policy language, and
the existence of a minority of results-oriented judicial
opinions adopting LaSal's position.

In its attempt to create

ambiguity where none exists, LaSal looks everywhere except to
the plain language of the insurance contract it entered into
with Omaha.

As this Court and scores of others have found,

fundamental principles of contract interpretation require
that the term "sudden," read in context, contain a temporal
element.
To support its argument, LaSal strives to create
ambiguity within the policy by citing in the abstract
multiple definitions of the word "sudden."

However, such an

analysis snatches the word "sudden" from its context and
views it in isolation, gleaning ambiguity solely from the
pages of dictionaries, where multiple meanings appear for the
vast majority of words which, as used in context, are clearly
understood.10

What a word means in a particular usage

10

See, e.g., Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern
Fidelity Ins. Co., No. 78,293, 1993 WL 241520 at *4 (Fla.
July 1, 1993)("dictionaries are * imperfect yardsticks of
ambiguity,M); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp.,
702 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1988)("[I]f merely
applying a definition in the dictionary suffices to create
ambiguity, no term would be unambiguous. The interpretation
of contractual language is not mechanical.").
9

depends in large part on context.

As Judge Learned Hand

observed,
[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition;
they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other,
but all in their aggregate take their purport from
the setting in which they are used[.]
NLRB v. Federbush Co.. 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
For example, in the sentence "the bride's train was
made of lace," no one would argue that the bride was carrying
a railroad car down the aisle on the basis of the fact that
the first entry in the dictionary under "train" may be
"railroad car."

Like "train" in the example above, the word

"sudden" must be read in its contractual context, where it is
coupled with "accidental."

In that context, to read "sudden"

to mean only "unexpected or unintended" would deprive the
term of any independent meaning.

As the California Court of

Appeal recently noted, read in context "the word [sudden]
must, if it is to be anything more than a hiccup in front of
the word accidental, convey a *temporal7 meaning of
immediacy, quickness or abruptness." ACL Technologies. Inc.
v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co.. 17 Cal. App. 4th 1773,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 214 (1993), review denied (Cal. Nov.
17, 1993).
Applying Utah law, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, in rejecting an argument identical to
LaSal's, cogently stated the point:
[R]eading "sudden" without a temporal component
renders "accidental" redundant. While both
10

conditions might include "unexpected11 or
"unintended," "sudden" cannot mean "gradual,"
"routine" or "continuous." Since Utah law dictates
each contract provision be given effect, . . . the
conjunctive association of "sudden" with
"accidental" is exactly the point on which our
interpretation turns. Dictionaries may indicate
each word has several overlapping meanings. We
cannot use only the redundant definitions, however.
Giving effect to every provision obliges us to
construe "sudden" and "accidental" as separate,
conditional requirements for coverage. This
interpretive rule thus removes any ambiguity
created by common usage.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113
S. Ct. 411 (1992).
LaSal also encourages this Court to find the term
"sudden" ambiguous merely because of the existence of
conflicting judicial precedent.

However, a contract is not

rendered ambiguous simply because some courts have
interpreted its language contrary to its plain meaning.

As

one appellate court observed, "we would be abdicating our
judicial role were we to decide such cases by the purely
mechanical process of searching the nation's courts to
ascertain if there are conflicting decisions."

Lower Paxton

Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa.
Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 400 n.4, allocatur denied, 93 M.D.
Allocatur Dkt. 1989 (Pa. 1989).

As the Michigan Supreme

Court has noted, relying on differences in judicial opinions
as proof of ambiguity "merely begs the question."

Upjohn Co.

v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 476 N.W.2d 392, 398
n.8 (1991).
11

In fact, the majority of recent decisions, including
decisions by six state supreme courts,11 seven federal
circuit courts of appeal,12 and numerous lower appellate and
11

See, e.g., Dimmitt, 1993 WL 241520 at *4 (Fla.
July 1, 1993)("to construe sudden also to mean unintended and
unexpected would render the words sudden and accidental
entirely redundant"); Polaroid Corp, v. Travelers Ins. Co.f
414 Mass, 747, 610 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1993)(pollution exclusion
bars coverage where "the discharge of pollutants into the
environment happened gradually, over a lengthy period of
time"); Hybud Equip, Corp, v. Sphere Drake Ins, Co,, 64 Ohio
St, 2d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1992), cert, denied, 113
S. Ct. 1585 (1993) ("[t]he inclusion of the word 'sudden'
readily indicates that the exception was not intended to
apply to a release that occurred over an extended period of
time"); Upjohn Co, v. New Hampshire Ins, Co,, 438 Mich. 197,
476 N,W,2d 392, 403 (1991) ("when considered in its plain and
easily understood sense, * sudden' is defined with a temporal
element that joins together conceptually the immediate and
the unexpected"); Lumbermens Mut, Casualty Co, v, Belleville
Indus,, Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1990)
("[i]f the word 'sudden' is to have any meaning or value in
the exception to the pollution exclusion clause, only an
abrupt discharge or release of pollutants falls within the
exception"), cert, denied. 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Powers
Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d
1301, 1302, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989)(exception to pollution
exclusion is not operative unless occurrence is both "sudden
and "accidental"); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v, American Home
Ins, Co,. 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S,2d
531 (1989)(same); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc, v.
Peerless Ins, Co,. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382 ("[t]he
exception . . . describes the event — not only in terms of
its being unexpected, but in terms of its happening
instantaneously or precipitantly"), reh'g denied, 316 N.C.
386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986).
12

Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. 91-16758, 1993 WL
485275 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1993); Bituminous Casualty Co. v.
Tonka Corp., 9 F.3d 51 (8th Cir. 1993); Bureau of Engraving,
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir, 1993); United
States Fidelity & Guar, Co, v, Morrison Grain Co,, 999 F.2d
489 (10th Cir. 1993); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem.
Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993)(Utah law); Aetna Casualty
& Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir.
1992); Hartford Accident & Indem., 962 F.2d 1484 (Utah law);
Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th
(continued...)
12

trial courts/ 3 have held that, to be sudden, a "discharge,
dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants must be
instantaneous or nearly instantaneous; it cannot occur
gradually or continue over an extended period of time.14

As

the California Court of Appeal found in ACL Technologies, a
case similarly involving pollution resulting from the longterm leakage of corroded underground storage tanks:
[Wjhatever "sudden" means, it does not mean
gradual. The ordinary person would never think
that something which happens gradually also
happened suddenly. The words are antonyms. . . .
[G]radual is the opposite of sudden. . . . Sudden
never means both "unexpected and gradual."
12

(.. .continued)
Cir. 1992); Terminix Int'l Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 956
F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1992); Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark
A s s o c . Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991); State of New York
v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991); A.
Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st
Cir. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville
Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991), cert, denied,
112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991); FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 911
(1990); Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 905
F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir. 1990); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988);
Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,
727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984).
13

A list of decisions recognizing that the term
"sudden" in the pollution exclusion has a temporal meaning is
attached as Addendum A.
14

In Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident
Insurance Co., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993), motions for
recons. pending, the New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized
that the pollution exclusion as written unambiguously bars
coverage for temporally sudden discharges of pollutants, but
refused to apply the plain language of the exclusion based
upon an estoppel theory. Id. at 847; see infra at pp. 15-16.
13

ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16 (citations and
footnotes omitted).
Finally, LaSal relies heavily on the analysis of a
handful of courts that have found coverage for gradual
pollution after inappropriate consideration of one-sided
"drafting history" or "regulatory history" of the pollution
exclusion.15

Those courts have relied primarily on articles

written by counsel for policyholders, and their decisions are
based on selected statements quoted from pro-policyholder
articles or from other decisions erroneously considering such
"evidence," which is untested by traditional rules of
impeachment and cross-examination.
This Court should reject any reliance on materials
relating to the exclusion's purported history.

First, it is

a fundamental precept of Utah law that extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent will not be considered where a contract
is unambiguous.16 Moreover, even were this Court to find
that ambiguity exists such that reference to extrinsic
evidence is permitted, only evidence of the contracting

15

See Morton Int'l. 629 A.2d at 848-49; Just v. Land
Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75
(1990); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333,
380 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1989).
16

Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d
534, 536 (Utah 1979); Anaconda Minerals Co., 990 F.2d at
1179.
14

parties7 intent should be considered.17

LaSal does not, and

cannot, contend that the materials relied upon in this
handful of decisions demonstrate the mutual intent of LaSal
and its insurers at the time they entered into the policies
at issue.

Indeed, LaSal does not suggest that it was even

aware of these statements when the insurance contracts were
executed.

These statements provide no evidence probative of

the mutual intent of the parties to the insurance contracts
at issue and therefore should not be considered by the Court.
The more reasoned decisions have refused to engage in
appellate "fact-finding" based upon self-serving assertions
of the purported "history" of the pollution exclusion.

For

example, in Polaroid Corporation v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
414 Mass 749, 610 N.E.2d 912 (1993), the highest court of
Massachusetts refused to consider extrinsic materials in
construing the terms "sudden" and "accidental" and struck
such materials from the record, stating that

H/

[b]ecause the

word 'sudden7 in the pollution exclusion clause is not
ambiguous, we have no need to consider the drafting history
of that clause or any statements made by insurance company
representatives concerning the intention of its drafters.7"

17

See G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)(in interpreting contract, court
determines "what the parties intended by examining the entire
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other,
giving objective and reasonable construction to the contract
as a whole") (emphasis added).
15

Id. at 916 n.7 (quoting Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d at
573) .18
A recent example of misplaced reliance on partisan
articles presenting the alleged "history" of the pollution
exclusion appears in Morton International. Inc. v. General
Accident Insurance Co., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993),
motions for recons. pending.

Although Morton International

recognized that the plain language of the exclusion as
written eliminates all coverage for pollution except that
caused by discharges that are both sudden and accidental, Id.
at 847.

Id.

It relied on the "regulatory history" of the

exclusion as presented in articles by policyholder attorneys,
held that insurers were "estopped" from asserting what the
court had found to be the clear terms of their contracts.
Id. at 848.19
18

Other state supreme courts are in accord. Upjohn
Co., 476 N.W.2d at 396 n.6 ("when the policy is found to be
clear and unambiguous, 'there is no need to resort to
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the
exclusion'"); Belleville Indus.r 555 N.E.2d at 573 (same).
Earlier this year, the Florida Supreme Court vacated an
earlier opinion finding the word "sudden" to be ambiguous on
the basis of such purported "drafting history." Dimmitt, No.
78,293, 1993 WL 251520 (Fla. July 1, 1993).
Upon motion for
rehearing, the Dimmitt court found the "sudden and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion to be
unambiguous; therefore, the court found it "inappropriate and
unnecessary" to consider the extrinsic evidence of "drafting
history" put forth by the policyholder. Id. at *5.
19

The New Jersey courts analysis fails in at least
three crucial regards. First, the court asserts that state
regulators were somehow misled about the terms of the
exclusion, even though the regulators were presented with the
admittedly unambiguous language of the exclusion itself.
(continued...)
16

Even if LaSal's contentions regarding the "drafting
history11 or "regulatory history" of the pollution exclusion
were relevant, a full and fair evaluation of the complete
range of available materials documenting the drafting and
regulatory background of the pollution exclusion supports the
proposition that the exclusion means what its plain language
says: there is no coverage for pollution occurrences unless
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of contamination
is both temporally abrupt and accidental.20
19

(.. .continued)
Second, at the time the exclusion was drafted, environmental
regulatory regimes like CERCLA did not yet exist. No one —
not insurers, not policyholders, not state regulators —
could have anticipated the kinds of massive, latent
liabilities that have arisen. Finally, the court made its
decision based on an unbalanced, incomplete view of the
pollution exclusion's drafting history. No trial was ever
held on this issue such that the parties could address the
various arguments adopted by the court. These flaws in the
Morton opinion, along with others, form the basis for
insurers7 motion for reconsideration currently before the New
Jersey Supreme Court.
20

We note that the law review article on which LaSal
relies was written by attorneys who regularly represent
policyholders in insurance coverage litigation. See, e.g.,
Coaklev v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 136 N.H. 402, 618
A.2d 777 (1992)(policyholders represented by Ms. Ballard,
principal author of article cited by LaSal). For the
insurers' side of the drafting history debate, see articles
of insurer representatives Bernard J. Daenzer & Edward
Zampino, Environmental Liability and the Pollution Exclusion;
Why Some Courts Find Coverage, 46 Chartered Property &
Casualty Underwriters Journal No. 2, 84 (June 1993)(Ex. 1)
and Victor C. Harwood, III, Brian J. Coyle & Edward Zampino,
The "Frivolity" of Policyholder Gradual Pollution Discharge
Claims. 5 Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Ins. No. 40 (Aug. 27,
1991)(Ex. 2 ) ; cf. Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause
Through the Looking Glass. 74 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1241-53 (1986).
See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company. IELA proffers these materials conditionally and
(continued...)
17

The pollution exclusion was drafted in 1970 by the
Insurance Rating Board ("IRB").

IRB,s General Liability

Governing Committee decided to adopt "a policy exclusion of
pollution that would run to bodily injury and property damage
• . . for all general liability insurance, the exclusion to
except pollution caused injuries when the pollution results
from the classical accident."21

A contemporaneous memorandum

confirmed what was common knowledge among insurers and major
insureds:

that the pollution exclusion was to "exclude all .

• . pollution or contamination of water and air except for
the xboom' case, or ^classical accident,,n22

20

(.. .continued)
invites the Court to consider them only if the Court elects
to consider extrinsic materials relied upon by LaSal.
21

Minutes of IRB General Liability Governing
Committee ("GLGC") meeting (March 17, 1970), quoted by
Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22 (emphasis in
original).
22

Memorandum by Robert S. Hansen, Aetna Casualty's
representative on the GLGC (March 20, 1970), quoted by
Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22. In order to
accomplish this, the pollution exclusion was drafted to
differ from the definition of "occurrence," which is part of
the contract's insuring agreement, in at least two important
ways. First, the pollution exclusion eliminates coverage for
repeated or continuous exposure to conditions with regard to
pollution-related liability. Second, unlike the "occurrence"
definition, the pollution exclusion does not focus upon the
nature of the damage or upon whether such damage was expected
or intended, but rather upon the nature of the discharge,
dispersal, release or escape. Accordingly, liability for the
repeated or intentional release of pollutants was plainly
intended to be excluded from coverage.
18

This classical accident (or "boom" event) has always
been understood to be sudden or abrupt.23 An explanatory
memorandum submitted by the IRB to state insurance
commissioners in 1970 incorporated this accepted
understanding of the word "accident":
Coverage for pollution or contamination
is not provided in most cases under
present policies because the damages can
be said to be expected or intended and
thus are excluded by the definition of
occurrence. The above exclusion
clarifies the situation so as to avoid
any question of intent. Coverage is
continued for pollution or contamination
caused injuries when the pollution or
contamination results from an accident
24

• • • •

This directly contradicts any claim that the pollution
exclusion would not change coverage for pollution claims
under the occurrence-based policies.

The occurrence

definition focuses on intent; for there to be an occurrence,
the damage must be unexpected and unintended.

In contrast,

the IRB submission plainly states that the pollution
exclusion "avoid[s] any question of intent." As the
submission states, the pollution exclusion does this by
eliminating coverage for all pollution-related liability
unless it was caused by the classical "accident."

23

Courts

See Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22-

24 & n.6.
24

See Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 38
& n.51 (emphasis in original).
19

have found that this is the proper interpretation of the IRB
submission.25
Policyholders and their representatives also recognized
and understood this purpose when the exclusion was drafted.
One broker wrote in the leading publication for corporate
insurance buyers that the exclusion's "purpose" is to provide
for some very short term phenomenon."26

An insurance

consultant wrote at the time:
the exception to the [pollution]
exclusion states that the dispersal,
release or escape must be "sudden and
accidental." In other words, it must be
both sudden and accidental rather than
either sudden or accidental.27
Mr. Melvin L. Summerhays was the General Liability Rates
and Forms Analyst for the Utah Department of Insurance in
1970.

He has stated that, at the time of the filing of the

pollution exclusion with the Department, his understanding
was that "*[s]udden' was something * abrupt7 or

x

quick.'

An

25

See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host
Corp.. 120 F.R.D. 129, 133-34 (D. Kan. 1988) (finding that
the submission "support[s] the courts previous
interpretation that the pollution exclusion has an
independent, objective meaning and is not simply a
restatement of the subjective definition of occurrence"); see
also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Pozzuoli, 17 Cal. App. 4th 856,
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 651 n.2 (1993) (finding that intent
behind the exclusion was to "wholly eliminate coverage for
pollution except in the case of a ^classical accident,' . . .
defined as a * sudden, boom-type accident7 such as an
explosion"), rev, denied. (Cal. Nov. 17, 1993).
26

G. R. E. Bromwich, Pollution and Insurance. 1971
Risk Mgmt. 15, 19 (Ex. 3).
27

Warren G. Brockmeier, Pollution — The Risk and
Insurance Problem. 12 For The Defense 77, 79 (1971) (Ex. 4).
20

*accident' was a sudden event that happened by chance."
Affidavit of Melvin L. Summerhays fl 4 (September 2, 1993)
(Ex. 5). 28 Thus, "[c]learly, coverage for gradual pollution
discharges would be excluded."

Affidavit f 5.

Numerous state regulatory documents also demonstrate
that insurance commissioners understood the pollution
exclusion to restrict coverage.

After considering the

exclusion, the Kansas Insurance Commissioner wrote, "[i]n
view of the obvious reduction in coverage, to what extent
will the premiums be reduced when this endorsement is
attached?"29

Moreover, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, South

Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia —

because of the reduction in coverage —

all

required the consent of the insured before permitting the
endorsement to be deemed part of outstanding policies.30
Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Texas, and Georgia
permitted carriers to attach the pollution exclusion only to
new or renewal policies.31

28

Because the cases relied upon by LaSal fail to
describe fully the drafting and regulatory history of the
pollution exclusion, IELA conditionally proffers this
affidavit in response. If the Court accepts LaSal's improper
invitation to go beyond the plain policy language to
interpret the exclusion, IELA offers this affidavit to help
the Court gain a complete view of that history.
29

Daenzer & Zampino, supra note 20, at 89.

30

Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 41.

31

Id. at 40.
21

Significantly, two states initially disapproved the
exclusion because it eliminated coverage.

The New Hampshire

Insurance Commissioner, in a 1970 press statement, announced
disapproval of the exclusion because it excluded coverage
that otherwise might be available on an occurrence basis; and
the Vermont Insurance Commissioner initially disapproved the
exclusion as well.32

Obviously, if the exclusion were merely

a "clarification" that did not restrict or limit coverage,
these regulatory actions would have been unnecessary.

It was

only because the exclusion eliminated coverage that state
insurance commissioners took these steps.
Ultimately, however, the entire historical debate is
irrelevant to the decision before this Court.

Interpretation

of the plain language of the insurance contract according to
the principles established by Utah courts can lead to but one
conclusion:

that the contract of insurance purchased by

LaSal did not contemplate insurance coverage for property
contamination caused by gasoline gradually dispersed through
the policyholders corroded piping.
II.

THE GRADUAL "DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR ESCAPE" OF
GASOLINE FROM A CORRODED UNDERGROUND PIPE CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED "SUDDEN."
LaSal argues in the alternative that, even if "sudden"

is properly interpreted to contain a temporal element, the
gradual leakage stemming from the corrosion of LaSal's
32

Id. at 43.
22

underground line was somehow temporally "sudden."

LaSal

attempts to achieve this sleight-of-hand by contending that
neither the length of time during which the leakage occurs#
nor the volume of pollutants released, nor the process by
which the release occurs is pertinent to whether the event
resulting in contamination was "sudden."

According to LaSal,

the only relevant inquiry is whether, at the instant when the
final molecules of the pipe wall gave way, the so-called
"fracture moment," the initial contact between gasoline and
soil was temporally "sudden."33
What LaSal's analysis ignores, however, is that this
Court will not impose "a force[d] or strained construction"
on a contractual term in order to create ambiguity.

Auto

Leasing Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d
264, 266 (1958).

Nor will this Court permit "a

hypertechnical distortion of language not in accordance with
the meaning intended by the insurance contract."

Marriot v.

Pacific Nat'l Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d
981, 983 (1970).

LaSal's arguments torture the policy

language and would wholly eradicate any independent meaning
of the word "sudden."
LaSal first argues that the length of time during which
a discharge occurs is irrelevant to the discharge's temporal
suddenness.

Such a construction, however, ignores the

language of the exclusion.
33

The exception restores coverage

LaSal Brief at 43.
23

for pollution events only where "the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape" —

not the "fracture moment" —

"sudden and accidental."

is both

LaSal's contention that the

operative "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is merely
the initial instant of contact between contaminant and
environment does violence to the plain language of the
insurance contract.
Every event has a beginning.

The formation of the Grand

Canyon began in one moment during which the accumulated
effect of water, wind, sun and the elements caused the first
particle of rock to separate from the earth.

To consider

such an event "sudden" because the precise point at which
that first, inevitable separation occurred was "of abrupt or
unexpected onset"34 makes a mockery of the concept.
Likewise, LaSal's argument would neutralize the plain meaning
of the contract.

See Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v.

Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423, 1428 (1st Cir.
1991)("From a microanalytical viewpoint, almost any event can
be labelled unexpected, since history probably never repeats
itself precisely.

But such an approach would eviscerate the

exclusion for pollution.")35
34

LaSal Brief at 32.

35

LaSal quotes only selectively from other cases to
support this contention. For example, in Belleville Indus.,
555 N.E.2d at 573 n.6, Massachusetts' highest court
"decline[d] to speculate on the proper construction of the
exception, if a release or discharge, initially both
accidental and sudden, continues for an extended period. As
(continued...)
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Further, LaSal's argument that the duration of the
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is irrelevant
ignores the weight of the many decisions which have held
that, because "sudden" has a temporal element, routine
discharges of pollutants or contaminants over an extended
period are barred from coverage by the pollution exclusion.
35

(. • .continued)
the discharge or release continues, at some point,
presumably, it would likely cease to be . . . sudden (even in
the sense of unexpected).11 Similarly, the California Court
of Appeal in Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal.
App. 4th 715, 15 Cal Rptr. 2d 815 (1993), qualified the
dictum relied upon by LaSal: "If a sudden and accidental
[event] continues for a long time, at some point it ceases to
be sudden or accidental." 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
Additionally, the New York intermediate appellate cases
relied upon by LaSal are clearly in conflict with the
pronouncements of that state7s highest court. In both Powers
Chemco, 542 N.E.2d at 1302, and Technicon, 542 N.E.2d at
1050, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the
"sudden" and "accidental" prongs of the exception to the
exclusion are independent requirements which must both be
satisfied in order for coverage to be restored. The cases
relied upon by LaSal clearly ignore that requirement.
36

See, e.g., Belleville Indus., 938 F.2d at 1429-30
("sudden and accidental" exception bars coverage attributable
to gradual pollution; no coverage for pollution occurring
over a period of years); AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d at 142829 (release or discharge over a period of years not "sudden"
despite insured's attempt to represent discharge as sudden or
accidental ruptures of individual containers); Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laudick, 859 P.2d 410, 412-13 (Kan. Ct. App.
1993) (long term leak from underground storage tank is not
"sudden"), review denied (Kan. November 9, 1993); Upjohn Co.,
476 N.W.2d at 394-95 (no coverage where manufacturing byproduct was pumped into a leaking underground storage tank in
nine batches over a month-long period); Technicon Elecs., 542
N.E.2d at 129 (industrial waste discharged for six years not
"sudden"); Waste Management. 340 S.E.2d at 382-83 (no
coverage where contaminants were disposed of at a landfill
over a number of years); ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 215-16 (where pollution resulted from corroded underground
(continued...)
25

The Gridlev court implicitly recognized that the term
"sudden" cannot be fairly interpreted within the context of
the exception to the exclusion without some reference to the
duration and volume of the "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape."

In Gridley, the underground line leak at issue was

a "clean break" caused by shifting of the area where the pipe
was located.

828 P.2d at 525. This Court distinguished the

situation before it from the situation where "the break was
caused by corrosion or deterioration which would have
resulted in a gradual drip or trickle from the line."

Id. at

36

(. . .continued)
storage tank, "sudden does not mean gradual"); Pozzuoli, 21
Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (long-term gasoline leak from underground
storage tank is not "sudden"); Borer-Warner Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 174 A.D.2d 24, 577 N.Y.S.2d 953

(disposal of

waste over periods ranging from two years to four decades not
"sudden"), review denied, 80 N.Y.2d 751, 600 N.E.2d 632, 587
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1992); Harlevsville Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W. Harp
& Sons, Inc., 305 S.C. 492, 409 S.E.2d 418, 420 (App.
1991)(gasoline leak from negligently installed underground
pipe union lasting between fourteen and thirty days is not
"sudden"), cert, dismissed, 419 S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 1992); Mays
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 103 Or. App. 578, 799 P.2d 653,
655, 657 (1990) (exclusion bars coverage for release of
wastes over ten year period as a regular part of business
operations), rev, denied, 311 Or. 150, 806 P.2d 128 (1991);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d
212, 214 (1985) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for
discharges released "regularly over a period of many years"),
rev, denied, 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986); Barmet of
Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 202
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (no coverage where frequency of gas
emissions ranged from occasional to once or twice a week);
Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
557 A.2d at 403 (no "sudden" discharge where methane gas
emanated from landfill "for some time"); Techallov Co. v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820, 827 (1984)
(no coverage for "regular or sporadic [discharge] . . . over
a period of 25 years"), rev, denied, 338 E.D. Allocatur Dkt.
1985 (Pa. Oct. 31, 1985).
26

527 (emphasis added).

That is precisely the situation

currently before this Court.
Other courts have agreed with the trial court and with
this Court's dictum in Gridley that leakage stemming from
corrosion of underground storage tanks cannot be temporally
"sudden."

See, e.g., ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

219 ("Corrosion is, by definition, a gradual process.").37
37

LaSal's suggestion that the interpretation of the
words "sudden and accidental" in old boiler and machinery
policies to include gradual deterioration of equipment may be
imported wholesale into the interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause is wholly without merit. The term "sudden,"
as employed in those polices, has a purpose wholly different
from that of the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion.
Boiler and machinery policies protect insureds against
liability arising out of damage to equipment. See 10A G.
Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 42.385 at 496-98 (rev. ed.
1982). Thus, "sudden" modifies the actual damage to the
machine — its breakage or explosion. See, e.g., Julius
Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 830
(D. Colo. 1955) (policy provided coverage for sudden and
accidental tearing, cracking, burning or bulging of insured's
machinery). In the context of the pollution exclusion,
however, "sudden" defines the temporal nature of the
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants, not
the resulting damage. The rationale provided for this
interpretation of "sudden" in boiler and machinery policies,
which specifically obligate the insurer to cover the sudden
and accidental breaking of covered machinery, cannot be
transferred to the pollution exclusion in general liability
policies.
In Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Ins. Co., 53 Wash. 2d 404, 333 P.2d 938, 940 (1959), the
court opined that "[i]t seems to us that the risk to the
insurer would be the same, whether a break was instantaneous
or began with a crack which developed over a period of time
until the final cleavage occurred, as long as its progress
was undetectable." This often-criticized, results-oriented
analysis, see, e.g., Victor C. Harwood III, A Case of
Misplaced Reliance; Anderson & Middletown Lumber Company
Revisited, 7 Mealey's Litig.Reps.: Ins. No. 33 at 12 (July
1, 1993)(Ex. 6), cannot rationally be incorporated into the
pollution exclusion, where the parties plainly contracted to
(continued...)
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LaSal can contend that the ongoing and extended leakage
of gasoline due to gradual corrosion in an underground line
is "sudden" is to create a scenario where every "discharge,
dispersal, release or escape" of a pollutant is "sudden"
based on its initial contact with the environment.

Such a

misinterpretation of the unambiguous contractual language
defies common sense and violates fundamental rules of
contract interpretation.
"gradual."

"Sudden" cannot be made to mean

The judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed.
III. IGNORING THE PLAIN MEANING OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
DISSERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY DESTABILIZING THE
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND HARMING ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS.
Any failure to enforce the clear provisions of insurance
contracts necessarily affects the integrity of the insurance

37

(.. .continued)
exclude coverage for all pollution claims, except those where
the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" was "sudden and
accidental." Whether or not the insured could detect, or
even knew of the polluting event is irrelevant to application
of the pollution exclusion. See, e.g., Aardvark Assocs., 942
F.2d at 194 (pollution exclusion applies to "passive
polluters," i.e., those who do not actually release
pollutants); Powers Chemco, 548 N.E.2d at 1302 (exclusion
precludes coverage even where former property owner
discharged pollutants without policyholders knowledge or
consent); Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 379 (pollution
exclusion applicable despite fact that insured was waste
transporter, not operator of waste disposal site); Dimmitt,
No. 78,293, 1993 WL 241520 at *5 (pollution exclusion bars
coverage despite fact that policyholder was generator of
waste oil who sold it to polluting recycler); ACL
Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (pollution exclusion bars
coverage to policyholder who unknowingly purchased property
with leaking underground storage tanks).
28

underwriting process in general.

Insurance involves an

agreement by the insurer to protect the insured against a
specified risk for a fee. Insurance can cover risks, even
very large ones, that can be actuarially predicted over a
large number of insureds.

This vital risk-spreading function

is undercut, however, by excessive uncertainty as to the
nature of the risk assumed.

No insurer can (or would) agree

to cover a carefully defined risk if courts felt free to
impose liability as they saw fit, notwithstanding the plain
language of the policy.38
In short, settled assumptions concerning judicial
enforcement of contracts underlie insurers' actuarial
projections of their expected loss experience and the
resulting calculation of premiums, particularly for large
commercial risks. Distorting policy language as LaSal urges
would transform the insurance contract from a pool of
actuarially predictable risks into a gambling transaction
with the odds stacked so that the insurer always pays.

In

the context of environmental claims, such a profound

38

As the United States General Accounting Office
recently noted in testimony before a subcommittee of the
United States House of Representatives, the projected cost of
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) alone is as much as
five times the total surplus of the U.S. property/casualty
insurance industry. See Insurance Liability for Cleanup
Costs at Hazardous Waste Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Policy Research and Insurance of the House Comm. on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50
(1990) ("Potential Liability of Property/Casualty Insurers
for Costs of Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites").
29

alteration of the insurance risk would expose insurers to
liabilities many times greater than the capacity of the
industry as a whole.
Moreover, if a court were to disregard the express and
unambiguous provisions defining the risks that the insurer
agreed to cover, the underwriter must pass on the cost of
this uncertainty to all consumers of insurance.

The failure

to enforce the insurance contract as written therefore would
affect the price and availability of insurance coverage for
those who do not have the resources to self-insure, e.g.,
individuals and small businesses.39 As the California
Supreme Court observed in Garvey v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.. 48 Cal.3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 711, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 292 (Cal. 1989), judicially created insurance coverage
leaves "ordinary insureds to bear the expense of increased
premiums necessitated by the erroneous expansion of their
insurers' potential liabilities."
39

The Environmental Protection Agency itself has
explained that the limited availability of insurance for
Superfund contractors is based in part on the fact that
"[c]ourts in key jurisdictions have imposed retroactive
liabilities on insurers for pollution damages and cleanup
costs that were never intended to be covered . . . . The
reinsurance market for gradual pollution insurance has
virtually disappeared because of adverse loss experience and
concerns over legal trends in the U.S." EPA, "Superfund
Response Action Contractor Indemnification," 54 Fed. Reg.
46012, 46013 (October 31, 1989). See also J. Kehne, Note,
Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives;
Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 Yale L.J.
403, 423 (1986) (contraction of pollution coverage market
attributed in part to insurers' "fears that further changes
in legal rules will undermine the basis upon which policies
are currently written").
30

In the long run, public policy is best served by
adhering to time-tested principles of insurance contract
interpretation.

These fundamental public policy

considerations reinforce what Utah law requires: an insurance
policy, like any other contract, must be construed according
to its clear language and not distorted to provide free
insurance where none was intended.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, amicus curiae IELA urges
this Court to affirm the judgment below in favor of the
appellees.
Respectfully submitted,
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ADDENDUM A
Cases Holding That The Term "Sudden"
In The Pollution Exclusion Has A Temporal Meaning1
State Supreme Court Cases
1.

Hybud Equipment Corp, v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co,, 597
N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992) ("the word * sudden' in the exception
is not synonymous with the word xunexpected' in the typical
definition of *occurrence'; instead, the word also has a
temporal aspect") (emphasis in original), reh'g denied. 600
N,K.2d 686 (Ohio 1992) , cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1585 (1993).

2.

Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. SCA Services. Inc., 412 Mass.
330, 588 N.E.2d 1346 (1992) (pollution at landfill occurring
gradually over several months of repeated activity was not
the result of a "sudden and accidental" discharge).

3.

Upiohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.. 438 Mich. 197, 476
N.W.2d 392 (1991) ("'sudden' includes a temporal element as
well as a sense of the unexpected") , reh'g denied, 439 Mich.
1202 (1991).

4.

Protective National Insurance Co. v. City of Woodhaven. 438
Mich. 154, 476 N.W.2d 374 (1991) ("'sudden' is defined with
a 'temporal element that joins together conceptually the
immediate and the unexpected").

5.

Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. . 407
Mass. 689, 555 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1990) (pollution exclusion
provides coverage "only if the discharge or release was not
only accidental but also 'sudden,' in the sense of an
unexpected, abrupt discharge or release").

6.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries,
Inc. . 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1990) ("For the
word * sudden' to have any significant purpose, and not to be
surplusage when used generally in conjunction with the word
*accidental,' it must have a temporal aspect to its meaning,
and not just the sense of something unexpected").

7.

Waste Management of Carolinas. Inc. v. Peerless Insurance
Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382-83 (1986) (pollution
exclusion bars coverage for "xcontribution' over a number of
years of contaminating materials to a landfill").

1

In order not to burden the Court, we have not enclosed
copies of the unreported opinions in this addendum. However, wo
can provide immediate copies of any or all of the unreported
opinions upon request.

8.

Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance
Corp., No. 78-293 (Fla. July 1, 1993) ("The ordinary and
common usage of the term 'sudden7 includes a temporal aspect
with a sense of immediacy or abruptness"; no coverage where
pollution "took place over a period of years and most of it
occurred gradually").

9.

Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Insurance Co. , 610 N.E.2d 912
(Mass. April 7, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage
where evidence showed that "the discharge of pollutants into
the environment happened gradually, over a lengthy period of
time").

State Intermediate Appellate Court Cases
1.

Dakhue Landfill. Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, No.
CO-93-905 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23,1993) ("Releases of
pollutants that extend over two decades cannot be considered
'sudden' under any reasonable interpretation of the word").

2.

County of Fulton v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co..
No. 67681, 1993 WL 271807 (N.Y. App. Div. , 3d Dep't July 22,
1993) ("The [underlying] complaints do not allege an abrupt
or quick discharge, but rather the inference is that the
discharge occurred over long periods of time. Such discharge
does not qualify as being sudden")•

3.

Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 427 S.E.2d 913
(S.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("sudden" as used in pollution exclusion
"is unambiguous and must be defined in its temporal sense" to
describe "a release which was abrupt or precipitant"; no
coverage for alleged "regular dumping" of hazardous wastes).

4.

Plasticolors. Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 1992 WL
532785 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1992) (pollution exclusion
bars coverage except where release was abrupt; no coverage
where policyholder failed to show sudden and accidental
release)•

5.

Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.. 616 N.E.2d 988 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 4, 1993) (pollution
exclusion barred coverage for continuous discharge of waste
over four-year period).

6.

Sylvester Brothers Development Co. v. Great Central Insurance
Co. . 503 N.W. 2d 793, (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1993) (because
"*sudden' in the pollution exclusion exception carries the
tempora connotation of *abruptness'" long-term and ongoing
release
of contaminants for over two decades "cannot
reasonably be considered ^sudden'"), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 30, 1993)
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Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. . 503 ^.w. 2d 486
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (alleged gradual and continuous
deterioration of asbestos-containing building materials over
the course of more than twenty years "cannot reasonably be
construed to be ^sudden'"), appeal pending. Nos. Cl-93-24,
C8-93-36r C5-93-186 (Minn.)Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co. . 12 Cal.
App.4th 715, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 815 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.
1993) (a temporal connotation is inherent in ordinary meaning
of "sudden"; for pollution exclusion to permit coverage,
discharge must be abrupt as well as unexpected), appeal
denied (Cal. May 13,1993).
Sylvester Brothers Development Co. v. Great Central Insurance
Co.. 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ('"sudden' in the
context of the policies carries the temporal connotation of
*abruptness' . . . * sudden' means the incident at issue
occurs relatively quickly rather than gradually over a long
period of time"), review denied, 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North Americaf 577
N.Y.S. 2d 953 (App. Div. 1992) ("liability arising out of the
long-term, intentional disposal of plaintiff's industrial
waste was not covered under the xsudden and accidental'
expection to the pollution exclusion": "for a release or
discharge to be %sudden' within the meaning of the pollution
exclusion, it must occur abruptly or quickly or over a short
period of time"), appeal denied, 80 N.Y,2d 753, 587 N.Y.S.2d
905, 600 N.E.2d 632 (1992).
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.W. Harp & Sons. Inc.,
409 S.E. 2d 418 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (gasoline leak of up to
sixty days' duration was not sudden), cert, dismissed, 419
S.E.2d 222 (S.C 1992).
Mays v. Transamerica Insurance Co.. 103 Or. App. 578, 799
P. 2d 653 (1990) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for
releases of wastes over a ten-year period).
Weber v. IMT Insurance Co.. No. 9-437, slip op. at 7 (Iowa
Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990) (" * sudden' in its common usage, means
*happening without previous notice or with very brief
notice'"; no coverage where pollutants were discharged on
ongoing basis over ten-year period), aff'd on other grounds.
462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990),
Chemetco. Inc. v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America, No.
109913, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1990)
(pollution occurring over "a long period of time" was not
sudden).

Lover Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co.. 383 Pa. Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 398 (1989) ("sudden"
means "abrupt and lasting only a short time"), review denied.
93 M.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1989 (Pa. Sept. 22, 1989).
Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (1988) ("[a] ^sudden and
accidental' event is one which is unexpected, unintended and
occurs over a short period of time"), aff'd on other grounds,
74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989).
Barmet of Indiana. Inc. v. Security Insurance Group, 425
N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (discharge of emissions
due to regular and frequent malfunctioning of pollution
control equipment is not sudden and accidental).
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 338 Pa. Super. 1,
487 A. 2d 820, 827 (1984) (no coverage for "a regular or
sporadic discharge over a period of 25 years"), review
denied, 338 E.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1985 (Pa. Oct. 31, 1985).
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Sunnes. 77 Or. App. 136, 711
P. 2d 212, 214 (1985) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for
discharges "regularly over a period of many years"), review
denied. 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986).
Q#Brien Energy Systems. Inc. v. American Employers' Insurance
Co. , No. 2660 PHL 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1993) (pollution
exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for "gradual migration"
of polluting gases).
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Pozzuoli. 17 Cal. App. 4th 856,
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Aug. 3, 1993)
(pollution exclusion barred coverage for leak from
underground storage tank of at least 60 days' duration).
ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co.,
17 Cal. App. 4th 1773 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1993)
("gradual is the opposite of sudden"; no coverage for
longterm leakage from corroded storage tanks on property
purchased by insured).
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Laudick, No. 68990 (Kan.
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage
for longterm leakage from underground tank, since "sudden"
has a temporal meaning, "combining both the elements of
without notice or warning and quick or brief in time").
Krawczewski v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.. No. C3-93-672
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1993) (pollution occurring over a
period of one to thirteen years "cannot reasonably be
cons idered 'sudden'").
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State Trial Court Cases
1«

City of Portsmouth v. New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty
Association, No. 88-E-759 (N.H. Super. Ct., Rockingham County
Sept. 22, 1993) (pollution exclusion unambiguously bars
coverage for gradual contamination of a landfill over a
thirteen-year period: "[w]hen read in conjunction with the
term 'accidental,' a reasonable [insured] could only
understand 'sudden1'1 to mean abrupt")

2.

Atlas Tack Corp. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. . Nos. 91566, 91-5667, 91-5669 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County Sept.
15, 1993) (no coverage where "the contamination resulted from
regular business activity over an extended period of
time") .

3•

Service Control Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., No.
644496 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County Apr. 12, 1993)
(pollution exclusion bars coverage for leakage from corroded
underground tanks: "corrosion, by its very definition, [is]
not abruptr but gradual").

4.

Hecla Mining Co. v. Continental Insurance Co, . No. CV-9187608 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Kootenai County Mar. 19, 1993)
("sudden" in phrase "sudden and accidental" in pollution
exclusion is unambiguous and has a temporal connotation).

5.

Cooley, li I C v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 90-00060
(Mass. Super. Ct., Bristol County Feb. 17, 1993) (pollution
exclusion barred coverage where insured failed to show
release was abrupt as well as inadvertent).

6.

MSM Industries, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., No.
90-6968 (Mass. Super. Ct., Middlesex County Jan. 19, 1993)
(coverage barred by pollution exclusion where insured failed
to show that alleged polluting discharge was abrupt as well
as unexpected).

7.

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. c610358 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County May 17, 1993) (to
avoid effect of pollution exclusion, insured must show that
polluting event was a M/sudden# event/1 as opposed to "
gradual event").

8.

Republic Insurance Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., Nos. 95229 and
95239 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada County Apr. 27, 1993) (pollution
exclusion bars coverage for contamination arising from
insured's longstanding waste disposal practices)^

9.

ACC Chemical Co. v. Alexander & Alexander, liic. , No. CL-14219
(Iowa Dist. Ct., Clinton County Mar. 16, 1993) ("sudden"
includes a temporal element and means "happening, coming,
made or done quickly, or abruptly without warning").

- 5-

Arthur Bleaknev v. California Union Insurance Co,. No, 90-004-18 (Mass. Super. Ct., Norfolk County April 15, 1993)
(pollution exclusion barred coverage for pollution resulting
from policyholders routine business operations and waste
disposal practices).
General Chemical Corp. v. First State Insurance Co. . No. 903833 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Sept. 18, 1992) (a
continuous course of disposal of pollutants over a 26-year
period due to practices in the regular course of operating
the facility "is not sudden and accidental").
Landauer, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., No. 91-5802
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Apr. 24, 1992) (routine
dumping of hazardous substances at landfill over several
years is not "sudden"), appeal pending. No. 92-P-1175 (Mass.
Ct. App.).
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of Menominee,
No. 87-4939CE (Mich. Cir. Ct., Menominee County Feb. 13,
1992) (no coverage for routine dumping of hazardous materials
at landfill over many years).
Rochester Smelting & Refining Co., Inc. v. Merchants Mutual
Insurance Co., No. 91/02683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe County
Sept. 9, 1991) (where wastes were deliberately dumped in a
landfill over a seven-year period, "it would be difficult to
conclude that such discharges were either sudden or
accidental"), aff'd. No. 1495 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 30, 1992).
Aeroiet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance Co.,
No. 262425 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County Aug. 20, 1991)
("the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of sudden is
abrupt, quick, swift, not gradual"), appeal pending, Nos.
A057580, A057812, A059976 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.).
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mccormick & Baxter
Creosoting Co. . No. A6711-07096 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah
County Dec. 21, 1990) ("while the term %sudden' in certain
contexts may mean * unforeseen,' when used in conjunction with
*accidental,' it necessarily assumes its temporal definition
of short in time"; no coverage for 25 to 30 spills of
chemicals over 40-year period), appeal pending. No. A71072
(Or. Ct. App.).
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17.

New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. H. Brown Co. . No. 87-56315-CK
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Kent County Sept. 27, 1989) ("only fair
reading" of the pollution exclusion is that the policy does
not cover damage which arises from normal, continuous
business operations), aff'd. No. 121961 (Mich, ct. App. July
29, 1991), cert, denied, 483 N.W.2d 901 (Mich 1992).

18.

City of Maple Lake v. American States Insurance, Co., Nc.
C4921804 (Minn. Dist. Ct. , Wright County Jan. 29, 1993)
(polluting discharge of effluent from policyholder's
wastewater treatment
plant "was neither sudden nor
accidental").

19.

United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co..
No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Aug. 3, 1993)
("The term 'sudden' has a temporal aspect; only an abrupt
discharge or release of pollutants falls within the
exception"; exclusion bars coverage for pollution resulting
from releases occurring in the course of continuing
manufacturing and disposal operations).

20.

Union Oil Co. v. International Insurance to.. No. 351219
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County Aug. 16, 1993) (no
coverage for discharge from underground storage tank; judge
instructed jury that "(a) process that occurs slowly and
incrementally over a relatively long time Is not sudden").

Federal Appellate Court Cases
1.

Smith v. Hiahes Aircraft Co. , No. 91-16758 (9th Cir. Nov,
1993) (no coverage for claims arising from practice of
discharging pollutant into unlined ponds: "the 'sudden and
accidental' exception to the pollution exclusion necessarily
incorporate a notion of temporal brevity")

2.

Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.. No. 92-3187 (8th
Cir. Nov. 12, 1993) (to qualify for "sudden and accidental"
exception, insured must show that release of contaminant was
abrupt; "ongoing and routine" onsite disposal of wastes was
not "sudden" as a matter of law).

3.

Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.. No. 922910 (8th Cir. Oct. 1, 1993) (no coverage for pollution
where barrels of contaminants had been leaking
at the site for almost fpn years).

4.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Ob.,
Inc.. No. 90-3123 (10th Cir. July 19, 1993) ("The discharge
here was not 'sudden and accidental,' but a gradual dispersal
LI release
toxic chemicals which ought to have been
anticipated i * avoided").

Anaconda Minerals Co, v. Stoller Chemical Co, . 990 F.2d 1175
(10th Cir. 1993) ("sudden" in the pollution exclusion must be
given its conventional temporal definition, which is "abrupt
or instantaneous"; no coverage for pollution that took place
gradually as result of routine release of flue dust).
Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co,, 974
F,2d 754 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1992) (routine dumping and
crushing of drums containing insured's wastes at landfill was
not "sudden and accidental" within exception to pollution
exclusion).
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, v. General Dynamics Corp,, 968
F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992) ('"sudden' must mean abrupt,"
barring coverage for discharges "occurring over an extended
period of time").
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) ("continuous
or routine discharges of pollutants are not covered").
Terminix International Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 956 F.2d
270 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming and adopting trial court's
holding that pollution exclusion bars coverage where
contaminants were released over a long period of time).
Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance Co, , 905
F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir. 1990) ("the phrase 'sudden and
accidental' has a temporal component and does not describe
continuous or ongoing polluting events").
FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 897 F.2d 214,
219 (6th Cir. 1990) ("word * sudden' has a plain, everyday
temporal component . . . a sudden and accidental event is one
that happens quickly, without warning, and fortuitously or
unintentionally"), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
Oaden Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.. 924 F.2d 39, 42 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("For a release or discharge to be sudden, it must
'occur[] over a short period of time'").
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coals,
Inc.. 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[w]e do not believe
that it is possible to define * sudden' without reference to
a temporal element that joins together conceptually the
immediate and the unexpected").
Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance
Co. , 727 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1984) (no coverage for
contamination as a result of "regular business activity").
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15

• A, Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty k Surety Co. . 933 F.2d 66,
72 (1st Cir. 1991) (predicting that Maine will "join the
jurisdictions which accord %sudden7 its unambiguous, plain
and commonly accepted meaning of temporally abrupt").
State of New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("The underlying complaint here, alleging that an
industrial operation disposed of its manufacturing waste by
certain improper methods for close to thirty years, cannot be
understood to allege a 'sudden7 release").

17•

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries,
Inc. . 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991) (pollution exclusion bars
coverage for discharge of pollutants as ordinary part of
longterm business operations, notwithstanding that scattered
instances of release may have been unforeseen or occurred
suddenly), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992).

18.

Northern Insurance Co. v. Aardvark Associates, Inc.. 942 F.2d
189 (3d Cir. 1991) ("exception for xsudden and accidental7
discharges applies only to discharges that are abrupt and
last a short time": no coverage for pollution "occurring
over a period of years").

Federal District Court Cases
1.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.. no.
88-2220C(8) (E.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 1993) (contamination that
"reflects the culmination of years of illegal or at least
improper waste disposal, [resulting in] a slow and persistent
dissemination of chemical pollutants into the soil, "cannot
resonably be termed a "sudden" discharge).

2.

Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Flanders Eletric Motor Service,
Inc.. No. EV 91-186-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 1993) (pollution
exclusion barred coverage for "long-term effects of leakage
from improper handling and storage practices"; "the word
7
sudden7 would not have any meaning in the exception if it is
not interpreted to mean quick, abrupt, or happening withoutprevious notice or very little notice")

3.

Hussey Plastics Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. , No. 9013104-WD (D. Mass. June 18, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars
coverage where insured "over the course of years
deliberately caused its plastic waste materials tu be
deposited at the landfill").

4.

Freedom Gravel Products, Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance
Co.. No. CIV-91-237C (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1993) (pollution
exclusion barred coverage for contamination alleged to occur
over a three-month period, a "non-sudden" event).
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Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. No.
91-2346 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 1993) ("sudden" is not ambiguous
and includes meaning of "quick or brief in time"; no coverage
for groundwater contamination that occurs gradually or over
an extended period of time).
Gould, Inc. v. CNA, No. 3-CV91-0569 (M.D. Pa. 1992)
(pollution exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for bodily
injury claim arising from gradual pollution;
"sudden"
includes a "temporal element, that being %abrupt' and lasting
a short time").
Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. . No. K88-124CA4
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 1993) ("sudden" includes a temporal
element as well as the unexpected; no coverage where
pollution resulted from poor business practices at plant or
from intentional dumping of wastes at landfill).
Meridian Oil Production. Inc. v. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. . No. G-91-167 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1993)
(discharge of pollutants "in the normal course of [insured's]
drilling operations over a period of thirteen months . . .
does not fulfill the temporal requirements for * sudden'"),
appeal pending. No. 93-7463 (5th Cir.)
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.P. Hoffman Mobil Inc..
No. 90-1187 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1992) ("a release of gasoline
over the period of several months to almost two years cannot
be said to be abrupt or sudden"; no coverage for pollution
resulting from leakage from underground storage tank) , appeal
pending. No. 92-7549 (3d Cir.).
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Kansas Citv Fire and Marine
Insurance Co.. 805 F. Supp 905, 909 (W.D. Okla. 1992) ("As
the discharges at issue occurred over a number of years in
accordance with [the policyholder's] intended disposal plan,
they cannot as a matter of law be deemed to be * sudden and
accidental.'. . . Routine discharges over a period of years
cannot be viewed as * sudden.' Likewise, in no event can such
purposeful conduct be %accidental'") , appeal pending. No. 926391 (10th Cir.).
City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., No. 88CV-574 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1992) (pollution exclusion bars
coverage for "a lengthy and continuous course of conduct. .
, whereby wastes were intentionally deposited at the
site11).
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West American Insurance Co, v. City of Southaate. No, 91-17
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 22, 1992) (pollution exclusion bars coverage
where insured had its wastes disposed of at landfill over
ten-year period).
In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination
Insurance Coverage Litigation. MDL No. 764 (E.D. Pa. July 9,
1992) ("^sudden' clearly has a temporal meaning," barring
coverage where discharges into environment took place over a
period of years), aff'd. No. 92-1638 (3d Cir. May 28r 1993)*
Christopher v. Hartford Insurance Group, No. 89-CV-72492-DT
(E.D. Mich. July 1, 1992) (ongoing pollution at drumreconditioning site, including leaks, spills, and discharges
from accidental machinery malfunctions, was not "sudden and
accidental").
State of New York v. Raeco Products, Inc., Nos. 89-1263L, 916015L (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1992) ("long-term, continuous release
of pollutants over the course of sixty years cannot be
interpreted as an allegation of a *sudden' discharge").
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Royal Group, Inc., 779 F. supp,
736 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discharge not "sudden" because waste was
deposited repeatedly over an extended period of time) f aff'd,
(2d Cir. May 14, 1992).
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., No. 901251-A, slip op. at 2 n.l, 1991 WL 323804 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 5,
1991) (insured's "arguments that the word * sudden' has no
temporal component would require the Court to ignore that the
clause in question refers to * sudden and accidental'
discharges") (emphasis in original).
Aeroquip Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., No. CV 904260 RG(Gx) (CD. Cal. Oct. 16, 1991) ("the release must be
brief, abrupt and of short duration to fall within [the
* sudden and accidental'] exception to the pollution
exclusion"), appeal pending, IT 91-56356 (9th Cir.)
Ludlow's Sand & Gravel Co. v. General Accident Insurance Co.,
No. 87-CV-1239 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 1991) (discharges taking
place over twenty-year period cannot be considered "sudden") .
Detrex Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 457 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("sudden and
accidental" does not include events over a period of time).
Peerless Insurance Co. v. Strother, No. 87-91-CIV-3-B0, slip
op. at 10 (E.D.N.C. June 21, 1990) ("a pattern of repetitive
activity" is not "sudden and accidental")
Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co., No. 89-CV-70584-DT (E.D. Mich. May 17, 1990)
(pollution exclusion unambiguous).
- 11 -

Becker Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Granite State
Insurance Co., No. 86-CV-1294, slip op. at 6 (N.D.N.Y. June
9, 1989) (1989 WL 63671) ("[n]or can this court conclude that
allegations of continuous disposal of waste solvents for a
period of approximately twenty years . . . constitutes a
* sudden and accidental' exception to the pollution
exclusion").
C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance
Co. , 712 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989) ("sudden" connotes
"a temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness,
quickness, instantaneousness, and brevity").
Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna
F. Supp. 169, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1989)
broadly, but nevertheless plainly,
gradual pollution"), atfJd, 928 F.2d

Broadcasting Co. , 727
("pollution exclusion
excludes coverage for
1131 (3d Cir. 1991).

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Murray Ohio
Manufacturing Co.. 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd
without opinion. 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (release of
pollutant over seven year period "cannot, under any
reasonable interpretation, be deemed a %sudden' discharge or
release").
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Korman Corp., 693
F. Supp. 253, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (pollution exclusion
applies where alleged leaching of contaminants was not sudden
but rather "occurred continually over a long period of
time").
Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 702
F. Supp. 1317, 1325-26 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ('"sudden7 in the
pollution exclusion includes the temporal component of
briefness, and means *brief, momentary, or lasting only a
short time /w ).
EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 701
F. Supp. 399 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (no coverage for releases
occurring from 1977 to 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 905
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990).
Centennial Insurance Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.,
677 F. Supp. 342, 347, 348 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("pollution
exclusion clause . . . . [is] unambiguous and . . . the
language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning";
waste released on numerous occasions over thirteen-month
period cannot be characterized as "sudden").
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Neville Chemical
Co., 650 F. Supp. 929, 933 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("annual careless
spillage onto the ground surface cannot be sudden").
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Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated hn Insurance Co. r 682 F. Supp,
927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (regular depositing of radioactive
wastes "is precisely the type of activity which the pollution
exclusion was drafted to preclude"), aff'd mem,. 865 F.2d
1267 (6th dr.),
cert,
denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989)
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. G e n e r a i n os t Corp., 667
F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[n]o use of the word
* sudden' or %suddenly' could be consistent with an event
which happened gradually or over an extended time") , aff'd on
other grounds. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4428, vacated in part on
reh'q. 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir 1<^1).
Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 656
F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (continuous dumping of
toxic chemicals is not "sudden").
Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance Co. , 669
F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (pollution exclusion bars
coverage for pollution discharged "at least sporadically and
may be continuously"), appeal dismissed mem.. 838 F.2d 4^0
(6th Cir. 1988).
American States Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587
F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (no coverage for
continuous dumping).
National Standard Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co..
No. CA-3-81-1015-D, slip op. at 17 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1983)
(chemical discharges "over n period of years" are not
sudden)•
01in Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America. 762 F. Supp.
548 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1991) (pollution exclusion bars
coverage for claims resulting from discharge of DDT-bearing
effluent where discharge was neither "sudden," since it
occurred over a sixteen-year period, nor "accidental," since
insured was aware of DDT in effluent).
United States v. Amro Realty Corp., No. 87-CV-1418 (N.D. N.Y.
Nov. 10, 1992) (no coverage where allegations that
contamination occurred over period of several decades
precluded finding that contamination was "sudden"), aff'd.
No. 93-6046 (2d Cir. June 18, 1993).
Downtown Airpark. Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co.. No. CIV91-673-L (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 1993) (pollution exclusion
unambiguously bars coverage for pollution occurring over a
number of years as a result of routine waste disposal
practices).
Upiohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. No. K88-124CA4
(W.D. Mich. June 3, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage
where insured's wastes were deliberately dumped at landfill
over period of years).
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Macklanburq-Duncan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. CIV92-1650-A (W.D. Okla. March 29, 1993) (no coverage for claims
arising from repeated and deliberate disposal of wastes at a
landfill).
United States v. Hardage. No. CIV-86-1401-W (W.D. Okla. April
20, 1993) ("sudden and accidental" exception to pollution
exclusion applies only to discharges that are "both abrupt
and unexpected or unintended by the insured").
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Duro Bag Manufacturing. Co.,
No. 89-161 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 1993) ("sudden and accidental"
exception to pollution exclusion does not apply to the
hauling of waste to a dumpsite regularly over a period of
years).
St. Paul and Marine Insurance Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp..
No. 91-0518P (D.R.I. Dec. 8, 1992) (discharge of insured's
wastes into landfill was neither "sudden" nor "accidental";
"(t)he majority of the recent judicial interpretations of the
sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion
clause held that the word * sudden' unambiguously has a
temporal component and means abrupt"), adopted June 3, 1993,
appeal pending. No. 93-1721 (1st Cir.).
Harrow Products. Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. No.
l:89-CV-967 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 1993) (no coverage where
spills "appear to have occurred in the regular course of
business and cannot reasonably be characterized as abrupt or
sudden events").
IMCERA Group. Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co. . $o. BC
011005, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County
Sept. 8, 1993) (pollution exclusion barred coverage: "This
was an instance of long chemical use, and of gradual
variegated chemical and metallic pollution of the soil and
consequent pollution of the water flowing through the soil
and into the groundwater. This was pollution which occurred
over a extended period of time").
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Environmental Liability and the
Pollution Exclusion:
Why Some Courts Find Coverage
by Bernard J. Daenzer, CPCU, and
Edward Zampino, J.D.

ABSTRACT- Since 1970 pollution txcluswm have been endorsed to These tactics are founded upon accusations that in 1970
or included m American comprehensive general liability (CCL) poli-the entire community of insurance companies perpetrated
cies Insureds frequently seek coverage for gradual pollution discharge
a fraud upon the public and all state insurance commisclaim* as coming withm the 'sudden and accidental' exception to cersioners when the standard bureau pollution exclusion was
tain exclusions They allege not only that exclusion language is amdrafted,
filed for regulatory approval, and marketed The
biguous on its face but that the "history* of that policy language
purpose
of this amde is to demonstrate whv some courts
snows that insurers' conduct has threatened the integrity of the judical
nxess In this article, the authors discuss the litigation strategies ad*are finding coverage for environmental liabilities under
pressing these allegations and evidence that they believe refutes suchthe comprehensive general liability (CCL) policy s pollution exclusion based upon such groundless accusations.
contentions
Editor's Note: This article was submitted m response to the article by
Charles Becker published m the December 1992 CPCU Journal While
Th« Evolution of
this article does not address the accuracy of the survey of case utto made
in the earlier article, it does provide a different perspective on the issue
Pollution Exclusion Litigation
It contains insight into both the issues and the process that surrounds he pollution exclusion was drafted as an endorsement
>he resolution of these issues,
in 1970 and later incorporated into the standard 1973
CCL policy. It reads as follows:
It \s agreed that this insurance does not appiv to
he onslaught of environmental insurance
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the
coverage litigation that began in the 1980s
discharge, dispersal release or escape of smoke, vashows no sign of letting up in the 1990s.
pors, soot fumes, aads, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liqInsureds and insurers continue to litigate
uids or gases, waste materials, or other umtants,
quite ferociously over who will ultimately
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body ot water, but
pay the price of a nationwide cleanup of
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, discontamination resulting primarily from decades of inpersal reiease or escape is sudden and accidental.
sureds' normal operational polluting acts. The intensity of
this battle is understandable. There are. literally billions of
In environmental coverage cases, policyholders assert
dollars at stake.
that "sudden" must be interpreted as "unexpected." It is
also urged that there is coverage under the exclusion for
What is not understandable to many people in the inany unexpected pollution damage, even though the "sudsurance field art some of the tactics used in this Litigation.
den and accidental" language in the exclusion s exception
modifies the "discharge" of pollutants. On the other hand,
Bernard J. Daerue* CPCU, served as president of The Society of
insurance earners contend that "sudden" cannot be
CPCU m 1959 He t$ a past president of the Society's Connecticut
stripped of its temporally abrupt element, and that the
Chapter and a trustee of the CPCU-Harry J Loman Foundation He is
exclusion's plain "discharge" focus cannot be ignored
also a past chairman of the Board of Trustees of the College of Insurance
Some early court decisions interpreting the "sudden
Edward Zampino, J.D,. is a partner m the Neio Jersey law firm.
and
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion
Harwood Uoyd He represents insurers tn environmental coverage
found
coverage for long-term and gradual pollution
litigation.
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discharges. As tune passed, the rationale or those pro-policy holder
decisions was rejected-m some of
the junsdicaons where those cases
had been deaded As more courts
were dismissing insureds' claims
based upon the plain Language of
the exclusion, manv policyholders
and their lawyers began creating
and expanding upon arguments
based upon the exclusion s purported "historv"
Specifically it was argued that an
analysis of the exclusion's drafting
history demonstrated drafting intent to create an exclusion that excluded nothing Some suggested
that the exclusion was deliberately
drafted to be ambiguous : It was
also argued that the regulatory history of the exclusion's filing for approval with stare insurance commissioners showed that insurance

.. .Insureds and insurers
continue to litigate
quite ferociously over
who will ultimately pay
the price of
a nationwide cleanup
of contamination
resulting primarily from
decades of insureds'
normal operational
polluting acts...

bureaus such as the Insurance Rating Board (IRB) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MiRB)
made dishonest representations to
insurance regulatory bodies * It
was argued at every turn that a
public history of speeches, articles,
and comments made by individuals in the insurance business
demonstrated that the exclusion
was not meant or understood to
restrict existing coverage in 1970,
and that the earners present litigation posture is seriously disingenuous

The Integrity Argument

I

n light of their purported evidence of insurance dishonesty,
many policyholders, pnmanly
through the assistance of policyholder amia curiae associations

represented bv the same lawyers that represent individual insureds, have insisted
that courts must find coverage for insureds. They have
alleged that denial of coverage for insureds' gradual
pollution discharge claims
would destroy the "integrity of the judicial system."4
Insurance earners are cast as
chameleons, who told the
world one thing about the
meaning of the exclusion at
its "point of sale" in 1970
and who now tell quite a
different and unscrupulous
story at the "point of ciaum "3
Not all of the verbiage
used is so inflammatory.
'owever, the inflammatory
message transmitted to
courts nationwide has been
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
uniformly consistent—the
^^^^^^^^^^^^^*
insurers scammed both the
public and insurance regulatory bodies in 1970. They told everyone that the exclusion
merely restated then-existing occurrence coverage for unexpected harms, and they now must be made to provide
coverage for gradual pollution discharge claims. While insurers contend that all of these accusations are patently
false, a number of courts have taken them at face value.

The Insurer Dilemma

E

ven in the face of these accusations, for many years insurance carriers did little to challenge or rebut the policyholders' extrinsic "history* contentions. Rather, they
properly held firm to the proposition that courts should
not have to resort to extrinsic evidence when interpreting
policy language They argued that this was especially true
of extrinsic evidence of a far-flung "history" that played
no pan whatsoever in the insurance dealings between a
particular policyholder and a particular insurer.
On top of these objections, carriers correctly argued to
courts that the extrinsic history materials policyholders
were relying on were not even part of the record in a
iven case. Generally there was no discovery taken or
ftfovided by policyholders concerning such materials or
the individuals who generated thent Most frequently policyholder amia curiae groups appeared in cases on a na-

tionwide basis when thev
reached a jurisdiction > ,rtermediate appellate or
highest court Thu* tor tn*
hrst time durine the appelate process, these Amia
raised arguments bas«d
upon extrinsic materials
whose existence was unknown to insurance earners or their attorneys in a
given case
Some earners made, with
mixed success, affirmative
motions to strike such evidence When insurers opposed the insureds'
extrinsic evidence tactics,
insureds and their amici argued to courts that such resistance proved that
carriers were trying to
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
"keep hidden" revealing
^^^•^^^^^^^^W
evidence that supported
the policyholders' contentions and accusations.*
However, as time went on, carriers found they could
not count upon the courts to enforce tradinonal'legal rules
that dearly delineated precise restrictions on the use of
parol evidence to demonstrate the intent of the particular
parties entering into a contract of insurance. These courts
often looked at the insured presentation of such evidence
and did not uniformly grant carrier motions to strike it
More distressing, some courts relied upon this extnnsic
evidence in awarding coverage to policyholders.7 Indeed,
ui light of the policyholders' accusations and one-sided
presentation of extrinsic history evidence, some courts
have labeled insurers "dishonest" and described the earner coverage position as "irrational."*

An Invisible Body of Evidence
ourts that purport to make observations on the "history
of the exclusion have not seen th* complete evidence
of that history. In some instances, a handful of documents
were attached to the briefs of insureds and their amicx curiae. M06t often, these briefs simply made reference to published "commentaries" about the import of the exclusion
written by lawyers who represent policyholders in environmental coverage disputes. These arguably bused articles, which appeared m such diverse places as insurance

C

trade journals, law reviews,
and insurance hagaoon rrade
pubkcanons, presented cerram excerpts of exmnsic
evidence documents. As
demonstrated below, this
"evidence" was presented
out of context
The court bnefs that referenced these articles of policyholder counsel (and the
snippets of evidence* contained therein) also routinely rehed upon self-serving
"'conclusions" set forth m
such articles. Courts were
typically told that "commentators agree" that the
exclusion excluded nothing.
However, courts were rarely
dvised of the partisanship
J these commentators.*
Thus, without reviewing
any or the smallest selection
• • • • • • • • • • • •
of, actual evidence, some
courts made erroneous assumptions about the import of extrinsic "history" evidence
based upon policyholder counsel commentaries.*0 As soon
as one court accepted these accusations and arguments,
policyholders cited its opinion as precedent to other
courts Without making an independent review of the insureds' exmnsic evidence, the observations previously
made by one court were simply accepted by others.11
Thus, a small cycle was created wherein unfounded conclusions about the history of the exclusion set forth in policyholder lawyers' articles were adopted by some courts,
and were in turn rehashed bv still other courts.

gradual pollution discharges
urder the exc *sior\ a
virtual storeroom ot documents was compiled it
included evidence from
(1) leading international nsurance brokers w ho acred
as agents for policyholders
(2) insurance bro*e' trade
associations, (3) prominent
policyholder industry and
insurance trade associations, (4) the federal goveminent, and (5) a host of
major insurance trade publications
This enormous collection of historical materials
f>roved quite enlightening
t demonstrated that every
segment of the insurance
world understood exactly
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
how, in accord with its
^ ^ • • • • • • • • • i
pUin language, the pollution exclusion restricted
coverage How, then, have
courts been persuaded to think otherwise* The answer is
more than a little disturbing.

,the inflammatory message
from plaintiff
to courts
nationwide
has been that
the insurers scammed
both the public
and insurance
regulatory bodies
in 1970...

Belated Insurer Response

T

he above scenario occurred often enough that a few
earners began to obtain and take a very hard look at
the universe of documents comprising the history of the
pollution exclusion. Hundreds of thousands of documents were reviewed They included the drafting history
records of the Naftonal Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
(NBCU), KB, MIRB, and the Insurance Services Office
ISO). They included the records of state Insurance departments across the country. Additionally, because many
insureds were also asserting in courts that they had a reasonable expectation of coverage for the consequences of

Anatomy of a Stratagem: Selective Excerpting

I

t is commonplace that bnefs anng documents or testimony m support of positions do not recite the entirety
of that evidence. Rather, pertinent excerpts are a ted This
is especially so when that evidence is part of the record in
a case. However, use of excerpts to cast a document or a
set of documents m a ousrepresentative light is quite another matter.
The complete history of &* pollution exclusion demonstrates that in 1970 it was drafted and understood as comprising both a clarification and a restnction of coverage It
clarified that *ix\ most cases" there was no coverage for
harm resulting from normal operational polluting everts
under the occurrence definition- It further restricted coverage only to temporally abrupt (sudden) and fortuitous
(accidental) pollution discharges. By focusing on the discharge of pollution, the exclusion also avoided debate as to
what damage insureds expected or intended to result rrom
their polluting conduct.12
Unfortunately, over the years, many policyholders and
their omici cunae have selecnvely excerpted and txagger-

•v^nrrencat '^a&iLirv i?d *r* ^^unon Eacusion Wnv Sum ^ourva :

Kl references in extrinsic
icenais addressing the
nftcation aspect of the exision. References ro the extsion's resmcnve aspect in
»e very extrinsic ma teni were completely ignored.
was then inaccurately arled to courts that the exnsic evidence showed that
e exclusion only clanhcd
isnng coverage.
Of course, courts were esxiaily susceptible to being
isled by such arguments
hen they did not review
le actual evidence, and
ley misplaced trust in and
jliance on the inaccurate
nclusions" sat forth in
policyholder commenines that selectively ex*
erpted these materials to

•s*

..They repeatedly refrained
from mentioning
how these very minutes
expressly described .
drafting efforts to narrow
pollution coverage to the
temporally oriented
"classical accident"
and provide for a
buyback of coverage...

egin with.

Some specific examples
allow.
Drafting History."* One of the purposes of the pollution
exclusion was to stop coverage for normal business poilulon practices. In 1970 it was commonly perceived that
•ounne operational pollution conduct caused "expected"
2ollunon damage. Coverage for such claims was already
precluded by the 'nether expected nor intended" limita*
non of the 1966 CGL policy's occurrence definition.13 This
Limitation was subsumed within the exclusion's further nr*
stncuon of coverage for pollution damage to that caused
by a sudden and accidental pollution discharge Urns, m
one r&pect the pollution exclusion did clarify the coverage
situation.
The exclusion provided an extra fail-safe mechanism,
different and separate from that of the occurrence definition, to produce a similar result the preclusion of coverage for most industrial pollution- However, while the
results of the different occurrence definition and pollution
exclusion mechanisms were similar, they were not identical. Those claims for unexpected damage slipping through
he "occurrence" net would be caught by the exclusion—
artless the damage was caused by a discharge that was
both sudden and accidental.
The March 17,1970, minutes of IRB's Central Liability
Governing Committee (CLGO show that it deeded to re-

turn pollution coverage
from a broader c a i * ^ ^ e
basis back to the more nar»
row classical accident basis.
It commissioned rhe creation of:
a polic\ exclusion
of pollution rhat
would run :o boddv injury and
property damage
should be adopted
for ail general liability insurance
the exclusion to recrpt vollutian caused
inturua when the
pollution mult*
from the classical
accident It was
agreed that coverage should be
made available on
an individual buyphasis added)14

As stated in these minutes.
it was recognized that insureds could repurchase the coverage taken away by the exclusion via a buyback.
For years, many insureds and their ermci routinely cited
only to another excerpt of these minutes (a few paragraphs above the excerpt cited here), which stated that the
exclusion also clarified the coverage situation. They repeatedly refrained from mentioning in their court briefs
and articles how these very March 17,1970, minutes (and
many other contemporaneous drafting documents) expresely described drafting efforts to narrow pollunon coverage to the temporally oriented "classical acridenf and
providefora buyback of coverage taken away by the exclusion.15 Through such selective excerpting some courts
have been persuaded to accept inaccurate drafting history
arguments.
Drafting History "Presumption" Argument Large numbers of policyholders and their enrua have also asserted
that there should be a "presumption" that in 1970 the
drafters of the exclusion had in mind a nontemporal
meaning for "sudden" purportedly adopted by one or
two courts that had already interpreted "sudden and acci*
dental" in the context of the boiler and machinery insurance policy.1* However, those drafters have testified that,
not only did they intend a temporal restriction by using

"sudden" in the pollution
exclusion, they were also
unaware of any decision
that purportedly interpreted "sudden and accidental"
without its temporal element m the context of a boiler and machinery policy.
Long ago, the community
of policyholder litigators
had aiso obtained all of the
actual contemporaneous drafting history documents (such
as the March 17, 1970, minutes, referred to earlier) that
corroborated the drafters'
sworn testimony and thoroughly rebutted any "presumption" of contrary drafting. Why. then, do policyholders and their amxci
onttnue to make a clearly
unfounded drafting history
"presumption" argument?
^^^^^^^^^^^^^«
The answer is quite simple,
some courts are occasionally taking the bait on this argument and awarding millions
of dollars in coverage when insurers do not precisely
rebut it.
Nationwide Regulatory History Documents. For years,
many insureds have urged that the community of state insurance commissioners presiding over the regulatory filing
of the exclusion in 1970 understood it as onhf clarifying coverage. For instance, through selective excerpting, it has been
argued that the Kansas insurance commissioner only understood that the exclusion precluded coverage for intentional conduct. Based on this excerpt, it has in turn been
argued that then-Commissioner Sullivan understood the
exclusion as a "mere" clarification of existing coverage.
On the contrary, the complete Kansas filing documents
demonstrate that Insurance Commissioner Sullivan understood that the exclusion also restricted coverage. He
wrote the IRB recognizing the "obvious" coverage reduction inherent ui the exclusion's language:
In view of the obtneus reduction in cm*r*$e, to what
extent will the premiums be reduced when this endorsement is attached' Wt/f a buybadc be aoailnbie.
and how will it be rated? (emphasis added)17
The RB's response confirmed that the coverage taken

awav by the exclusion
would be subec: to a buvback on an individual risk
basis. The IRB also revised
the proposed effective date
so that the restrictive endorsement would applv
only to "new and renewal"
policies. This responded to
Sullivan's terming the endorsement "discnminatorV'
and to his questioning its'
attachment to outstanding
polices.11
As in Kansas, insurance
departments in West Virginia. Kentucky. Mississippi. New York, texas, and
Georgia would not approve
the resmenve endorsement's
unilateral attachment to
outstanding polices.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Through selective ex^^^^^^^^^^^^^
cerpting tactics, some
courts have been persuaded to accept the argument
that the exclusion was understood by the insurance commissioner of Georgia as merely restating then-existing
"occurrence" coverage.1* In reality, the complete Georgia
regulatory filing documents reflect that its insurance commissioner prohibited attachment of the restrictive exclusion to existing policies as he felt"... the effect of the
addition of this exclusion could be so great."20 (Former Insurance Commissioner Samuel Weese, CPCU, of West Virginia has confirmed that this conditioned approval of the
exclusion indicated that it was perceived as a restriction of
coverage. The Weese affidavit is discussed later in this article)
The Louisiana Insurance Commission also balked at approving an exclusion with this coverage "restriction." An
Aetna employee
.. disnused this matter further with HP Walker, Executive Secretary of the Louisiana Insurance Commission. He said that the disapproval of eh« IRE'S
filing for this ratnetum of coverage was a poliocai
situation, (emphasis added)21
While recognizing the restriction of coverage, Louisiana
did, howevet permit application to outstanding policies
in which the insured signed a letter acknowledging the
"restriction of coverage" Similarly Michigan. South

Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia,
Iowa, and the District of Columbia also approved the
pollution exclusion hiing
upon the condition that the
written consent of the insured
be obtained before attaching
the restrictive endorsement
to an outstanding policy.
Regulatory records from
Texas demonstrate that the
"draftingshiftorV' irttent of
restricting coverage to the
sudden 'tJoom" or 'classical"
accident was highlighted for
Texas insurance regulators.
Texas regulatory records also
reflect awareness that coverage taken away by the exclusion could be repurchased
via a buy back.22
Thus, all of this nationwide evidence (and similar.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
lengthy evidence from other
^^^^••^^^^^^^B
states) demonstrates that
the presentanon of the ''regulatory history" of the exclusion made by many insureds
has been distorted. It is suggested that courts that rendered decisions awarding coverage based upon such arguments have been led astray
West Virginia Regulatory History, Perhaps no source of evidence has been more distorted than the 1970 West Virginia
pollution exclusion filing
scenario. For years, large numbers of insureds and their
amia have been attempting, sometimes successfully, to
persuade courts to accept their version of what thtn-Comrrussioner Samuel Weese, CPCU, was told and understood
about the import of the pollution exclusion. 0
It is true that Weese signed an administrative order in
1970 referring to the exclusion as a "mere clarification."
This seemed odd since the evidence from the historical
West Virginia regulatory files indicated that the insurance
department was advised and understood how this exclusion did change existing coverage.24
This situation is readily explained. Unbeknown to most
insurers, a prominent policyholder insurance expert testified in 1987 about a conversation he had had with Weese.
In that conversation, Weese advised that he had had little
involvement in the 1970 proceedings, which were essentially handled by one of his assistants.* This testimony

cast doubt upon insured
contentions about the- significance of the verbiage in
Weese'* 1970 order.
In a July 7, 1992, affidavit.
Weese corroborated what
he told the insureds' expert
five years earlier He farther explained that his 1970
administrative order referred to the exclusion as a
"mere clarification" only
because of an "assumption"
he had made, and not because of anything that any
insurance bureau or earner
representative had said or
submitted during the regulatory process.
11 did not aenvely participate at
the hearing or in
^^^^^^^^^^^^^_
the prehearing or
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^™
post-hearrng riling
process. Although
present at the
hearing, as Insurance Commissioner, I appropriately
delegated thefilingprocess to others. I was not involved in the discussions of the legal complexities
underlying the coverages provided by the polices
as amended by the addition of the proposed pollution exclusion. I recall entering the hearing with the
belief that coverage was generally excluded for normal operational polluting events'and premium*
charged did not reflect such coverage under the 1966
CCL policy. I also recall leaving the hearing with an
assumption that with the addition of the pollution
exclusion there continued to be no general coverage
for normal operational polluting events. Therefore,
without additional miysxs, I assumed that the txdusm
did not alter axxrtge. as none was intended initially.
(emphasis added)
Indeed if anyone had asked Weese in 1970, he would
have told them that "sudden" described a temporal event
identifiable in rime and place- He also understood that.
unlike the exclusion's discharge language, the occurrence
definition focused upon resultant harm.
4. In 1970,1 understood that a "sudden" event was
one which was identifiable in time and place I also
knew that an "accident" was an insurance term which
contained a "sudden" element In addition, I understood that the language of the occurrence definition

focjsad upon unexpected or un ittended damage *
The affidavit also notes
that the conditioned approval of the exclusion in
VVest Virginia (as in the numerous states discussed earlier), indicates chat those
actively involved in the
approval process properly
perceived the exclusion a's
a restriction of coverage
Weese further disapproved
of certain policyholders' use
of a 1988 declaration of his to
"misrepresent" his recollection of and involvement m
those 1970 events
The representanve of the
West Virginia Insurance
department who actually
handled the conditional ap^ ^ — « —
proval of the exclusion on
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Weese's behalf, Deputy Commissioner Donald W Brown,
has also admitted that the insurers' position is correct He
testified that the exclusion was understood as both clarifying
and restricting then-existing coverage He has also admitted that "sudden" meant "quickly," and that it would not
even be reasonable, as policyholders assert, to equate the
scope coverage of the pollution exclusion with that of the
occurrence definition ff
h is astounding that so many millions of dollars of
coverage have been awarded by courts based on what
Weese and the West Virginia Insurance Department purportedlv did or understood in 1970. This is especially so
when the 1987 testimony of a most prominent insured expert should have informed many policyholders that the
arguments being made in courts about Weese were completelv unfounded

-. .polio/holders have
routinely asserted that
since there was
no reduction in premium
when the exclusion
was introduced in 1970,
there was no intent
to reduce existing
gradual pollution coverage
... this is flatly incorrect...

Premium Reduction Argument Many policyholders and
their amici have also routinely asserted in courts that
since there was no reduction in premium when the exclusion was introduced in 1970, this snows that there was no
intent by the insurance industry to reduce existing gradual
pollution coverage.28 While some courts may have been
persuaded by that argument it is flatly incorrect The 1966
CCL policy, which expanded coverage to include certain
gradual exposures, did not involve a premium increase

for occurrence coverage
in the nnst place Therefore
thee was no reason *o 'debate anv premium w*e*
the exclusion eumirated ad
gradual poilunon v.o^eraje
tn 1970 » LnfomnateU insurers that were not aware
that this evidence * as
buned among hundreds of
thousands of insurance DUreau and regulatorv documents were unable to
prevent courts from being
persuaded by this argument

Public History of
Pollution Exclusion
any insureds and
their amia also argue
that the exclusion was pub^^^^^^^^^^^^^
iidy spoken or and market^^^^^^^^^•••M
ed in a fashion supportive
of their "mere clarification'
thesis. A good example of
that allegation's lack of ment is the uniform evidence of
public statements made by the community of insurance
brokers who negotiated and procured coverage on behalf
of their policyholder clients.
Consider the documentation generated by the respected
international broker.Johnson fcHiggins Qkti) Materials
used by JfcH in pollution coverage presentations to policyholders highlighted that the exclusion both clarified and
restricted existing coverage
Insurance Industry Both Clarifies (And Reduces) Coverage—The Sudden and Accidental Exception*

M

Thus, brokers, like the exclusion's drafters and state insurance regulators, were keenly aware of both of the dual aspects of the exclusion.
A member of J&H's Pollution Committee criticized
those courts that would go so far as to misinterpret the exclusion simply tofindcoverage. J&H recognized that
some courts did this by ignoring the discharge focus contemplated by the drafters and expressed in the exclusion's
plain Language:
our forecast that the courts would argue in favor
of coverage under the General Liability policy even
to d\e extent of mtsinttrprtttng the exclusion has been
borne out [Tlhe couns in their desire to Koid that

the insured ;s covered bv rhe policy
have not realized
that it is the discharge of the pollutants which must
be sudden and accidental and not
the damage or injury caused by the
dxscMrge of the pollutants, (emohasis
added)"

...brokers, like the
exclusion's drafters and
state insurance regulators,
were keenly aware that
the exclusion both clarified and
restricted existing coverage...
In a 1978 survey, NAIB members
called for ISO's deletion of its
restrictive sudden and accidental
exclusion...

Many other brokers disseminated similar information about the lack of
gradual pollution discharge
coverage under the exclusion, including the largest
brokers in the w o r l d Marsh & McLennan. Alexander & Alexander, and
rrank B. Hail. In fact, on behalf of all of its nationwide
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
membership, the National
^^^^^^^^^^^^^M
Association of Insurance
Brokers (NAlB) acknowledged that gradual pollution was not covered under the
ISO CCL policy In a 1978 survey, N'AIB members called
for ISO's deletion of its restrictive sudden and accidental
exclusion. They wanted the exclusion replaced with
broader language that did not contain a "sudden" discharge limitation.32
The broker evidence' is so powerful that some insureds
and policyholder commentators now also accuse die broker community of dishonesty Brokers are specifically accused of creating a false impulsion that the pollution
exclusion created a gap in coverage and of misleading
insureds into spending vast amounts of money for environmental impairment liability (EH) policies solely to
generate commissions for themselves.13 These accusations
should disturb all insurance men and women, especially
those brokers who took the GPCU charge to uphold a
'standard of honor and integrity" and put the interests of
their clients before their own.

Reasonable Coverage Expectations

N

one of the leading policyholder amicu* caw ruers m
the nation, the Chemxai
Manuxacrursrs Association
(CMA), made conrran. admissions in formal submissions to the United States
Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) over a decade
ago on behalf of its wide
membership In a nonhngious setting addressing
financial responsibility requirements under federal
statutes, CMA freely admitted that the CGL policy,
while providing coverage
for sudden polluting events,
did not provide coverage
for gradual polluting
events.*
Perhaps even more dis__
concerting, the head of
•••BBHBBHBHBBI
CMA's specialized Insurance Committee, Thomas
A Caldwell CPCU, published an article criticizing those policyholders who made
"frivolous" claims for gradual pollution coverage in the
bee of the exclusion. He criticized "creative" and coldblooded" policyholder lawyers for Sling such frivolous
claims because all policyholder risk managers and insurance personnel always understood the coverage restrictions
inherent in the plain language of the exclusion.39
At the time he wrote his scathing commentary, this
CMA Insurance Committee chairman was also the director
of corporate Insurance of one of the largest chemical com*
parties in the world. Unfortunately, that chemical company subsequently filed one of those "frivolous" gradual
pollution claims in a New Jersey court seeking coverage
under the pollution exdust *
The policyholder nsk manager association, the Risk and
Insurawe Management Society (RIMS), similarly acknowledged the lack of gradual pollution coverage in formal
submission to the EPA in a nonlitigious setting over a
decade ago. Furthermore, in an announcement of ISO's
then-new pollution insurance policy, RIMS pointed out in
its newsletter; SIMSCOPE, that this policy provided "both
sudden and gradual" coverage. It admitted that "gradual
incidents currently are not covered under standard general liability contracts." In fact, RIMS once drafted its own
proposed pollution exclusion language. RIMS's exclusion

umerous insureds and their amid have routinely
come into court asserting that a finding of coverage
for gradual pollution discharges comports with then "reasonable expectations" of coverage. This is ironic because

conspicuously omitted the
restrictive "sudden" limitation exactly because its
temporal restriction was understood "
Thus, like brokers, major
industry and insurance trade
associations representing the
policyholder community independently recognized the
coverage restricnons inherent in the plain language of
the pollution exclusion. This
recognition was documented years before segments of
that community asserted contradictive coverage claims in
courts.

A Matter of Priorities

r

here are a host of other
examples where draftmg, regulatory, and public
•^^^^^^••••••1
history documents have
been ignored or selectively
excerpted and presented out of context to courts. The sampling provided in the instant presentation, however,
should suffice to make the fair-minded reader take notice.
In the final analysis, the core question is whether insureds
and insurers alike should continue to tolerate patently
false accusatory tactics which, while sometunes successful
in court, truly undermine the integrity of the judicial
process and the insurance business.
Notably the availability of pollution coverage has dried
up, primarily as a result of court misinterpretations of the
1970 exclusion. This is something the heed of CMA's Insurance Committee, a GPCU,
recognued and lamented in his public criticism of the
frivolous" gradual pollution claims being filed by many
policyholders.
The attitude of management is, left spend some
money on lawyers and see if rhe courts will rule in
our favor. At best some battles were won but I am
afraid we lost the war.*
It is also suggested here that the answer to the question
of whether such claims, accusations, and tactics should be
.derated must take the form of a resounding no.
In late 1992, a handful of insurers began attempts to
change the manner in which the extrinsic history issue is

perceived bv litigants and.
hopefully, our courts They
have done this bv presenting courts with a cwofotd
argument. The first argument reiterates the earners"
traditional stance—that
there is no reason for courts
to go beyond the pohcy (to
its "history") to interpret its
language. The language *
unambiguous and the ''his*
tory" evidence is ob^ecnonable, since it is neither part
of the record nor illustrative of the specific dealings
between an insured and its
insurer However, the second argument is that, if
courts are going to consider
extrinsic evidence presented by policyholders, they
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
need to look at all such e w
^^^^^^^^^•••B
dence in fair and full context. A number of party
and amicus curiae briefs presenting the insurer side of the extrinsic evidence issue
have recently been filed with the courts. Time will tell
what impact they have on pending coverage litigation.*
However, it is clear that these insurer presentations are
having an impact on certain policyholder amm curme
and commentators. For instance, not long ago a policyholder amicus curia*fileda brief with the New Jersey
Supreme Court which made extrinsic evidence arguments about the "drafting history" of the pollution exclusion. Thereafter, an insurer amicus filed its own bnef
that demonstrated that the drafting history of the exclusion supported only the insurers' coverage positions.
In a rather abrupt retreat the policyholder amicus then
urged the New Jersey Supreme Court to ignore the amicus
(Urrier's drafting history evidence. The policyholder amicus stated that such "internal" evidence had no bearing on
an insured's "reasonable expectations" of coverage or on
how a court should interpret the exclusion's Language:
..."drafting history" refers to internal insurance industry documents, such is those in Amicus Cunae
Aetna Casualty k Surety Company's (hereinafter
"Amicus Aetna") motion to expand the record. The
vast majority of the drafting history documents
were never shown to the New Jersey Department of
insurance or the policyholder public Except for

those few documents which were
actually seen by
the New Jersey Department or Insurance or the policyholder public, the
drafting history
documents neither
formed the basis of
the Insurance Com*
missioner s approval of the "poU *
luter's exclusion"
or the policyholder*'
objectively reasonable
expectations Thus,
the drafting history
documents relied on
by Defendants-Respondents and Amicus Aetna are irrelevant in determining the meaning
of the 'polluters exclusion." (emphasis
added)*

r

•"

»•,'

M ^ — — — » — — •

'"**»—*•
""•V

X
I— ^
>*

' s

* **

'

A i ' . ' "

v-«. %
••»

" • - - • . - - •

>.

'•

*—*'--*

• . - - V ^ ^ . - r

^

% 9

* \-+.

V .%
" * * * ; ' * •

^A

^e\.

It is almost beyond irony
that the authors of the above
court submission denouncing drafting history as "irrelevant" before the New
Jersev Supreme Court are
the same authors who. in
numerous other policyholder amicus briefs, have insisted that courts must look at
drafting history evidence. It
\5 these same authors who
have urged courts to find
coverage so as to protect the
"integrity" of the judicial
svstem. ft is also these same
^^^^^^^^^^^^_
authors who publish com*
^^^^^^^^^^^^^™
mentanes (which are routinely cited to courts) lambasting insurance companies under titles decrying their
"dishonesty." It appears that certain insured proponents
of "history'' evidence want courts to look at it only ii it can
be presented unilaterally and inaccurately.41
t h e final irony is that the amicus curiae entity frequently
utilized by these authors and others when making such
allegations and accusations is represented to courts as
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.. .It is respectfully
submitted here that, if the
"integrity" of the judicial process
is at risk, as those representing
insureds have repeatedly alleged,
it has certainly not been put
thereby insurers...

being "nonpartisan " On
the contrary this p^Ucvholder amicu< hier which
also congratulates irseir m
court pap*r5 for its 'vigilance" in protecting the
integrity of the judical svstem, is lavashiv funded bv
the policyholder community, including policyholders
litigating these very coverage issues.42
A number of other policyholders are now vehemently objecting to earners'
recent presencanons of the
very categories of extrinsic
evidence they and thetr
amia have incessantly
pressed upon the courts for
so long. They understand
that an undistorted "history7' of the exclusion actually
corroborates the restrictions
set forth in its plain language—and seek to block
courts' consideration of
that evidence in fair and
full context.*5
It is respectfully submitted here that, if the "integrity" of the judicial process is
at risk, as those representing
insureds have repeatedly
alleged, it has certainly not
been put there by insurers.

Conclusion

I

n an ideal world, a discussion of this nature
would not be necessary
Litigants would be content
to let courts interpret the
language set forth in black and white in a policy. If a
court wished to resolve a perceived ambiguity, it would
consider only direct evidence bearing on the intent and
reasonable expectations of the particular parties to a contract of insurance. Notably, i* was those representing policyholders who first put forth history" arguments m
attempts to create an aura of ambiguity before courts

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^^^m

even determined whether policy language was so unclear
as co prevent insureds from understanding the bounds of
their coverage. Seemingly made overconfident by theu
success in persuading some courts to accept their ver*
sion of the history of the exclusion, some also saw fit to
heighten unfounded ad homintm accusations.
Regrettably a good deal of damage has already been
done. A body of case law founded upon acceptance of

these accusations has been handed down A bodv of
publications elaborating upon these charges ha* formulated negative public perception In the long run. ooticvhoiders, insurers, the judicial system, and the insurance
industry would ail be better served bv the straightforward advocacy and good faith dealings that have Historically underpinned insurance coverage disputes m the
business world. •
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THE "FRIVOLITY" OF POLICYHOLDER
GRADUAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE CLAIMS
(Everything carriers should want to know about pollution exclusion generic discovery, and shouldn't be afraid to ask)
By
Victor C Harwood, m
Brian J. Coyle
Edward Zampino
[Editor's Note: The authors' law firm, Harwood Lloyd, is located in Hackensack,
New Jersey. It defends environmental insurance lawsuits on behalf of insurance companies.
Victor C. Harwood, III and Brian J. Coyle are partners of the firm and head its environ*
mental department Edward Zampino is a senior associate of the firm. The personal
"editorial" observations of the authors do not necessarily represent the viewpoint of any
carrier the firm represents. Responses to this commentary are welcome.]
Picture for a moment a
major figure in the insurance
community stepping up to a
spotlit podium. He admonishes
CGL policyholders regarding
their pursuit of coverage for
gradual environmental contamination claims made against CGL policies containing a pollution exclusion with an
exception affording coverage only for "sudden and accidental" pollution discharges. This
speaker also strongly admonishes the courts in no uncertain terms for resolving some of those
claims in favor of the policyholder.

COMMENTARY

For instance, imagine this speaker accusing the policyholders of submitting:
"frivolous claims to their insurers and the courts in the hope of
finding coverage".
Listen to the speaker further assert that:
"it was clearly noi the intent of either party to the insurance
contract to cover many of these events which were not truly
sudden and accidental in nature".
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The speaker relentlessly insists that policyholder risk managers clearly understood that
gradual pollution discharges were not covered by virtue of the pollution exclusion, but that
nothing deterred their "cold blooded" and "creative" lawyers who try to:
"exploit a lack of specificity in policy wording and convince a
judge that any doubt regarding intent should be ruled in favor
of the policyholder".
The speaker indignantly concludes:
'This does not make the final outcome right".
Who is this vehement denouncer of perceived injustice? Is he the disgruntled president of a major insurance carrier? Perhaps a frustrated attorney for a carrier? You might
be surprised to learn that our speaker is actually the Director of Corporate Insurance for one
of the largest chemical company policyholders in the world.1
Don't be surprised anymore. This policyholder risk manager is only one of innumerable members of the insurance universe including policyholder risk managers, insurance
brokers, policyholder and broker trade associations, trade publication authors, state insurance
commissioners, and policy drafters who have known from the very inception of the pollution
exclusion in and around 1970 that gradual pollution discharges were not, and were never
meant to be, covered under a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion. They were also well
aware that only an Environmental Impairment Liability (MEIL") policy could plug the gradual
pollution discharge "gap" created by the pollution exclusion.
Unfortunately policyholders have been able to convince some courts to the contrary
by proffering misleading arguments based upon a handful of extrinsic documents propped up
by semantical confusion, many of which have appeared in the pages of this publication. Policyholders and brokers are no doubt thrilled to find these "gifts" of coverage from certain
members of the judiciary, but they are not always surprised by the generosity of the courts.
For instance, after one of the earlier favorable "policyholder" decisions in the country was
rendered by a New Jersey trial court judge2, a member of the pollution committee of broker,
Johnson & Higgins, observed they had already predicted that courts would do anything to
find coverage, even if it meant misinterpreting the plain language of the policy exclusion.
. . . our forecast that the courts would argue in favor of coverage under the General Liability policy even to the extent of
misinterpreting the exclusion has been borne out.3
Johnson & Higgins also immediately recognized a major flaw in the comprehension
and reasoning exhibited in such decisions, which improperly focused on pollution damage
rather than the pollution discharge.
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. . . the courts in their desire to hold that the insured is covered
by the policy have not realized that it is the discharge of the
pollutants that must be sudden and accidental and not the damage or injury caused by the discharge of the pollutants, (emphasis added)4
Policyholders have flooded the insurance literature forum with fantastical ramblings
on 'The World According To The West Virginia Commissioner Filings". They make untenable contentions that the drafting history of the pollution exclusion somehow supports their
case. They utter pleas of ignorance regarding their lack of understanding of the restrictive
nature of the pollution exclusion. Unfortunately, some carriers have shied away from generic
discovery efforts, burying their heads in the sand while simultaneously being sandbagged into
believing the policyholder myth that generic discovery is against them.
A great deal of credit is due to aggressive carriers who have permitted their counsel
to meet the generic discovery challenge generated by policyholders' contentions as to the
content of generic discovery materials. Thus, we have been able to pursue generic discovery
projects involving several hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, memoranda, minutes, letters, speeches, articles, books, and other writings generated by the broker community,
Insurance Service Organization (ISO), trade publications, policyholder industry and insurance
associations, state insurance commissions, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
the like. While consistently confident that the plain language of the pollution exclusion is
not remotely ambiguous, these carriers have recognized that the courts have been mistakenly
and unduly influenced by the policyholders' presentation of the import of certain extrinsic
evidence.
To paraphrase a famous quote which requires no footnote, "we hold this truth to be
self-evident": the pollution exclusion language is clear and unambiguous in excluding
coverage for gradual pollution discharges. However, if your state considers extrinsic
evidence and finds gradual pollution coverage in favor of the policyholders, it is because the
courts have not been properly informed. Unless you can guarantee that extrinsic evidence
will not be admitted in court, you had better be ready to confront it. We hope that the
evidence presented in this article will encourage others not only to negate extrinsic evidence
arguments raised by policyholders but to aggressively go after decisive wins, if necessary, on
the very extrinsic evidence battlefield where policyholders, until now, have always felt very
much at home.
1. DRAFTING HISTORY: THE POLICYHOLDERS' UNRELIABLE ALLY
Policyholders have routinely pressed courts to consider their unfounded arguments
regarding the drafting history of the pollution exclusion. While some courts have accepted
these histrionics where nothing in defense has been offered, the fact of the matter is that the
drafting history is one of the policyholders' worst enemies.
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A logical and chronological starting point as to the intended meaning and purpose of
the pollution exclusion is the documentation generated by the men who drafted the exclusion.
It is generally acknowledged that one of the drafters of the wording of the pollution exclusion
was Francis X. Bruton, a member of Aetna's casualty department, who was Aetna's representative on the drafting committee of the IRB (Insurance Rating Board). The IRB was a
precursor of ISO, an organization charged with developing and filing standard policy forms
for state approval on behalf of member insurance carriers. The deposition of Mr. Bruton *vas
taken simultaneously in a large number of environmental declaratory judgment actions.3
Marked as an exhibit at that deposition was a sworn affidavit of Mr. Bruton attaching key
supporting documents regarding his recounting of drafting intent to restrict pollution discharge coverage to the sudden/quick "classical accident".
These important documents establish that the IRB's General Liability Governing
Committee ("GLGC") met on March 17, 1970 to discuss a proposed endorsement to exclude
pollution coverage for general liability policies with an exception for pollution resulting from
a "classical accident". As the minutes of the meeting reflect, the Committee decided:
that a policy exclusion of pollution that would run to bodily
injury and property damage should be adopted for all general
liability insurance, the exclusion to except pollution caused
injuries when the pollution results from the classical
accident... (emphasis added)
That the GLGC decided to go ahead with a pollution exclusion with a temporal "classical accident" exception is reflected in a March 20, 1970 memorandum prepared by Robert S.
Hansen, an Assistant Vice-President of Aetna Casualty, who was Aetna's representative on
the GLGC. Mr. Hansen reiterated that the exclusion decided upon by the GLGC would:
exclude all other pollution or contamination of water and air
except for the "boom case", or "classic accident".
Subsequently, drafts of proposed pollution exclusion wordings were exchanged. The
final draft made it clear that it was the "discharge" of pollutants that had to be "sudden and
accidental" rather than the injury or damage caused by the pollution discharge. In fact, a
suggestion to include in the pollution exclusion language similar to that found in the "occurrence" definition ("neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured") was
expressly dismissed by Mr. Bruton in a letter of June 5, 1970 to a member of the IRB staff
for the reason that such "occurrence" wording would have the potential to drag back into the
pollution exclusion a debate as to the insured's state of mind. This was unacceptable, as the
intent of the pollution exclusion was to avoid any question of an insured's intent and direct
focus only upon the physical nature of the pollution discharge.
The words "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured" when appearing in the "occurrence" definition
of the policy actually appears in a completely different context
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and carries a different meaning than it would if added as a tag
to the (pollution) exclusion. The words "sudden and accidental" are used to modify the words "discharge, dispersal, release,
or escape" and as such refer to a physical event which itself is
sudden and accidental. In the context of the "occurrence"
definition the phrase in question modifies the words "bodily
injury or property damage" and describe a state of mind of the
insured as respects that occurrence of such bodily injury or
property damage. The exclusion, as pointed out above, does
not itself attempt to address to the state of mind of the insured
but rather is pitched to a particular physical event, (emphasis
added)
Thus, the drafters of the pollution exclusion, when wording the exception to it, expressly
chose language ("sudden and accidental") requiring a true sudden/temporal "classical accident". The drafters made clear that the focus of this "sudden and accidental" exception was
on the physical event of a pollution discharge. It was also made clear that application of the
pollution exclusion would not involve any consideration of the insured's state of mind as to
whether an insured "expected or intended" property damage or bodily injury resulting from
a pollution event.
There is no point in belaboring this discussion with illustrations' from the myriad
documents which encompass the background of consistent understandings shared by the
insurance universe of policy drafters, brokers, trade journalists, professors of insurance, etc.
on this temporal issue. It was a long established insurance concept that "classical accident"
or "boom" accident, or just plain "accident", were all described by the plain, ordinary,
common word "sudden", and all incorporated quickness.6
Policyholders will ask:
l)Q: If the drafters intended a temporal meaning why did they use "sudden and
accidental" when courts were already interpreting such language in boiler and machinery
policies as merely fortuitous?
A: That myth has already been exposed. With only one possible exception boiler
and machinery cases pre-1970 attributed a temporal meaning to sudden.7
2)Q: Why did the drafters use an ambiguous word like sudden to express the temporal when dictionaries define sudden as "unexpected"?
Aj, Respected dictionaries, such as Merriam-Websters, do riot define the current ordinary meaning of "sudden" as "unexpected." The first listed sense cited by policyholders
is the historical one, as explained in the "front matter" or usage instructions of the dictionary.
All Merriam-Webster's dictionaries have always ordered the senses of a word historically.
As explained, for example, in Webster's Seventh New Collcgate Dictionary (1972):
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ORDER OF DEFINITIONS
In general the order of definitions follows the practice of the
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL, where the earliest ascertainable meaning is placed first and later meanings are arranged in
the order shown to be most probable by dated citations and
semantic developments. This arrangement applies alike to all
meanings whether standard, technical, or scientific. The historical order is of especial value to those interested in the
development of meanings and offers no difficulty to the user
who is merely looking for a particular meaning (Preface,
Page 5a).
Therefore, when the purpose of using a Merriam-Webster's dictionary is to find the
plain, ordinary, and common (current) meaning of "sudden", one should look at subsequently
listed senses, such as:
5. Hastily prepared,... very quickly made . . . Webster's New
International Dictionary. Second Edition Unabridged (1935) and
(1952).
2a: characterized by or manifesting hastiness . . . Webster's
Third New International Dictionary. Unabridged (1961).
2: marked by or manifesting hastiness . . .
3: made or brought about in a short time . . . Webster's Seventh
New Collegiate Dictionary (1972).
Only policyholders' incorrect use of dictionaries support their claims. When used as intended
by their publishers all major dictionaries advise that "sudden" means "quick".8
3.Q: If "classical accident", or "accident", describes the temporal, why didn't the
drafters just use those words in the language of the pollution exclusion?
A: Considering the way the courts were misconstruing "caused by accident" as covering many fortuitous events [reference Schmalz article, Endnote 6(b)], it would have been
foolhardy to think courts would not treat that same language in the same way they did pre1966. The selection of "sudden" was a safe choice of policy language (or so they thought)
of a plain ordinary word to express the simple thought of quickness, especially since "sudden" was understood that way by insurance men and ordinary people alike. By emphasizing the temporal with "sudden", they permitted "accidental" to express fortuity, thereby
completing the classical accident concept.
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Let us emphasize the dramatic impact of a full and accurate presentation of drafting
history. When confronted with overwhelming generic evidence on this point, one of the
leading policyholder insurance experts in the country, Richard E. Stewart (ex-Insurance
Commissioner from the State of New York in 1970), made a headspinning turnaround.
Stewart completely backed off his opinion that the drafting history documents reflect "that
the 'sudden and accidental' language of that exclusion does not have a temporal component".9
In the very case where Mr. Stewart proffered this opinion, he later testified at his deposition
that:
. . . the drafting documents . . . speak of sudden in its temporal
sense, and as accomplishing a serious cutback in coverage.
Granted. I am not questioning the accuracy of anything in Mr.
Bruton's Affidavit as to what was going on.10
That one of the policyholders' most impressive and articulate insuranc experts had to pull up
stakes and ditch policyholder "drafting history" arguments should leave little to the imagination regarding the positive and powerful use carriers can make of theis category of extrinsic
evidence.
2. THE (BASHFUL) BROKERS
Any carrier counsel who has experienced a deposition session with an account executive or other representative of a commercial broker has probably emerged from that session
with the phrases "I do not recall", "that is not what I meant when I wrote that", or "what is
a pollution exclusion" ringing in his or her ears. Apparently, many brokers do not wish to
have it said that their testimony worked quite negatively against a client or former client.
Fortunately, a wide and wonderful universe of generic broker documents exists for carriers
to utilize. Without exception, these documents demonstrate that every commercial insurance
broker in the country understood that the pollution exclusion restricted existing pollution
coverage and created a gradual u gap" in coverage. Of course, the recognition of the gradual
pollution "gap" by the entire insurance industry and policyholder brokers in particular,
precludes any suggestion that the pollution exclusion merely restated the language of the
"occurrence" definition and did not restrict existing coverage. Here are some samples from
the universe broker documents:
(a) Alexander and Alexander
Alexander & Alexander ("A&A") was well aware since the introduction of the pollution exclusion in 1970 that coverage for "gradual" pollution discharges was expressly
excluded from the CGL policy and that the pollution exclusion created a "serious coverage
gap." Consider the following discussion contained in A&A's National Environmental Action
Team pamphlet.
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Does Your Insurance Protect You? For accidental and sudden
pollution, industry has long been covered under Comprehensive
General Liability policies. But in the early 1970's gradual
pollution was excluded from the CGL. This exclusion represents a serious coverage gap for most companies . . . (emphasis
added)
A&A also had a complete understanding that the gradual pollution gap, not covered
under a CGL with a pollution exclusion, could only be insured by way of purchase of an EIL
policy. This long known principle is reflected in an excerpt from A&A's 1979 Annual
Report.
A&A is developing programs which, using through engineering
surveys and loss prevention techniques, provide coverage for
gradual inadvertent environmental impairment. These programs
fill the gap currently created by widespread restrictions that
limit coverage to sudden and accidental events.
In fact, Alexander & Alexander acquired an EIL producer, Shand Morahan, as a
subsidiary. There can certainly be no doubt that Alexander & Alexander understood the
pollution exclusion and the gradual pollution gap it created in a manner perfectly in tune with
the express intent of its drafters.
(b) Frank B. Hall
Frank B. Hall is another well known broker whose understanding of the nature and
purpose of the pollution exclusion should be examined. In one of its highly informative
publications entitled "Newsletter", Frank B. Hall routinely discussed the nature of the EIL
policy and how it afforded the gradual pollution coverage taken away by the CGL's pollution
exclusion.11 The basic message succinctly carried by Frank B. Hall to its policyholder clients
was the need to fill the temporal coverage gap for "long term" or gradual pollution:
Most companies are not insured against long term and gradual
pollution, but several underwriters now offer EIL insurance,
which provides coverage for claims arising out of gradual
pollution occurrences, (emphasis added)12
But Frank B. Hall had an even stronger message to disseminate to policyholder clients
which was published in an insurance trade publication. In that article, a senior staff scientist
of HaU's subsidiary Risk Science International ("RSI")* highlighted the "brief temporal"
element of "sudden" and blasted as "rash" court decisions rendered in favor of policyholders.
It also stated:
It is clear that despite some readings to the contrary by some
courts and commentators the pollution exclusion in the CGL
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policy was meant to and does deny coverage for claims arising
out of pollution events that are not of a brief temporal duration,
(emphasis added)13
The Frank B. Hall/RSI message ends with a plea for the courts to refrain from simply
looking for a "deep pocket".
It has become a standard part of insurance law that ambiguity
in an insurance contract should be resolved in favor of the
policyholder. It is incumbent upon the courts, however, to
provide reasonable interpretations of language based on contract and not to exploit the inherent ambiguity of the English
language. Otherwise, the definitions section of an insurance
contract will become unwieldy. Because an insurance company
may have the deepest pocket in some pollution cases does not
mean it should be unreasonably forced to empty it. (emphasis
added)
This is not an insurer speaking! These are the words of a broker whose clients are
policyholders! There can be no doubt that Frank B. Hall understood the true meaning of the
pollution exclusion as expressed by the plain wording chosen by the drafters, and spread this
understanding as gospel to its policyholder clients and the insurance community at large.
(c) Marsh & McLennan
All evidence similarly demonstrates that Marsh & McLennan ("M&M") was as well
aware as its brethren that gradual pollution discharges were not afforded coverage under the
CGL by virtue of the pollution exclusion. For instance, M&M's Technical Service Unit, also
known as Clayton Environmental Consultants, Inc., expressly advised in its environmental
"newsletter" that a CGL provided coverage only for "sudden" pollution events, and that only
an EIL policy would afford coverage for "gradual" pollution.14 In its informational literature,
M&M's Waste Management Services unit demonstrated a similar understanding when advising the public that only an EIL policy afforded the "gradual" pollution coverage that CGL
underwriters never previously provided.15
The head of M&M's Hazardous Waste Management Program likewise broadcast to
the policyholder public in insurance trade publications that only "sudden and accidental"
coverage was provided in the CGL and that an EIL policy was required to afford "gradual"
pollution insurance, correctly noting that the EIL "gradual" market needed time to develop.16
Even at the apparent height of environmental insurance litigation in 1990, and despite some
court misinterpretations to the contrary, M&M was still acknowledging that the CGL provided only "sudden" pollution coverage, and that it took time, with Marsh & McLennan*s
help, to develop a "gradual" pollution market after the pollution exclusion was introduced in
1970.17

C COPYRIGHT 1991 MEALEY PUBLICATIONS. INC.. WAYNE, PA

27

MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS
INSURANCE
August 27, 1991

Vol. 5, #40

(d) Johnson & Higgins
On May 11, 1970, shortly after the Insurance Company of North America (INA), a
non-IRB member company, announced the introduction of its pollution exclusion ("sudden
happening . . . neither expected nor intended'*), Johnson & Higgins ("J&H") held a meeting
of its Casualty Department where the exclusion was discussed. It was noted in the minutes
that the ERB was preparing a similar endorsement. J&H prepared a form letter for distribution to its clients expressly advising them that INA's exclusion may have the effect of
reducing the scope of coverage.
In a February 5, 1976 letter, J&H's in-house counsel to its Casualty Department
expressed concern over the impact of a pollution exclusion with a usudden and accidental"
exception on the coverage of a J&H client. He pointed out that underwriters were motivated
to exclude pollution coverage because of litigation directed at "concerns whose everyday
plant operations created harmful exposures'9. He also complained that this exclusionary
restriction was unfair and recommended negotiations with underwriters for a "more equitable" pollution exclusion. What wording did J&H suggest in lieu of the "sudden and
accidental" language? Not surprisingly, J&H recommended negotiating for a pollution
exclusion that barred only "unintentional" pollution discharges. It is obvious that very early
on J&H recognized that the "sudden and accidental" concept was more restrictive than an
exclusion that merely restated the fortuity requirement set forth in the CGL's "occurrence"
concept.
The reader is requested to revisit a previously mentioned J&H memorandum commenting on courts' lack of comprehension of the obvious wording of the pollution exclusion.18 In this same memorandum J&H also warned against reliance upon such misguided
decisions, fearing such misplaced reliance would prove detrimental in the event a court
interpreted the exclusion in accord with its underwriting intent and plain wording.19 The
memorandum concluded by recommending that J&H clients be advised to purchase EIL
coverage when warranted.
In addition to the positions of J&H set forth in the above-cited memorandum, J&H
personnel had no hesitation in voicing public acknowledgement of what courts were improperly doing when handing down decisions in favor of policyholders. For instance, in a leading
trade publication, a J&H Assistant Vice-President was quoted as saying that such court
opinions favoring policyholders had the effect of "completely emasculating" the CGL's
pollution exclusion.20 This J&H executive was making absolutely clear that these courts were
(painfully) abusing the wording and purpose of the pollution exclusion, rendering it impotent.
These statements of broker employees were not the wild personal opinions of a few
individuals. Rather, the understanding that gradual pollution claims were simply not covered
by a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion constituted the formal position of the brokers in
their insurance manuals and pollution seminars. In such materials one routinely finds historical discussion of the pollution exclusion. The J&H pollution insurance manual, for instance,
echoes the drafting history story previously discussed, advising that the pollution exclusion
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came "full cycle" and returned coverage for pollution from a broader 1966 "occurrence" basis
to the more narrow "interpretation of accident".21 Brokers' materials also show an excellent
understanding of the coverage gap created by the pollution exclusion which could only be
filled by a "gradual" pollution policy such as the EIL policy offered by the London market
in the mid-1970's. Typical broker seminars similarly educated and informed policyholder
clients and potential clients that the CGL only covered sudden pollution discharges and that
EIL coverage was required to fill the gradual pollution ugap" created by the pollution exclusion.22
(e) The National Association of Insurance Brokers (NAJB)
As will be discussed in regard to EPA topics, infra, the NAIB, on behalf of all of its
broker members acknowledged that gradual pollution was not covered under the CGL and
that an EIL was the appropriate coverage option.

3. POLICYHOLDER AMNESIA
As just demonstrated, there can be no question that insurance brokers perfectly
understood and broadcast to their policyholder clients and the policyholder public that gradual pollution discharges were not afforded coverage under the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion. As will be further demonstrated, the community of
policyholders itself broadcast the identical understanding. American Cyanamid's Director of
Corporate Insurance was not the only risk manager to acknowledge that a CGL policy with
a pollution exclusion did not cover gradual pollution discharges.23 That only truly sudden/
temporal discharges were afforded coverage under the pollution exclusion was a normal
operating premise upon which business was done throughout the insurance community. Thus,
when policyholder risk managers were routinely "quoted" in trade publications, as will be
discussed, infra, their quoted discussions begin with a starting premise that a CGL with a
pollution exclusion barred coverage for gradual pollution discharges.
For instance, one article describes how risk managers for Republic Steel Corporation
and Hanna Mining Company, never presuming that any such "gradual" coverage was ever
afforded in their CGL policies, got together and drafted their own version of an EIL gradual
pollution policy.24 In another trade publication article entitled "Most Firms Plan To Insure
Gradual Pollution Risks", the quotes given by numerous policyholder risk managers reflected
the normal operating premise that federal EPA insurance requirements for coverage of
"gradual" pollution incidents could not be met by mere proof of CGL insurance.25 Rather, the
risk managers simply debated whether they would purchase quite expensive EIL policies or
comply with EPA gradual pollution financial responsibility requirements by way of selfinsurance. The quoted risk managers represented policyholders such as United Technologies
Corporation, Hexcel Corporation, Koppers Company (and its subsidiary), as well as numerous unidentified petroleum, chemical, and manufacturing companies.
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Some comments chosen from the article sum up the strategy expressed by these risk
managers for choosing either EIL policy coverage ("its expensive as hell") or going the selfinsurance route ("its much less expensive"). The bottom line was, "It's all a matter of economics/'26 Of course, it was never once suggested that the cost (EIL) or risk (self-insurance)
dilemma posed by the federal requirement to purchase "gradual" pollution coverage could be
easily avoided because it was understood that CGL policies existing in these risk managers'
portfolios already afforded such protection. If that were the case no risk manager, obviously
perturbed by the high cost of EIL protection, would keep quiet about such a proposition. On
the contrary, such an astute risk manager would have probably deserved a promotion. The
reality of the situation was, however, that no risk manager ever suggested a CGL solution for
the EPA's gradual pollution insurance requirements because it was simply impossible, illogical, and contrary to any policyholder understanding or objectively reasonable expectation of
coverage.
Similarly, risk managers for some of the largest and most well known chemical
companies in the country began their discussion of pollution insurance with the familiar
premise that the CGL did not cover gradual pollution incidents. Once again, the only debate
was whether to purchase EIL policy protection or go the self-insurance route.27
From the risk manager of DuPont — "We want to self-insure as much as possible".
From the risk manager of DOW Chemical — "We haven't bought the (EIL) coverage
yet, and were looking at self-insurance".
And, from the risk manager of American Cyanamid — "We hope the final regulations
will permit some semblance of self-insurance".
It should not surprise anyone by this time that it was never suggested by these major
chemical industry risk managers that their CGL policies already provided the gradual pollution insurance they were required to obtain by the government. Everyone knew the CGL did
not ever provide such coverage.
4. POLICYHOLDERS' INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS: GROUP AMNESIA
The proclamations of the trade associations and industry groups to which policyholders and their risk managers belonged are also instructive on the understandings of its
membership. Consider, for example, the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., also
known as "RIMS". According to a RIMS paper submitted to the EPA in 1980, RIMS
represented 3,500 policyholder corporations and 6,500 policyholder risk managers.23 RIMS'
understanding of the gradual pollution gap created by the pollution exclusion mirrored those
of the drafters of the pollution exclusion. For example, on April 21, 1982, RIMS and the
broker, Alexander and Alexander, jointly participated in a pollution presentation in Washington, D.C. entitled "RIMS Seminar - Update of Environmental Impairment Insurance". The
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materials utilized at the RIMS pollution seminar make crystal clear that RIMS understood
that the pollution exclusion accomplished exactly what its drafters wanted it to do.
A topic heading found in the seminar materials, "UNDERWRITERS' INTENT FOR
EXCLUDING NON-SUDDEN AND GRADUAL COVERAGE FROM CGL", tells us:
Pollution incidents of this type are normally of long duration
which causes difficulty in determining, in an occurrence policy,
exactly when the occurrence took place, (emphasis added)29
This and numerous other statements in the seminar materials remove any conceivable doubt
that the RIMS risk managers perfectly understood that gradual "pollution incidents" (i.e.
discharges) "are normally of long duration" (i.e. temporal). Thus, when the RIMS seminar
material further stressed that "sudden and accidental" claims "have traditionally been covered
by Comprehensive General Liability Policies (CGL)" there cannot be an iota of doubt that
everyone understood that "sudden", like "gradual", was an expression of temporality. The
RIMS pollution seminar material accordingly instructed its risk manager audience of the
correct conclusion that:
Non-Sudden and Gradual Pollution Claims — Not Covered by
CGL policies.
Of course, RIMS was also correct when it instructed risk managers that the industry response
to the pollution exclusion's taking away of gradual coverage resulted in the creation of the
EIL policy, that product being intended to fill the gradual pollution "gap" created by the
pollution exclusion in the CGL policy.
INDUSTRY RESPONSE
Creation of a new product (policy) called Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance (EILI), EILI provides insurance
for non-sudden and gradual pollution. It fills in the gaps not
provided bv vour coverage CGL contract, (emphasis added)
Is it not curious that a risk manager association, run by and on behalf of risk managers, never even hinted, thought or suggested that a great deal of money could be saved by
advising RIMS members or the EPA that CGL policies already issued to the policyholder
community provided the EPA mandated "gradual" pollution coverage? ;j it not curious that
it was never hinted, thought, or suggested that it was simply not necessary to purchase
expensive EIL coverage or assume catastrophic risks by way of self-insurance because the
CGL already provided "gradual" coverage? No such suggestion was ever made by RIMS to
its risk management audience or to the EPA since it was common knowledge and had been
a normal operating premise for over a dozen years that, since its inception in 1970, the
pollution exclusion covered only truly sudden/temporal pollution incidents.
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In addition to being members of RIMS and participating in the operating premises that
were common knowledge in the community of risk managers, brokers and underwriters, policyholders routinely belonged to industry associations. Consider the industry trade association, CMA (Chemical Manufacturers Association). According to documents submitted by the
CMA to the EPA in 1980, the CMA was made up of 190 member companies in the United
States "representing more than 90 percent of the domestic production capacity for basic
industrial chemicals".30 What did 90 percent of the chemical industry understand about the
pollution exclusion? In public documents comprising the submission of formal comments by
the CMA on behalf of its membership, CMA addressed the use of liability insurance as a
mechanism for complying with federal financial responsibility requirements. CMA expressed
therein an explicit recognition that a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion could not be
proffered as a mechanism for complying with federal requirements for "gradual" pollution
coverage. It is further reflected that the CMA understood that only an EIL policy provided
"gradual" pollution coverage and, EPA regulations aside, all types of gradual environmental
exposures needed to be protected against with an EIL policy.31 As will be examined in a
separate discussion of EPA topics, infra, other policyholder industry associations had similar
understandings.

5. WHAT EVERY READER OF INSURANCE TRADE PUBLICATIONS KNEW
Insurance trade publications were read and contributed to by policyholders and brokers alike and present an accurate picture of the premise under which the insurance industry
had been operating for many years — that a CGL with a pollution exclusion did not cover
gradual pollution discharges. For example, contemporaneously with the filing of the IRB
pollution exclusion with state insurance commissioners in 1970, the insurance trade publication, the John Liner Letter, addressed the impact of the new exclusion, immediately recognizing that the "sudden and accidental" exception of the exclusion pertained to the pollution
discharge. The John Liner Letter also immediately recognized that the exclusion as described
in the IRB announcement "obviously" constituted a reduction in coverage from that coverage
previously afforded under the CGL.32
In April 1971, Risk Management magazine carried an article pointing out the "limited
extent of coverage'' carriers were now affording for pollution liability claims. It also observed:
What seems to be the intent is to- provide for some very short
term phenomenon . . . (emphasis added)13
In 1973, the Weekly Underwriter published a three part article regarding the then new
CGL policy form, which incorporated into the policy the pollution exclusion which heretofore had to be added to a policy by separate endorsement. That article, authored by Bernard
J. Daenzer, President of the national brokerage firm, Wohlreich & Anderson Agencies, similarly
highlighted that the exception to the pollution exclusion focused on the pollution "discharge".
The author also expressly noted the temporal nature of "sudden", distinguishing this "sudden"
requirement from the additional "accidental" requirement of the wording.
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. . . if the discharge is not sudden and accidental, there is no
coverage in the basic policy. It must be both sudden and
accidental, not either sudden or accidental.34
In another Weekly Underwriter article, Daenzer, like so many others, recognized the gradual
pollution "gap" created by the pollution exclusion's reduction in coverage.
'The non-marine market has been very sluggish in plugging the
gap for gradual pollution — land, air, water — not now in the
standard CGL or for the sudden and accidental exposure where
it has been excluded."35
In November, 1979, one author pointedly explained the long standing knowledge of
the insurance industry that this gap was a gradual gap, giving the example of "slow leakage".36 Thus, the author recommended the use of EIL to fill the "gradual pollution" gap.
Going beyond acknowledging the mere premise that the pollution exclusion barred
gradual pollution coverage, trade publication authors were just as aware as risk managers and
brokers37 that courts rendering environmental insurance decisions in favor of policyholders
were doing so without basis and in contradiction of the express and clear understanding of
the entire insurance community. In discussing the weakening of the pollution insurance
market available to help business meet EPA mandated requirements, one trade publication
author succinctly noted that a cause of this problem was coverage awards made by courts
without any basis in the insurance contract.
'The bottom dropped out of both types of coverage when courts
began awarding coverage when none was written . . .". (emphasis added)36
Regarding the pollution exclusion and its "sudden and accidental" exception, the obvious "instantaneous" temporal nature of "sudden" was highlighted by the author.
In this form, pollution or contamination is covered if it is sudden
or instantaneous, not gradual, (emphasis added)39
A director of environmental risk management services for the Corroon & Black brokerage
also recognized in another trade publication the unfair treatment afforded to policy wording
by certain courts.
Originally, comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies
sought to exclude all claims arising from pollution that were not
sudden and accidental. Recent court decisions, however, have
awarded damages to insureds even though the pollution event
was clearly not sudden or accidental. These cases significantly
broadened the coverage provided under the CGL policy.
(emphasis added)40
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Along this identical line, in May 1984, another trade article noted that such court decisions
ran afoul of the plain wording of the policy and the industry's common knowledge of the
exclusion's "unequivocal" bar of gradual pollution coverage.
While that language appears to be unequivocal, the courts have
now in a scries of cases determined that gradual pollution is
covered in many instances because (of) a variety
of . . . interpretations, (emphasis added)41
While only a small sampling of the large number of trade publications expressing
these propositions has been mentioned herein, it amply demonstrates that the articles being
published by insurance trade publications were completely in accord with the intent of the
drafters of the pollution exclusion to bar coverage of gradual pollution. Their message was
also in accord with the common knowledge of all brokers and policyholders procuring and
purchasing CGL policies containing the pollution exclusion — i.e. that only truly sudden (and
not gradual) pollution discharges were afforded coverage.
6. THE EPA REGULATIONS: POLICYHOLDERS CHAMPION CARRIERS*
POSITIONS
Certain documents generated by the insurance industry in response to the federal EPA
financial responsibility requirements have been previously discussed. The instant discussion
will focus on early formal analyses made by the EPA reflecting how the EPA understood a
"sudden" pollution event and how that was distinct from a "non-sudden" or "gradual" pollution event. This discussion will then target a sampling of the formal comments submitted
by the insurance community in response to the EPA request for public comments regarding
pollution insurance issues. As will be seen, carriers could not have had better advocates than
the policyholder voices themselves for the proposition that the pollution exclusion barred
coverage for gradual pollution discharges.
In April of 1980, the EPA generated one of a number of "Background Documents"
regarding the financial requirements mandated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) in 1976/ a The EPA recognized that the CGL provided coverage for "sudden
events", but that "non-sudden" or "gradual" events were not afforded under the CGL.43
What, then, did the EPA mean by a "sudden" event and how was "sudden" distinguished
from "non- sudden99 coverage? Firstly, and as will be seen continuously throughout EPA
records, "non-sudden" was used interchangeably with "gradual". Secondly, the EPA's distinction between "sudden" and "gradual" was one of pure temporality - a "sudden" pollution
event was one of short duration and a "gradual" pollution event was long term in nature.
Appendix B of the EPA Background Document comprises an intensive case study of pollution events, separating them into these two categories - "sudden" and "gradual".
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ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE
TREATMENT. STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL SITES
Incidents on sites where hazardous waste was knowingly received or managed were extremely varied. Incidents were both
sudden and gradual; they occurred both on manufacturing sites
and on independent commercial waste management sites; they
occurred on abandoned and on operating sites. Based on a
review of the damage reports, the incidents have been grouped
into the following categories to facilitate their analysis:
Sudden:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Overflow of lagoons due to rain
Collapse of dikes supporting lagoons
Explosion/fire or toxic fumes
Spills or material discharge to the ground

Gradual:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Dumping on ground or burial of untreated wastes
Leaks from unlined ponds
Continual overflowing of lagoons
Leaking drums/tanks without back-up containment for wastes
Leaks during production or treatment of wastes44

Tables and charts in the EPA's Background Document utilize these identical temporal categories.45
Thus, the EPA quite logically included in the category of "sudden'* events things that
happened quickly — such as an explosion, a spill, or a collapse. This analysis in the 1980's
is quite in accord, by the way, with the long standing insurance concept of the "boom"
accident or the "classical accident" and the drafting intent to use "sudden" as expressing that
concept within the pollution exclusion in 1970. The EPA also quite logically grouped under
the "gradual" category events of long term duration such as leaking drums, continual overflows and burial/dumping of untreated wastes.
It is refreshing to sit back and see how ordinary people knew exactly what was meant
by simple words like "sudden" and "gradual". It is also enlightening in this litigious era to
see that the world always quietly understood that discharges from buried leaking drums and
the like were not "sudden" pollution events. Of course, all of these plain and simple understandings existed without the benefit of the efforts of policyholders to "re-educate" the world
that the concept of "sudden" was one beyond the normal comprehension of mankind. The
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EPA, like the rest of the world, simply operated on the common sense premise that "sudden"
events were sudden and "gradual" events were gradual. There was absolutely no mystery
involved.
As evidenced in its "Background Document", the EPA sought input from the insurance community regarding its proposed financial responsibility requirements. More specifically, in its "Request For Public Comments", the EPA asked some very pointed questions
regarding the cost of gradual coverage, the timing of gradual coverage requirements, the
capacity of the gradual pollution marketplace, etc. The responses submitted by the insurance
community routinely tracked the order of the EPA questions. What, then, was the response
of the insurance industry to the solicitation of the EPA regarding how to address availability
and cost of insurance for gradual pollution events such as dumping of waste, burial of
drummed waste, slow leakage of waste, etc.? The responses consistently reflected an understanding that the GCL's pollution exclusion coverage was limited to the EPA's "sudden"
category of pollution incidents and that GCL coverage had to be supplemented with EIL
coverage so as to protect against the exposures described in the EPA's "gradual" category of
pollution incidents.
This article has already addressed the formal comment response of the chemical trade
association, the CMA,46 and that of RIMS, the risk manager association.47 Moreover, the
formal comment responses of individual major insurance brokers were totally in accord, as
would be expected based upon the prior discussion in this article of broker understandings.
However, consider the submissions to the EPA from the National Association of Insurance
Brokers ("NAIB").4* The NAIB informed the EPA that "NAIB member brokers negotiate
the major share of the business-related insurance in this country." On behalf of all its
member brokers (not just "major" brokers), the NAIB informed the EPA that gradual pollution was never covered by the CGL but that the NAIB had hopes for development of EIL
coverage options.
Policyholders, through their industry organizations, also submitted formal comments
to the EPA implicitly recognizing that the CGL did not cover "non-sudden" or gradual
pollution discharges. A sampling of the list of policyholder industry associations who made
such submissions includes the American Petroleum Institute, the American Iron & Steel
Institute, and the National Solid Waste Management Association/9 Thus, the innumerable
policyholders comprising the petroleum industry, the iron and steel industry and the solid
waste management industry also shared in the common knowledge of the entire insurance
community that gradual pollution was not afforded coverage by the pollution exclusion's
"sudden and accidental" exception. It should also be noted that many individual policyholders submitted similar comments to the EPA or expressly joined in the comments submitted
by its industry association.
The EPA was not alone among federal agencies in having a clear grasp of the way
the pollution exclusion operated to exclude gradual pollution. Indeed, in 1970, ISO specifically advised the Rural Electrification Administration (REA):
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First, although the intent of the endorsement is essentially clarification, there is no doubt that the endorsement tightens the
coverage by requiring that the occurrence be "sudden" in addition to being neither expected nor intended. However, this is
an underwriting exclusion which may be deleted for individual
risks under the (a) rating procedure.50
In any event, the bottom line concerning the EPA financial responsibility requirements issue is that no one ever thought, hinted or suggested that the EPA's gradual pollution
coverage requirement could be satisfied by mere proof of CGL coverage. On the contrary,
both the EPA which solicited public comment on gradual pollution coverage and the responding insurance community of policyholders/policyholder associations and brokers/broker associations clearly understood that the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion did not afford coverage for gradual pollution events such as dumping of waste, burial
of drummed waste, slow leakage of waste and the like.

7. STATE COMMISSIONER FILINGS: THE "UNABRIDGED" STORY
Policyholders typically proffer the meritless argument that the IRB/insurance underwriters, when filing the pollution exclusion endorsement with state insurance commissioners
in 1970, did not inform or represent to said commissioners that the pollution exclusion
constituted a reduction in coverage. Rather, policyholders contend that the pollution exclusion was filed solely as a "clarification" and as a mere restatement of the "occurrence"
definition's language ("bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured").
Indeed it was the opinion of underwriters that (under the 1966 policy prior to the
exclusion) coverage for pollution was not provided in most cases because it could be said to
be expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. The IRB told that to the
commissioners in the first sentence of the Explanation.51 It would stand to reason that
pollution damages generated in the regular course of business by a regular manufacturing
process would be something known to or reasonably to be expected by the insured in most
cases.
However, the occurrence definition was not working well. Disputes arose as to
whether the pollution damage was expected or intended, and the carriers were losing some
of those disputes in court. An additional test was needed to simplify the matter that regular
business pollution was not covered — and to get the insured's intent or expectation of
damage issue out of the courts. In that respect the additional test was certainly a clarification
of underwriting intent not to cover pollution damage. That is a far cry from saying, however,
that the additional test would operate just like the old test, as merely restating the occurrence
definition's coverage conditions.
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This additional test would also clarify that policyholder intention or expectation of
damages was no longer relevant in this second line of defense to pollution claims. If
policyholders passed the occurrence test they would next have to pass the "sudden and
accidental'' test. In that sense, the exclusion could be regarded as a restriction on coverage.
However, most of the gradual pollution problem produced by regular business practices
should be weeded out by the occurrence definition. But if any should slip through it would
certainly be snared by the "sudden and accidental" test. Thus, the result under both tests
would ordinarily be pretty much the same: the industrial pollution problem would not be
covered, one way or the other.
Policyholders, however, routinely distort this issue and cite a few documents from the
1970 West Virginia insurance commissioner's file - to the exclusion of an entire universe of
documents related to state insurance commissions across the country which reveal these
policyholder assertions for what they are.
Preliminarily, in discussing the understanding of state insurance commissioners, it is
anticipated that policyholders will argue that use of the word "accident" in the IRB uExplanation" which accompanied the pollution exclusion endorsement filings conveyed nothing to
the state insurance commissioners about the restriction in coverage inherent in the plain
exclusionary language. Accordingly, it is necessary to briefly discuss the historical usage of
"accident" by insurance men and how it conveyed the classical "boom" concept contemplated
by the drafters of the pollution exclusion. The IRB "Explanation" accompanying the pollution exclusion endorsement as filed with state commissioners read in part as follows:
Explanation
Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused
injuries when the pollution or contamination results from an
a c c i d e n t . . . (emphasis added)52
It is well known that prior to 1966 general liability insurance policies usually provided
coverage on a "caused b accident" basis. As demonstrated in the discussion of drafting
history above, the insurance community's use of "accident" had always been one of the
"boom" accident or the "classical" accident which encompassed the temporal element of
instantaneousness. "Accident" was commonly used in the insurance industry as a term of art
pertaining to an event "identifiable in time and place". Astonishingly, policyholders have
taken the meritless position that since various courts had broadly interpreted the word
"accident" in the context of an insurance policy dispute, the insurance comnuu *y completely
threw away its long standing day to day common usage of the word "accident" to express
a sudden "boom" event. Policyholders, mixing insurance apples and oranges, contend that
anytime anyone in the insurance industry referred to "accident" in a conversation, piece of
correspondence, or state filing memorandum, it had to be assumed that such reference
necessarily incorporated the proposition that "accident" no longer conveyed the temporal
meaning "accident" had since the dawn of (insurance) time.
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Quite frankly, this is preposterous. The insurance community never stopped using
"accident" to describe a classical accident.53 If that were the case, the then new 1966 CGL
form could have simply retained the "caused by accident" terminology. Quite to the contrary,
the insurance industry expressly sought to articulate the narrow meaning of "accident" by
switching coverage in the revised 1966 CGL over to an "occurrence" basis. The new
"occurrence" definition thus retained both the sudden "accident" concept and added the
continuous "exposure to conditions" coverage as well.54
There should be no disagreement that the advent of the revised 1966 CGL policy form
was a major event in the history of insurance. A careful examination should be made, then,
of what the insurance carriers (through their bureau) were telling state insurance commissioners in the 1966 "Explanatory Memorandum of Changes" when that policy was filed for
approval. What the state insurance commissioners were being told in 1966 was this — that
while the new "occurrence" coverage included broadened coverage for "exposure to conditions" occurring over time, such coverage was in addition to coverage for sudden events
identifiable in time, i.e. "accident" coverage.
An "occurrence", as defined, includes not only a sudden event
identifiable in time which is characterized as an "accident", but
also exposures to conditions which may continue for days,
weeks, months or even years.55
The bureau also expressly advised state insurance commissioners in that filing that the
new broader "occurrence" definition eliminated the connotation of suddenness inherent in the
old "caused by accident" policy.56 Therefore, when only a few years later in 1970 the state*
insurance commissioners were expressly told in the "Explanation" accompanying the pollution exclusion endorsement that pollution coverage would continue for a pollution "accident",
those commissioners were well aware that an "accident" was a "sudden" event "identifiable
in time". If that concept needed any reinforcement, it was provided in ISO's 1971 filing of
an explanation relating to changes which eventually became the 1973 CGL policy.57
It is, therefore, disingenuous of any policyholder to assert that insurance people (such
as the ERB) speaking to other insurance people (such as the state insurance commissioners)
in 1970 did not understand the usage of "accident" as referring to the sudden event identifiable in time. This is precisely what the state insurance commissioners were told in the 1966
filing Explanation: exactly what they understood by the filing Explanation received with the
pollution exclusion in 1970 and specifically what they were reminded of in the 1971 Explanation filing of the 1973 policy. It should not be forgotten, however, that an "Explanation"
was not necessary to tell any commissioner that the exclusion constituted a restriction of
coverage to sudden pollution events. The clear wording of the endorsement did that.
Use of the word "accident" to capture the temporal/sudden/identifiable in time concept (in contra-distinction to use of the word "occurrence" to describe exposure-type/gradual
events) is well documented in the prc-1970 literature and documents, as discussed in the
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drafting history section of this article.58 Moreover, this distinction between "accident" and
"occurrence", as a point of reference for insurance persons, persisted in the literature after
1970, and continued to constitute an acceptable framework for communication.59
Furthermore, to put beyond any doubt the message given to and understood by state
insurance commissioners in 1970 in the United States and Puerto Rico, an examination of
material related to various state insurance commissions is instructive.60 These materials
overwhelmingly establish that, contrary to policyholders' contentions, there was a complete
understanding by insurance commissioners that the pollution exclusion could take away a
measure of existing pollution coverage.
Consider for example the Kansas' materials. On June 11, 1970, the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner wrote to the IRB acknowledging that the filed pollution exclusion constituted
an "obvious reduction in coverage".
In view of the obvious reduction in coverage, to what extent
will the premiums be reduced when this endorsement is attached?
Will a buy back be available, and how will it be rated?
(emphasis added)
As indicated above, the commissioner also inquired whether there would be a "buy back" of
coverage available. A "buy back", obviously, would not be necessary or logical without an
attendant understanding that the coverage to be repurchased had been taken away by the
exclusion.
The Commissioner also inquired, since the endorsement was "discriminatory", why
the endorsement should be attached to outstanding policies. The commissioner felt that such
a restrictive endorsement should not be unilaterally superimposed upon an existing policy. In
response to the Kansas Commissioner's letter, the IRB revised the proposed effective date so
that the endorsement would apply only to "new and renewal" policies. The IRB also confirmed on June 18, 1970 that the restricted coverage would be subject to a "buy back" [on
an individual risk basis with an (a) rate determined in accordance with the hazard of the risk].
Other states, like Kansas, conditioned approval of the filing upon carriers attaching
the endorsement only to new and renewal policies. These states included Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Texas, and Georgia. If there was no similar perceived effect on coverage,
why limit the exclusion's application to new or renewed policies? A May 29, 1970 letter
from the Georgia Insurance Commission to the IRB provides the answer, the insurance
commission noting that "the effect of the addition would be so great".
Surely, there cannot be any doubt that the State of Kansas' Insurance Commission
fully understood the "obvious reduction in coverage" expressed in the plain wording of the
pollution exclusion. Moreover, Kansas' Commissioner suffered from no confusion whatsoever purportedly generated by the "Explanation" attached to the pollution exclusion endorsement advising him that pollution coverage would continue for a pollution "accident". Based
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upon the Kansas materials alone, Courts should dismiss out of hand the broad extrapolations
policyholders seek to make from the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner files. However,
as will be demonstrated, there is an abundance of additional evidence establishing awareness
by other members of the insurance commissioner community that the pollution exclusion did
not merely restate the "neither expected nor intended" language of the "occurrence" definition
but resulted in an obvious coverage reduction.
The insurance commissioner materials for the State of Louisiana reflect that the IRB
filing of the pollution exclusion was initially disapproved. Discussions held between Aetna
Casualty and the Louisiana Insurance Commission in June of 1970 reflect that the disapproval
was based upon political pressure generated by the "restriction" in coverage the exclusion
obviously carried.
He said that the disapproval of the IRB's filing for this restriction of coverage was a political situation.61
The Louisiana Insurance Commission did, however, permit attachment of the pollution
exclusion to individual risks as long as the insured acknowledged in writing it understood that
the pollution exclusion constituted a "restriction of coverage".62
Iowa, Michigan, South Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia, and the District of Columbia also
approved the pollution exclusion filing upon the condition that the consent of the insured be
obtained before attaching the endorsement to an outstanding policy. If there was no similar
perceived effect on coverage, why would consent of the insured be required?
The filing documents from the State of Texas not only recognized the exclusion's
reduction in coverage but emphasized the established insurance usage of "accident" to connote the sudden/boom "classical accident".63 Oviously, the Texas Board of Insurance also did
not suffer from the presently espoused policyholder delusion that the pollution exclusion
merely restated the "neither expected nor intended" (damage) language of the "occurrence"
definition. Rather, the documents reflect an understanding of the intent of the drafters' to
return pollution coverage to an (classical) "accident" basis.
In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the pollution exclusion filing was initially disapproved- On November 30, 1970 in follow-up correspondence from the IRB to the Puerto
Rico Commissioner of Insurance, the need for the exclusion was elaborated - the commissioner being informed that underwriters did not want to debate whether an insured "expected
or intended" the pollution "act", especially a "continuous"* pollution sitL«:ion.
Reiving solely upon the policy definition of occurrence which
requires that the act causing damage must not be expected nor
intended bv the insured, might well cause dispute as to whether
in fact the act was unexpected or unintended particularly in a
fact situation involving a continuous course of action. This
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kind of situation is often very costly to both insureds and
companies since many of them are brought into court to be
resolved, (emphasis added)
This concept is totally consistent with the aim of the drafters to avoid debate over whether
an insured "expected or intended" damage by shifting focus to the physical (sudden) discharge of pollution.64 The filing was subsequently approved in Puerto Rico.
As noted, the State of New York approved the pollution exclusion filing but would
not allow the endorsement to be placed on outstanding policies. If there was any doubt,
however, that New York did recognize the exclusion's restriction against gradual pollution
coverage, one need only read the law approved in 1971 that made it illegal to issue gradual
pollution insurance coverage.65 Immediately recognizing the gradual pollution gap which the
law left unprotected, a utility company tried to persuade the governor not to sign the bill into
law.66 However, the law was passed.
Therefore when the EIL market for gradual pollution developed in the mid-1970's,
those EIL policies could not be sold in the State of New York. It remained illegal to sell
gradual pollution insurance in the State of New York, with certain legislative exceptions,
until the repeal of this law in 1982, Thus, the New York Department of Insurance instructed
ISO in 1981 that its claims-made pollution liability policy (i.e. EIL) could not be issued to
an insured unless that insured fell within certain enumerated exceptions to the 1971 statute.67
Of course, the New York Insurance Commission had no problems with existing CGL pollution coverage as it was evident that the "sudden and accidental" exception to pollution
exclusion did not provide (illegal) gradual discharge coverage.68
Regarding the North Carolina State Insurance Department, correspondence between
the department and ISO reflects that policyholders in the exterminating industry opposed
approval of the pollution exclusion because it "would take away coverage from them.'9 It was
noted, however, that one underwriter routinely modified the policy for a considerable number
of exterminating risks by restoring the coverage taken away by the exclusion for a charge (via
a buy-back).69
The Illinois Department of Insurance file contains documents filed by the London
Market evidencing a consistent understanding on the part of that State's Director of Insurance. London's Cause (Industries, Seepage, Pollution and Contamination Clause No. 3), like
the IRB's pollution exclusion, contained a "s .den" happening limitation. Regarding the
coverage taken away by the exclusion, the Lonaon Market pointed out to the Illinois Insurance Commission that coverage taken away by Clause No. 3 was subject to a "buy-back" (as
was also the case with the IRB exclusion).70 The Kentucky Department of Insurance was
similarly advised by London representatives of the "buy-back" available for the gradual
coverage taken away by London's Seepage Cause No. 3. 71
Two states that did not approve the pollution exclusion filed by the IRB in 1970 were
New Hampshire and Vermont. However, documents reflect awareness in those states of the
restrictive nature of the exclusion. Moreover, subsequent insurance events which generated
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explanations from the insurance commissioners of New Hampshire and Vermont convincingly confirm the understanding of these commissions that the pollution exclusion constituted
a reduction of existing coverage.
The commissioner in New Hampshire issued a press release on September 28, 1970
announcing disapproval because the exclusion excluded liability on an occurrence basis, providing only sudden and accidental coverage. Subsequently in September of 1981 ISO filed
with the New Hampshire Insurance Department its then new claims made pollution liability
policy (an EIL). New Hampshire's reason for denying its approval in 1981 is quite instructive. Essentially the Insurance Department told ISO that since it had disapproved the 1970
CGL pollution exclusion, gradual coverage was automatically afforded to CGL policyholders.
Thus, there was no need in 1981 for a pollution liability policy covering gradual pollution.72
The identical scenario is evidenced in Vermont which also disapproved the 1970 filing
of the pollution exclusion. As was the case in New Hampshire, the IRB sent follow-up correspondence to the Vermont Commissioner of Insurance advising that the exclusion was
subject to a buy-back, an obvious confirmation that the exclusion indeed reduced coverage.
Vermont then disapproved ISO's pollution liability policy in 1982 on the basis that gradual
pollution coverage was never taken away because the pollution exclusion was not approved
in 1970.73
The foregoing establishes beyond any doubt that the "big picture"1 of what the community of state insurance commissioners understood about the effect of the pollution exclusion is a vivid picture of clear recognition of the exclusion's restriction of existing coverage.
Their collective understanding stands in stark and overwhelming contrast to the assertions of
policyholders that the pollution exclusion was understood by the state insurance commissioners as merely restating the language of the "occurrence'* definition.
Finally, regarding the insurance personnel of the State of West Virginia, the entirety
of the evidence indicates that West Virginia truly understood that the pollution exclusion did
not cover gradual pollution. Some of the documents in the 1970 West Virginia file demonstrate shared understanding by those who attended the July 16,1970 hearing that the pollution
exclusion was a restriction on coverage. These materials have already been reported on.74
The record also discloses comments by another oil and gas industry spokesman who objected
to the pollution exclusion. He understood that salt water produced with gas and oil was the
largest cause of pollution in West Virginia. Recognizing that gradual salt water pollution
would be excluded, he stated the "word sudden (is) inappropriate."73
Moreover, consider the West Virginia Hazardous Regulations, Section 47-35-13
("Financial Requirements").76 and incorporating by reference the EPA financial responsibility
requirements, the State of West Virginia acknowledged that it also participated in the longstanding and common knowledge of every segment of the insurance world that the pollution
exclusion restricted coverage. This legislative acknowledgment is clearly contrary to policyholder assertions that West Virginia took the position that the pollution exclusion served no
restrictive function whatsoever.

G COPYRIGHT 1991 MEALEY PUBUCATTONS, INC., WAYNE. PA

43

MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS
INSURANCE
August 2 7 , 1991

Vol. 5, #40

Further confirming West Virginia's understanding that the pollution exclusion took
away gradual pollution coverage provided in the CGL is the fact that West Virginia approved
ISO's filing of its pollution liability policy. The reader will recall that states which had
disapproved the 1970 pollution exclusion filing (such as New Hampshire and Vermont) also
subsequently disapproved ISO's pollution liability policy filing, taking the logical position
that a gradual pollution policy was not necessary as gradual pollution coverage was already
provided in the CGL (the pollution exclusion's restrictions not being approved in 1970).
Therefore, by approving the ISO pollution liability policy, West Virginia conversely acknowledged its long-standing recognition that there was no existing mechanism in 1983 to
protect gradual pollution exposures, the pollution exclusion having taken awav gradual coverage
in West Virginia back in 1970.
In any event, any confusion generated by the West Virginia scenario as to what
insurance commissioners across the country were told and understood about the restrictive
nature of the pollution exclusion is laid to rest by the overwhelming nationwide evidence
documented and presented to the reader herein. Quite frankly, the broad extrapolations
policyholders divine from the West Virginia file are simply incorrect. Even a brief look at
the "big picture" of the insurance commission understandings in the United States and Puerto
Rico make it evident that insurance commissioners participated in the common knowledge of
brokers, policyholders, underwriters, trade organizations and insurance trade commentators
that the pollution exclusion did not, and was never meant to, afford coverage for gradual
pollution discharges.
POSTSCRIPT: THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND UTILIZE GENERIC DISCOVERY
Surely, certain of the court decisions favorable to policyholders have been based upon
the lack of adequate presentation of generic proofs by defendants or upon acceptance of the
handful of incomplete proofs proffered by policyholders. Perhaps certain of these decisions
were rendered primarily to target the proverbial "deep pocket". Whatever the reasons, it is
submitted that it is absolutely necessary to present the courts with the "big picture" of the
common knowledge of the insurance community, the lack of any objectively reasonable
expectation of gradual pollution coverage by the policyholders, and the intent of the drafters
of the pollution exclusion. It is also necessary to present the true and complete "big picture"
of the state insurance commissioner filings, one small part of which being so artfully and
repeatedly emphasized out of proportion and context by policyholders. Finally, this article
suggests that it is necessary to advise our courts that policyholders and their brokers are
keenly aware that courts are finding coverage for policyholders (where it was never written)
by misinterpreting the plain language of the pollution exclusion.
With so many millions of dollars at stake, one could almost understand the motivation
of policyholders to file such lawsuits. However, it is impossible to condone the endless filing
of litigation where it is known in advance that such litigation is "frivolous", based upon hopes
of continued "misinterpretation" of policy language or based on providing courts with a
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targeted "deep pocket". The instant discussion of the pollution exclusion began with a series
of informative and instructive quotes from American Cyanamid's Director of Corporate
Insurance. That risk manager acknowledged the common knowledge of the insurance
community that there was never any intent of any party to the CGL insurance contract to
cover gradual pollution claims under the pollution exclusion. He further criticized courts for
"grossly mistreating" insurance underwriters and chastised policyholders for bringing "frivolous" lawsuits. It is thus distressing to report that American Cyanamid has recently filed an
environmental insurance lawsuit in New Jersey against virtually all of its liability insurance
carriers.77 The pollution exclusion is among the issues being contested. A commentary by
an attorney was reported publicly when the suit was filed:
The Courts know the insurance industry is huge and wealthy
and can always pay off by raising premiums.78
The filing of such suits and the making of such comments seems to ignore the fact that
insurance companies are not immune from financial disaster and, more importantly, the fact
that insureds never paid a penny in premiums for coverage of gradual pollution discharges
excluded by the pollution exclusion.
Several thousand documents have been assembled which reflect the insurance community's common knowledge of the coverage restriction expressed in the pollution exclusion.
Many of these documents are protected from public disclosure by confidentiality protective
orders. It is submitted, however, that even a partial sampling of the unprotected documents
is more than sufficient to demonstrate that policyholders could never at any time have
entertained any objectively reasonable expectation of coverage for gradual pollution discharges. Certainly, policyholder brokers were so attuned to this reality they commented on
the courts which failed to comprehend what every insurance man knew about the plain
meaning of the pollution exclusion language. Clearly, powerful industry groups, like the
CMA, the American Petroleum Institute, National Solid Waste Management Association, and
the American Iron & Steel Institute were intensely attuned to the temporal meaning of the
pollution exclusion as well as to why and when gradual pollution coverage was taken away
from the CGL. Moreover, the powerful risk manager insurance association, RIMS, representing many thousands of policyholder corporations and their risk managers, acknowledged what
every risk manager knew - that "sudden" and "gradual" were temporal pollution concepts and
that the CGL did not cover gradual pollution events. All of these sources further recognized
that a "gap" was created in CGL coverage because the pollution exclusion took something
awav from previously afforded coverage. They recognized that the "gap" created by the
exclusion was one of gradual pollution discharge coverage. They recognized that this "gap"
was serious. Finally, they all recognized that only an EIL policy could fill this coverage
gaP •

Even if any particular policyholder's risk managers did not have the benefit of an
international insurance broker, or the centralized voices of an industry association, or a risk
manager insurance association, they would still have been appropriately informed of the
restriction by the wealth of information being disseminated by the broker community to
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potential clients and to the insurance world at large in pamphlets and pollution seminars.
They would also have been educated by the information being disseminated by publishers of
insurance trade publications in quite explicit articles. Such a policyholder, to claim ignorance
of what was going on, would also have had to turn a deaf ear to the similar operating
premises and acknowledgements in articles and quotes by his policyholder risk manager
brethren in trade magazines and newspapers.
It is quite emphatically suggested that the time has come to put a stop to the policyholder pollution exclusion games being played in the courts. The pollution exclusion bars
coverage for all but truly sudden and accidental discharges and everybody knew (and knows)
it. Presentation of the foregoing generic materials should preclude any court from accepting
the proposition that policyholders lived hermits' existences in caves of isolation or in plastic
bubbles shutting out the insurance world at large. Aggressive and intelligent use of generic
evidence should also prompt courts to wonder where policyholders ever got the notion that
thek claims are anything other than "frivolous".
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Hall, Inc. (1968):
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and unexpected. By referring to 'injurious exposure' the requirement that the
injury be sudden in character has been eliminated" (page 33).
7. "Insured Counsel Doubletalk: The Fallacies in Anderson and Pauamante's Arguments Concerning the Interpretation of 'Sudden and Accidental' in Boiler and Machinery
Policies", by James M. Johnstone and Frederick S. Ansell, Mcalev's Insurance Litigation
Reports. Vol. 5, Issue #10, January 15, 1991.
8. Dictionaries that list the common meaning of a word first are in accord that the
meaning of "sudden" is "quick". See, for example, any dictionary published by Random
House.
9. November 21, 1988, report submitted in J.T. Baker v. Aetna, Paragraph 11.
10. Stewart expert testimony given in the J.T. Baker litigation; TR. 725-18 to 25.
11. See, for example, June 13, 1979, issue of Frank B. Hall "Newsletter"; "For those
not familiar with EEL coverage, it has been designed to provide insurance for gradual pollution such as the PCB contamination of the Hudson River . . . and the Kepone case in
Virginia . . . all uninsured because pollution/contamination was not "sudden and accidental".
(emphasis added)
12. August 7, 1981, issue of Frank B. Hall "Newsletter".
13. October 29,1984, article in Business Insurance. Hall newsletters also reflect that
RSI frequently made pollution presentations, including pollution seminars to policyholder
risk managers across the country.
14. September 1981, issue of Clayton Environmental Consultants Inc. newsletter.

C COPYRIGHT 1591 MEALEY PUBLICATIONS, INC., WAYNE, PA

47

MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS
INSURANCE
August 27, 1991

Vol. 5, #40

15. "Is Insurance Pollution For You"; undated informational literature authored by
Richard J. Powols, Assistant Vice President, Waste Management Services.
16. See, for instance, William A. Mahoney article "A Risk Manager's Guide to
Pollution Liability Policies" published in July 1982, issue of Risk Management. See also
Mahoney article "Insuring Hazardous Wastes: Analyzing the New EPA Regulations" published in April 1981, issue of Risk Management.
17. March/April 1990, issue of "M", entitled "Environmental Awareness".
18. See Endnote 3.
19. IcL; "One of the grave dangers in relying on the decisions as cited is the fact that
the courts in the jurisdiction in which you may be involved will interpret the policy exclusion
as it was intended by the underwriters and there will be no coverage."
20. November 28, 1983, issue of Business Insurance.
21. J&H manual entitled "Pollution Insurance and Statutory Requirements Under
RCRA"; July 1981.
22. J&H seminar material entitled "Pollution Liability Legislation am} Insurance".
23. See Endnote 1.
24. See May 3, 1982, issue of Business Insurance. "Risk Managers Design Own
Pollution Liability Form".
25. See January 31, 1983, issue of Business Insurance.
26. IdL

27. August 24, 1981, issue of Business Insurance.
28. July 15, 1980, correspondence forwarded by RIMS to the EPA.
29. See RIMS seminar materials, April 21, 1982 "Rims Seminar - Update of Environmental Impairment Insurance."
30. July 18, 1980, CMA submission of comments to the EPA.
31. July 12, 1983, CMA submission of comments to the EPA.
32. May, 1970, issue of John Liner Letter: "such language will obviously rule out
coverage of many occurrences which would likely be insured under current language".
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33. "Pollution and Insurance," by G.R.E. Bromerick, Risk Management Magazine.
April 1971.
34. February 24, 1973, issue of Weekly Underwriter.
35. Reprint from the 1977 Weekly Underwriter. The article goes on to state:
"It could be accidental but not very sudden, undetected over a period of time....
An unintended event can be sudden or gradual."
36. November 1979, issue of Rough Notes; "Without question, this exclusion leaves
the insured with a serious gap in coverage for his pollution liability exposures. If the
discharge is not both sudden and accidental, there is no coverage under the CGL. Thus, a
discharge which is accidental, but not sudden (such as a slow leakage undetected over a
period of time) would not be covered by the CGL."
37. See, for example, Footnotes 1, 2 and 13.
38. August 1985, issue of Rough Notes.
39. Id,
40. September 1985, issue of Risk Management.
41. May 18, 1984, issue of Insurance Week.
42. Background Document - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - Subtitle
C - Hazardous Waste Management.
43. Idj reference pages 0-7 and D-8.
44. I&; reference Appendix B, appendix Page B-3.
45. | 4 ; reference Tables II and IV of Appendix B found on appendix Pages B-5
and B-ll.
46. See Endnotes 30 and 31.
47. See Endnote 28.
48. July 17, 1980 and March 17, 1981 submissions of NAIB to EPA.
49. See July 18, 1980, submission of the API; March 13, 1981, submission of the
AISI; March 27, 1981, submission of the NSWMA.
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50. Letter from MacArthur at ISO to Montague at the REA, November 17, 1970.
51. The identical 1970 pollution exclusion endorsement Explanation, which accompanied the pollution exclusion endorsement, was filed with all state insurance commissioners.
Its text is as follows:
Explanation
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases under
present policies because the damages can be said to be expected or intended and
thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The above exclusion clarifies
this situation so as to avoid any question of intent. Coverage is continued for
pollution or contamination caused injuries when the pollution or contamination
results from an accident except that no coverage will be provided under certain
operations for injuries arising out of discharge or escape of oil into any body of
water, (emphasis added)
52. Reference Endnote 51.
53. Even in 1991, for instance, Rupo's Insurance <fe Risk Management Glossary distinguishes an "accident" from an "accidental occurrence"9 as an accident is "sudden and at a
definite time and location'9.
54. "Occurrence" means an accident, including injuries exposure to conditions, which
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured."
55. NBCU filing of 1966 CGL policy with all state insurance commissioners
"Explanatory Memorandum of Changes99.
56. I d . . . . by the addition of coverage for "injurious exposure to conditions99 eliminates the connotation of suddenness previously intended as respects coverage on an "accident99 basis, (emphasis added)
57. Explanatory Memorandum of Changes - November 1. 1971, Standard Provisions
for General Liability Policies-Jacket, reference:
Definition of "occurrence"
The language "occurrence means an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions99 has been changed editorially to "occurrence means an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions99 to meet criticism of the
old language that it might be construed as limiting exposure situations to the
limiting factors of "accident", i.e.. that the old language still required suddenness
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(a boom) as to time and place. Thus, under the revised language, the intent
under the 1966 policy is made clear that the definition encompasses not only the
usual "accident" but also exposure to conditions which may continue for a period
of time, (emphasis added)
58. Endnote 6, supra,
59.

(a) "What Role Will the Insurance Industry Play in the Fight against Pollution", by Dan R. Anderson, Ph.D., CPCU Annals. Volume 25, No. 1, March 1972:
The presence of the exclusion has the effect of converting that portion of the
liability policy from a "per occurrence" to a "per accident" basis. This was
accomplished by including the phrase "sudden and accidental". By accepted
insurance terminology both an accident and an occurrence are unintended
(page 27).
(b) "Insurability of the Water Pollution Risk and Current Industry Practices
in Meeting This Exposure", by Numan A. Williams, CPCU Annals. March 1973:
article discusses a questionnaire sent to three groups:
The requisites were first listed for coverage on an accident basis and then
related for coverage on an occurrence basis. "Accident" was defined as a
sudden, unintended event, and "occurrence" was defined as an unintended event,
either gradual or sudden (pages 17 and 19).
(c) "Insurability of the Water Pollution Risk: Public Policy Questions and
Methods of Accomplishment", by Numan A. Williams, Assistant Professor of
Insurance, CPCU Annals. Volume 26, No. 3, September 1973: "An accident, in
insurance usage, is sudden; an occurrence can be either sudden or gradual" (page
105).
(d) Property and Liability Insurance. Second Edition. Huebner, Black and
dine, Prcntice-HalL Inc. (1976). The same discussion of "Accident versus Ocenrrence" which appeared in the 1968 edition [reference en. 6(c)] is
repeated. 30/Public Liability:I/page 438. A discussion follows (442-443) relating
to the pollution exclusion, new to this edition, which states:
The effect, as far as the named peril of pollution is conceded, is to revert to
an "accident19 basis. (Page 443)
(e) Id* Third Edition (1982). The same discussion on "Accident versus
Occurrence" as is contained in the 1976 and 1968 editions is repeated with minor
stylistic changes (26/Public Liability:I/pages 359-360). The same discussion of
the pollution exclusion as is contained in the 1976 edition is also repeated (pages
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363-364). The comments in the 1982 edition conclude that gradual pollution
coverage is available through specialty (EIL) markets and that EPA action mandating such (non-sudden) coverage is expected soon (364) (emphasis in the original).
60. Documents relevant to the understandings of the commissioners are found not
only, to some extent, in the still existing files of individual state insurance commissioners bit
in the files of ISO. For convenience, all relevant documents will be generically referred to
as if from a single source.
61. June 19, 1970, Aetna memorandum.
62. Idj "Walker indicated that we could make individual risk form filings, attaching
a copy of the endorsement and a letter from the insured stating in essence that he understands
that the endorsement is a restriction of coverage, that it has his approval and requesting its
acceptance by the Commissioner/9 (emphasis added).
63. April 20, 1970 correspondence; a(the exclusion) . . . will apply to bodily injury
or property damage arising from pollution caused injuries except when pollution results from
the classical accident", (emphasis added)
64. See Bruton letter of June 5, 1970 discussed in drafting history portion of this
article.
65. "Property damage liability insurance," meaning insurance against legal liability
of the insured, and against loss, damage or expense incident to a claim of such liability,
arising out of the loss or destruction of, or damage to, the property of any other person, but
not including any kind of insurance specified in paragraph thirteen or fifteen. Policies issued
to commercial or industrial enterprises providing insurance against the legal liabilities specified in this subdivision shall expressly exclude therefrom liability arising out of pollution or
contamination caused by the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of any pollutants, irritants
or contaminants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water
unless such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental. Senate Bill 6080,
(A.6952V
66. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation letter to the Executive Chamber in Albany,
June 17, 1971: a A discharge or release may be, in some cases, accidental but gradual and
not immediately detectable. The rigid language of the bill would seem to render such
occurrences uninsurable."
67. September 21, 1981 correspondence of the New York Department of Insurance
to ISO.
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68. In regards to the 1971 New York statute, policyholders typically argue that it only
repeats the language of the pollution exclusion and "sudden", as used in the
statute, still means "unexpected". The evidence, however, demonstrates an understanding in New York that "sudden" had a temporal meaning. Consistent with this
understanding, in the course of efforts to have the 1971 statute repealed, the
participants in these efforts expressly acknowledged that the opposite of a
(covered) "sudden" pollution event was a (not covered) "gradual" event. For
instance, the following sampling of 1982 correspondence and documents found in
the files of the New York Insurance Commissioner made the specific request that
"gradual" insurance coverage be permitted in the State of New York by repealing
the 1971 statute.
1. July 14, 1982 Budget Report qn Bill (Bill would allow coverage for
industrial facilities that discharge pollutants "on a regular basis"; allows insurance
companies to provide "gradual pollution coverage").
2. July 15, 1982 correspondence from New York Superintendent of Insurance, Albert B. Lewis to Counsel to the Governor ("the Insurance Department
notes that there has been an increased interest in recent years in obtaining insurance to cover gradual pollution").
3. July 19,1982 Manufacturers Association of Central Ndw York correspondence to Governor Carey (legislation allows purchase of coverage for "gradual or
continuous discharge of pollutants")*
4. July 12, 1982 correspondence of Insurance Brokers of New York (IBA/
NY) to Counsel to the Governor ("insurers in New York are unable to provide
coverage for gradual pollution liability").
5. July 16,1982 correspondence of The Business Council of New York State
to Counsel to the Governor (legislation allows coverage for "gradual or continuous
discharge of pollutants").
New York unquestionably understood, then, that the pollution exclusion constituted a restriction of existing gradual pollution coverage.
69. May 12, 1972 correspondence.
70. February 27, 1970 correspondence.
71. March 13, 1970, correspondence.
72. September 17, 1981, correspondence of New Hampshire Insurance Department.
73. November 11, 1970 correspondence from ISO and February 4, 1983, correspondence from Vermont Insurance Commission.
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74. "Lawyers Say Insureds Are Attempting to Reinvent History" by Timothy C.
Russell, Thomas S. Schaufelbcrger and Alan C. Nessman, Mealev's Insurance Litigation
Reports, Vol, #2, Issue #10, March 23, 1988.
75. Hearing notes, West Virginia's 1970 Insurance Commissioner's record. Comment is by Larry L. Skeen, Executive Secretary, Independent Oil & Gas of West Virginia.
76. West Virginia Hazardous Regulations, Title 47, Department of Natural Resources
(effective April 24, 1982).
77. See July 26, 1991, Bergen Record front page article.
78. Id.
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Tab 3

Pollution and Insurance
by G. R. E. BromwKh

Responsibility for Poilution and other aspects of production, which r.iay adversely affect the public at
large, is potentially the most devastating single hazard
risk faced by management today. Risk managers
should play a vital role m minimising this problem.
Mr. Bromwtch, who is Manager of the Research
Department at Reed Shaw Osier Limited in Toronto,
discusses the nature of the pollution problem, the
general non-availability of insurance as a panacea and
the role of the risk manager.
T he pollution liability insurance situation if both
1
simpit and complex. Limitations on coverage
can ,be understood quickly; unfortunately, if not
amended or eliminated they often leave the risk manager with a senous uninsured exposure. The beck*
ground is more complicated, but must be understood
if one is to make the best out of a bed business. Most
of the examples given here refer to Canada and
Canadian law but they are applicable in the United
States because the questions involved are fundamental.
Insurers Concerned
do not think there is any doubt that the msurince market, both direct and reinsurers, is perturbed
about the possibility of large pollution liability
claims. Their immediate reaction has been to introduce endorsements which attempt to define the
limited extent of coverage they wish to give for most
risks and to exclude virtually all liability for pollution
in the case of risks associated with the petroleum
industry. 1 believe Lloyd's was first to introduce what
it called Seepage, Pollution and Contamination
clauses which went beyond previous similarly named
clauses. This was in tht early past of last year and
IN A was not far behind with its dause termed.
Environmental Pollution .Exclusion. Other versions
put out by insurers have such titles as Environmental
Exclusion.
in<uren rarely reocTUhmod lately to any situation
.itui the origins of the peeoent concern over pollution
go back for some yuan.
For example, * y fisherman will confirm that for
years people writing about fishing have been bemoaning the extent to whkh rivets and lakes have become
polluted. Attempts have been made to counteract this
but conservation, as far as 1 am aware, never made a
great deal of headway.
Torrey Canyon Aroused Interest
was not until the Unker Torrey Canyon went
t» -and off the south coast of England and the oil
tpiU fouled the coasts of England and Prance that

general interest in pollution was aroused. Tht British
Navy attempted unsuccessfully to salvage the wTtc*;
the R.A.F. tried to set the oil on fire by bombing it,
also without success. Subsequently, a inter ship w U
"arrested" in Singapore harbor and tvtntually tht
British and French governments recovtrtd about $7 8
million from the charterers. Union Oil Company of
California, who apparently owned tht vtssel through
a subsidiary.
Then came the enormous spill from a drilling ng
operated by Union Oil in the Pacific Oean near Santa
Barbara, California. Representatives of the parties
damaged, which included fishing and boating industries, beach front property owners and the beachusing public, have filed suit for SI.3 bdlion (not
million) damages against the four companies invoked
(although Union Oil was operating the rig. it wis in
partnership with Mobil Oil, Gulf Oil and Texaco).
There have been other smaller spills in Canada and
elsewhere. One of these "smaller" spills involves suits
for $100 million against Chevron Oil Company for
damage done to shrimp and oyster fishing in the Gulf
of Mexico.
Voluntary Action
As a lefel^of various oil spill* from Unkers, an
arrangement wee readied between* the majority of the
world's tanker owners to provide compensation to
governments .who incur izpmmm clean-up. This arrangement i known as TOVALOP (Tanker Owners
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil
Pollution). These is a corresponding scheme for
owners of c a r g o - CRISTAL (Contract Regarding
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil
Pollution).
A special Canadian act. The Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, has been pasesd in recognition of the fact that oil pollution in arctic areas
would takf Jar tai^se to dlapesea than m a wexmer
climate.0Although, puetd byvPlrttement the Act wdl
not come into-fctfet until prodnfcatioa and it uk-mainlyr ^skeleton" l e g ^ t i M * btf fleshed oi* by ftgula.
tioits^ProvMon is o*do, amnrif.£h« ***£"< f o t
evidence of. financial responsibility "by way-Sf insurance** be required of developers, shipowners, etc.
The Arctic Waters Act ia complementary to the
proposed changes in the Canada Shipping Act.
Other Causes, Effects
There est, of course, other types of water poilution. For instance, there has been s 1 ^ * f j V"
news recently about mercury, which ^ ^ " .
result of the industrial process, is P « ™ * ^ * : *!
Great Lakes. Subsequently, wanungi have tnsuto
is

about estmg fish from these wttin. As a rtsult the
livelihood of commercial fishermen has been affected
and the tourist fishing industry has suffered a blow.
The discharge of great quantities of domestic detergents, which contain phosphates, is also a problem.
Near the city of Elliot Lake, Ontario, radioactivity
has been discovered in certain waters to an undue
extent as the result of uranium mining. Various industries have unfortunately allowed their effluents to
flow into waters of lakes or nvers in quantities that
foul the waters and prevent safe swimming. Insufficiently treated sewage has caused the rivers and lakes
near some of our big cities to become polluted.
Regulations have been introduced recently forbidding
pleasure boats over a certain size to dump their sewage in the waters they use.
'In conjunction with the proposed changes in the
Canadt Shipping Act to control water pollution (Bill
C-2), an attempt is being made to obtain U.S.
agreement so as to lead to some international
standards regarding sewage dispose! from commercial
vessels. Incidentally, this same bill will likely impose
heavy fines for the discharge of oil or other pollutants
and set up a fund to compensate anyone whose
property is affected by such dischargee, the money
being obtained from a levy on oil imported into
Canada.
Liability under the Act, aa amended by the bill,
would be absolute. No proof of negligence would be
necessary, but there would be a limit of $140 per ton
of the ships tonnage with a total limit of S14 million.
Of course it is not yet known what will be the final
terms of the bill when pasted. In the VS. the Water
Quality Control Act has been peased to handle similar
mature though the Canadian bill appears broader in
scope.
Air Pollution
Another Arte of concern ie over air pollution, (n
Toronto and many other large cities a special watch ia
kept on the extent of air poUution and when it
reaches a certain level* industry ie warned to reduce
its activities. Recently a number of large concerns
wen cited aa being warned about the extent of the
emissions they were permitting and the press report
stated that relatively speakinf the emissions by
smaller concerns were probably just aa bad, but it was
impossible to identify them individually.
Airliners can be seen every day trailing black
smoke from their engines and this undoubtedly adds
o the air pollution. Attempts are being made to
reduce the extent of the fouling of the air from this
cause. Then there ie pollution from automobile
exhausts. Loe Angeles, for example, has had particu-

lar problems with smog and **s taken sups against
the pollution caused by automooile exhausts. Vinous
devices have been developed by auto manufacturers
to reduce the exhaust emissions and the intention is
to make the installation of these compulsory m new
model cars. Lead free gas, which has bt^n the suoject
of advertising campaigns by certain oil companies and
counter-campaigns by others, is another attempt to
reduce the emissions from car exhausts.
Not only is water and air being polluted, but the
ground and even the animals we use for food can oe
afTected. Govern menu have become satisfied
DDT, although of great use in killine
dangerous in large quantities
taken to ban its use.
The above gives some idea ,»
the
problem and the fact that it crops up in so many
different situations.
Public Interest Awakened
Some of the pollution which is now being so widely publicized is inevitable. It is the pnee of living in
urban areas which supply the types of service and
comforts to which we have become accustomed.
Also, pollution has crept up over a penod of generations and it will take a long time and a great deal of
money to reverse the trend and imorove matters to an
acceptable level.
We have to face the fact that pollution is one of
the social concerns of the day and a happy hunting
ground for politicians. It's like motherhood; one cannot be against motherhood. Who can be against purer
environment?
Just recently the Canadian Government announced
the formation of a new departm* ;, to be controlled
by the present Minister of Fisheries, that will be
called the Department of the Environmental and
Renewable Resources. This development appears to
be in line with the increased interest in what is loosely called consumer protection. Industry of all kinds. I
feel, is going to be under increasing pressure o reduce
poUution and will be subject to considerable penalties
where it seems to have fallen short.
Another trend which ia appearing over the honxon
in Canada ia the "class action/9 a legal action by one
or a few persona on behalf of a number of others
having the same interest. The enormous suit arising
out of the oil drillinf spills off the California coast
and that in the Gulf of Mexico are class actions
Thus we have on the 6ne hand a recent awakening
of the public to the extent of pollution and me
continued dramatixation of thia in the media coupitd
Z*uJSaladve
pressure on industry to reduce .t by
2 poaSSe m e S T w d perhape increasing opportu-

nitits for actions for damages where pollution dots
occur. It is chis combination of circumstatnces which
provides tht background to tht action taken by the
insurtrs in restricting thtir policies.
Position of Central Liability Policies
I believe that wt art foinf to stt endorsements
plactd on most Gtntril Liability policies rtstnctinf
tht covtrtft providtd in rtsptct of pollution. This
may btcomt as routine as exclusions relating to
nucitar risks.
Somt po lie its will no doubt continue in forct without any special rtstnetion and it is well to consider
how far pollution liability may be covered by these
policies. Of course, we can only deal in general terms,
but even this has some value.
First of all, inevitable damage is not covered under
any type of wording. The relevant legal cases have
usually been concerned with policies providing
coverage on an accident basis. But even in -policies
extended to include occurrence basis property dam*
age, there is normally some provision which requires
that tht damagt must bo unexpected.
Accordingly, a couple of Ontario dtcisions art
rtltvant. Tht first ont was Crisp v. Great Amtrican
(CILR 1-046 1961) in which tht insured contractor
undertook to grind teraxao tilee at a customer's
houst. Tht contractor took virtually no precautions
with tht result that dust permeated throughout tht
house causing considerable damagt to tht furnishings.
Although there was no doubt that tht contractor was
Habit to tht homeowner, ht failed to recover undtr
his Liability policy on tht grounds that what ht had
dont intviubly ltd to tht damagt. In tht cast of
McCoUum v. Economical Mutual (ClUt 1-064 1962),
tht insured was cltening tht outside of a building by
sandblasting. Soma of tht windows of tht building
were damaged in tht very ctnter, which indicated
that tht workman had mode no uae at all of wooden
shields which won providtd to protect tht windows.
Again tht decision was that no recovery was allow*
able since damagt was virtually certain.
Must Bt Accidental
It, therefore, stems that coverage win not apply if
an insured has madt pollution damagt virtually tntvtt*
ablt by his set of-omission. Furthtr, while untxptcted damagt will bt covered, unites tht insured
takes prompt sups as soon as ht realixas that damagt
has arietn, subttqutnt damagt will not bt covered.
With property damage coverage on en ecodtnt
isie, somt insurers maintain that en accident must
-akt place at a specific point in time end if unintentional pollution occurred over a period of time with-

out being discovered, the policy would not apply.
While most insurance companies would use this
contention, it is doubtful whether it is correct m isw
snd 1 do notice that most of the indorsements rtiating to pollution, where they permit limited coverage,
require what happens to be mddert as w«n u accidental, indicating that the word accident or accidtntal
does not necessarily imply suddenness.
In summary and in general terms, if you have iiabiljty coverage without any special endorsement - md
how long this state of a/fain will be tnjoyed is
questionable — you almost cartainly do not have
coverage if the actions of your company inevitably
lead to oollution and no reasonable steos have been
taken to avoid it. If you have accident rather1 than
occurrence basis property damage insurance you will
be faced probably with a further contention that only
a sudden happening is covered.
Endorsements Limiting Coverage
( A number of different endorsements are now being
used by various insurers to limit or exclude their
liability for pollution risks. They seem to have uktn
separate legal advice on what to say. Lloyd's produced ont stt of clauses, INA produced another, and still
other versions have been set forth by Great Amtrican
and other insurers. Perhaps eventually we shall have
some type of standardisation. In the meantime here is
a general review of common features although it is
most important to examine throughly the wording
actually employed in a particular instance.
Theet endorsements generally exclude completely
sny liability in connection with the oil business and
sometimes the gas business — often closely connected
wtthoi.
As regards other typee of risks, they tend to
provide coverage for a happening which is accidental
Md sudden, although the exact wordings vary. Some
sped out what is meant by pollution in dttail
(references to smoke, gases, alkalis, aeida etc.) and
some deal with it in general terms only, so that in
examining a clause at least three questions should be
. botnt m mmd.
(1) Doaa it attminata a eo««faf« for pollution
cauaad by o i and gM?If M. how ia thia
phnaad?
(3) Art poButioa, contamination or otfttr
Basilar word* dafinad and if » . in "**'
unna? If not daflnad. how fax would tht
tanani tama afctand in tha eireuiniuncts
(3) la a m n f a Umitad to fuddan and aceidtn.
tal haopanam?
• • • f-

*—»tt?i

Short Ttrtn Phtnomtnon
Takmf fint tht tradta which are fortunate tnoufh
to havt bttn Itft with torn* form of covaraft, it
sttms eltir that if damaft ta inevitable, owing to tht
actions of tht inmirad, thtra is no covtraft. As
ex pit in td previously, this almost certainly exists tvtn
if there is no iptcial endorstmtnt. but tht situation is
now spelled out. It is usually suttd that tht damaft
must bt sudden and this ctrtainly is ntw to tht
majority of insureds who havt proptrty damaft
covtrtfts on an oceurrtnet basis. What sttms to bt
tht intent is to provide for somt vtty short ttrm
phtnomtnon, for example, a breakdown in somt
filttnnf apparatus which ptrmits tht discharge of a
polluunt into a nvtr or a lakt. How far the use of
such a word as "sudden" limita tht umt dunnf which
damaft must occur is uncertain, but it dots sttm that
tht insured must takt prompt sttpa to remtdy what*
tvtr ltd to tht pollution. Ptrhapt somt form of
dtvtct which would pvt warning of pollution ovar
tht minimum acctpublt limit is implitd by tht
word inf.
Tht imposition of thtst tndorsmtnts has bttn so
recant that no casts on tht subject havt ytt comt to
court which makts it virtually impossible tvtn for
lawytrs to sty what thtir txact tfftet will bt.
Whit Can Bt Doot About PoOuttoa
Wt art In tht tarty sttfltt of daaiing with, pollution
at an insurmnct probitm. Thtrt appttn to bt no

chanct of an ovtrall solution whicn wouia apoiy :o
all insureds. Rather. I btittvt that wntntvtr tne
question of restricting or eiiminstmg pollution ,110mty covtraft is raistd by an insurer, tnd it is liktiy to
bt raistd tn virtually tvtry insunct whtre aiert is any
chanct of tht nsk arising, that tach cast must bt
dtalt with on its own mams. We, if I may spaa* for a
momtnt for our compttiton in tht ig*ncy *nd
broktragt fitld as wall as my own firm, will havt to
bt vtty tnttfttic on your bthalf m making rtpresenutions to tht insurers and I am confidant that wt
shall bt.
You as risk manaftn should. I suggest, provide us
with somt additional ammunition. Wt shall havt a
much bttttr chanct nagousting if wt can say that
A.B.C. Company it vary much alivt to tht pollution
problem, although it has ptrhapa ntvtr had a claim
madt against it on thtst pounds. Wt should hkt to
bt ablt to sty, tor instance, somtthing to tht tfftet
that a stnior company official has bttn given tht task
of prevtntinf pollution and that undtr his direction a
special survty of tht company's operations has bttn
earned out to pm-pomt typas of pollution which
might occur and to tliminata any wtak spota whtre it
could Ukt plact. If dtfinitt amounu of money havt
bttn sptnt tor spteial machintry such aa fUttrs of
somt sort, ths would ctrtainly bt a htlp. Wt should
alto Ukt to ttttak that thtit a, if tht orcumstancta
are appropriate, soma sptcml monitocvigdtvact from

POLLUTION ANO INSURANCE
which a warning is immadiatafty
pvtn if an accaptabla Itvtl ii « •
caadad. If spacial investigation has
been made by tht company's restarch staff, or by soma oulsida
Ann at its request, or perhaps by a
trade association, with a view to
changing mathoda so that pollution
is raada leas likely, thia too will bo
heipftiL
If wo can jointly put togather a
caaa which showa considerable
activity by your particular group,
than wo can go to tht mauiar with a
good hopo of succeaa. You may
think that thia sounds aa though tho
insurer will only ghra cotet whan
thara m vary Uttla likelihood of a
claim, but no amount of precaution
will tiiminata all chance of aoaaa
thing going wrong and ! augpal
that tha procedure ! hate outlined

C**n*m* him # f » t$

is in accordance with ona or tha
basic risk managamant philo*
sophias: to tiiminata risks aa far aa
possible and only insura what cannot ba tiiminatad.
Probably insurars will gradually
coma to raaliaa that tha riak in
soma industries is far iaaa than in
otheti and wa may ba able to
sacura batter tarms for soma of our
diants accordingly. It may ba thai
tha uaa of conaidetmblo deductible
w i l eventually provide partial
aniwats whaia inaurars still oppoaa
wida forma of coverage.
Out of our afforta to obtain
improvements, wa C M hopa thara
will gradually tvotve a mora logical
and Iaaa restrictive approach to tha
problem of pollution aa an mauf*
aMa riak.
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DfFINSI MIMO:
POUUTION - THI RISK AND INSURANa FROtUM
WAIUW C

iMTteeucnoN
Through the centuries R U A his proceeded on the
assumption that there are uncoid acres of land on
*hich to dump refuse: thai there are billions of gallons of water in the rivers, lakes and oceans to dilute
anv effluent placed in them; thai there is a great
blue skv whose winds can disperse whatever is thrust
up there by our chimneys and smokestacks.
Today such assumptions are being questioned in
our social and political arenas in which the contra
verrv over environmental pollution is being fought.
In more immediate and particular terms, the pollution
question mav be posed by the president of a company
asking the treasurer: "Our insurance manager knows
which insurance policy applies to this pollution claim,
doesn t he?" And meanwhile, back at the office, un.
derwriters are busy formulating underwriting pro
grams with respect to the haxards of pollution and
contamination.
This Defense Memo will discuss in pan the history
and development of pollution insurance with respect
to the general liability policy. However, this is only
a part of the total impact of the pollution problem
on industry and risk management. In fact, pollution
and its attendant problems are truly problems in industrial risk management and not problems in insurance. Industrial management must be involved in the
identification of the risk, in the elimination or rt»
duction of the haiard. in the decision of whether or
not to assume tht risk and in the determination of
how the risk might be transferred, if at alL

Most of the attention relative so i
for pollution
on the
eral liability poise** * * o r <• tke 19M revised
the is
prehensave general liability
about poUt>
industry was not p r t k u i a r i y
L Most of the
tion from an u n A i n riling m
terage prior m the I M C re
covt
accidental das*
nt" basis. Untam a large.
dent"
took place, there was no
charge of a poita
AmmMJ M a i
MI2AM.S I
age under the
preferred insureds usually hod "occurrence
t of
either on a manoempt policy or by
die standard policy.Sometimes occurrence" was not defined and an endorsement would simply Mite thai wherever the

Central
(Nov I f M |
r ftte Me. #447. Ise
' m s mat tavetvtag
ss s mm* ef

Btoc&Mtm*

accident" apoeared in the policv. the word occurrence was substituted. Other endorsements defined
occurrence" simply to mean an event or happening
Still others defined "occurrence to mean an event or
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions. *hich
unexpectedly causes injury during the polio period
During the late IMO's and eariv 1960s, the granting
of -occurrence" coverage by underwriters became more
frequent and was easier to secure. A common premium
requirement durine those years was 1% of the bodiW
injurywerage » d 3% of the propem dam ace co*er.
age. The granting of bodily injurv occurrence coverage was effected with few questions asked and little or
no resistance by the underwriters. The granting ot
property damage "occurrence* coverage was a little
more difficult, as indicated by the higher premium
requirement. However, there were few problems m
securing property damage occurrence coverage. Except
tions to this general rule were posed bv an occasional
pronounced exposure situation, such as a nurserv adjoining an asphalt plane or a contractor using large
machinery and causing continuous heav> vibrations
Claims were confined to common law liabiht\ The
following examples illustrate the types of occurrences" which gave rise to typical damage claims:
flooding as a result of earth movement b% a grading
contractor; cracked walls as a result of a contractor s
use of heavy equipment (including dump trucks) m
proximity to affected buildings; pollution of a water
well from seepage of a gasoline underground tank of

With tht advent of the 1964 revised comprehensive
liability policy, virtually all insureds were
" basis. Underwriters talked
placed
on risks who had Urge potenof
occurrence exposures. As a retial
occurrence* property damsuit of
would be amended by endorsement back
Such restrictions, however, afto
fected only an insignificantly small number of inr was denied to some m*s done principally with
its who had poor loss experience and
who probably would not have been renewed on M
a modest prot>
to accounts with
This was a tech"underwriters tor many \ears

approach was to tm
\ deductible with

nit N * ts 2« *t+
mm. mawm* vt *comi ofCTtfiom

«rtor 10 the 1966 polky revision. Painting contractors
?lhri«. tor******- w « commonlv written with a
£ £ £ ; ^ d l m a ^ S u c t i b k of SiOO or $250 per accident.
POUUtlOM COHTIOVBST MVBOM
HoHcxrr " w h more was happening during the
GO % than mrreh the appearance of che revised comprehemnc Kcnerai liabilm polio. Environmental
pollution, ome the mm era of onh a few small and
ineffectual ercKjpv developed into an issue ol worldwide HXMI ami puliiKal concern.* Wideh read books
and periodicals have tpelled out the consequences ol
continued fouling ol our environment in a nation
where each tear che population increases in M amount
equal co that ol Rhode Island. Delaware. Idaho, Montana Mnd Nevada combined: where conspicuous consumption and pUnn^d obsolescence are pans ol our
way ol life: where in 100 years die amount ol land
per person has declined from 4f acres per person to
10 acres per person with only 2J acres ol cropland
per -person.
The Torre* Canvon disaster gave definition and
impetus to the vague general concern ol the public
Thu disaster was followed by others. Oil spills in
1970 from wells in the Cull ol Mexico were attended
bv wide publicity regarding the lack ol safety devices.
That event, following the California off-shore drill
oil spill in 1969. caused concern among underwriters
which substantially led to the present restrictive endorsemenu employed by Lloyd's and by moat domestic
insurers.

It supplemenu Bureau Endorsement IRB-G335 entitled Contamination or Pollution Exclusion The
latter endorsement excludes bodily injurs or prooertv
damage arising out of the discharge, dispamf release
or escape ol smoke, vapors, soot fumes, acids, alkalis
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or
body ol water. However, this exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden
and accidental. Therefore, even with these two endorscmenta. coverage would be afforded for a spilled
oil leak on land providing the occurrence was sudden
and accidental."
Those restrictions were obviously of momentous
concern to petroleum insureds, particular!* to shippers ol petroicum product* by boat or barge and bv
operators ol oil drilling platforms o%er water *
The impact ol pollution on the oil mdustn and its
insurance coverage, and the industry s response co the
situation are worth considering m some detail This
is a striking and informative example of the farreaching consequences which can affect an industry
as a result ot concern over environmental problems.
The restrictive endorsement problem, along with rising coats ol insurance, caused a number of ^\ companies to form a new company (Oil Insur
* Urn*
ttcd). This company affords insurance to inoemmfy
an insured for afl risk ol loss or damage to us prop*
e n r up to S70.000.000: in addition, such expenses as
suit and labor costs, well control costs and debris
removal costs are covered. The policy also indemnifies
or pays on behalf ol the insured any sum or sums for
which die insured may be legally liable (whether asturned under contract or imposed by law). as a result
ol bodily injury or loss ol or damage co property ol
any kind occurring or alleged to have occurred as a
result ol teenage, pollution or contamination.
The Oil Insurance Limited policy does not cover
watercraft or their cargoes owned or chartered bv the
insured except watercraft normally used in exploration, drilling and producing operations. Other exclusions art aa follows: any business interruption tou or
extra expense; injury or destruction caused by intentional or wilful introduction of waste products
into any soil or inland or tidal waters unless caused
by accident: liability for fines or penalties, or anv
lots, damage, or expense caused by or resulting from
inherent defect, wear and tear, or gradual detenora.

POiUmON COVttAOl O O U S I O N t
Most domestic insurers are now using two standard
endorsements designed by the Insurance Rating Bureau.1
The first, which follow* the Lloyd's restriction, is
Standard Provision Endorsement IH1-G336. It is a
restricting endorsement applicable to
or pollution as a result oil oil and natural gaa
operations, oil pipeline operations (inch "
tenancc). and oil rig or derrick erasing or
tling. Coverage is excluded for bodily injury or
property damage arising out of the discharge. di>
penal* release or escape of oil or other petroleum
substances or derivatives (inducting oil residues or oil
mixed with wastes) loan or upon any water course or
body ol water. Covorasje is excluded er*#tAer m not
such discharge, dtsparml. release or ocape is
and accidental. It is noteworthy that this exck
applies only to diachar^ into a water course or body
of water. This spodni *dorscmcnt is emitted "Coalaminaoon or relation-Described Operations Supple
mentary Each

^ ^ - ^ ia therefore provided for on-short and
off-shore property and lor pollution damages - up to
$70 million during any one policy year. Coverage is
subyect to deductibles of Sl.0ft0.000 to $10.000 000 dcpending on
on the assess of the insured. It should be
penijsng
.noted
_ _ tKat
— this venture involves: (I) a *ery high deductible, and (J) a loss pay-beck agreement which is
intended to provide only chronological stabtluacion.
rather than any true mswfar of risk over the long
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Another development has btta tht formation of
TOVALOPjfTenkcr Own*, Voluntan Agreement
Concerninf t a t i l l i y far Oil Pollution). This agreemem is available to tanker owners throughout the
world. It provides a participating arrangement to
reimburse national governments for expense* reasonably incurred to prevent or clean up pollution ol
coast lines as the result of tht negligent discharge of
oil from tankers. The agreement provides for reimbursement of costs up to a maximum of $100 (US.)
per gross registered ton of tht unktr. or SI0.000.000
(U.S.) whichever is less. TOVALOP also provides tor
reimbursing a tanker owner for exptnsts reasonably
incurred to prevent or clean up pollution from a discharge of oil. Coverage applies only to physical contamination to land adjoining waters navigated by
tankers. Coverage dots not extend to fire or explosion damage, consequential damage or ecological
damage.
These two infants of the 70s. OIL and TOVALOP.
were born of the immediate and urgent insurance
needs of the petroleum tndustrv and tht unktr ownen. Protection was required which was unavailable
from private insurers and bevond tht financial capacity of an individualpttroltum company or a ship
owner to self-insure. These developments give testimony to what may well become common practice in
the 70s, namely tht creation of an industry captive.
There were some indications in IMS when Lloyd's
announced its restrictive endorsements, that "clean
up" coverage for oil spills would bt madt available
although tht premium requirement would be severe.
However, to the authors knowledge, no such coverage
was written. Such reluctance on the part of insurers
may bt expected to force tht afftcttd industry into
consideration of a captive for sharing of large and
infrequent losses. Substantial dtductiblts art a pre*
requisite in theory (as well as in fact, to data) far tht
success of such an undertaking. Othtr industrits. currently leas pressed by tht pollution crisis, may yet
follow tht lead of tht oil industry. Thty may bt
forced by economic ntccmity to form insuranct companies to indemnify against tht risk of loss by environmental pollution, or to farm agreements along tht
lints of TOVALOP.

Underwriters maintain that this is merth an explanation of the definition of "occurrence;' which reads in
part: an accidental exposure to conditions winch results during the policy penod in bodiiv injur* or
property damage which is neither e*pteted nor mtended from the standpoint of the insured." The
emission of fumes into tne air or discharge of harmful
waste products into a stream which an insured knows
is occurring continuous^ and which he can reasonably
conclude will cause property damage or bodiiv injur*
is not a proper subject matter of insurance. Arguabiv.
it would be against public poltcv to afford such in^
surance. An insured who knowmglv emits into the
air or discharges into a stream waste products which
contain harmful elements, and who chooses to purchase insurance rather than to eliminate such emitsion or discharge, would find few svmpathucrs if insurance protection becomes unavailable. With these
underwriting anas we must all agree.
However, the exception to the exclusion states that
the dispersal, release or escape must be Sudden and
accidental/* In othtr words, it must be both sudden
and accidental rather than etthrr sudden or accidental.
However, there can be emissions or discharges which
are accidental but may not be sudden, in that they
continue for a pthod of time before being detected.
For example one such incident was recently reported
in Wisconsin. A leak of mercury into a watercourse
had gone undetected for some ume. and therefore was
not a sudden dispersal, release or escape. However, it
was accidental and unintended to the degree that
there was no intent to discharge this quantity of mer*
cury into tht stream as waste. Purely as an economical
measure, systems have been established to recover as
much mercury as possible. To account for such situ*
atiooa. it is arguable that coverage should be worded
"not inttndtd by tht insured" in lieu of 'sudden and
accidental." This type of problem gets us back close
to the policy definitions and has caused insurance
buyers to ask. "Why is tht endorsement necesaarv*"
Rather than clarifying coverage, it appears to becloud
the already nebulous definition of "occurrence."
Fitting a definition of "accident" to fact situations
may also be quite difficult where one is dealme with
pollution control devices. Them are inherentW high
maintenance devices. Dry precipitators and * rubbers
involve considerable maintenance activity, without
which they btcomt increasingly less effective and on
occaaoo will suffer total breakdown. If a steel plant
starts emitting clouds of dirty and no&ious grime due
to a breakdown in its pollution control system, caused
by poor maintenance, a serious question ma* arise as
to tht applicability of insurance coverage.

TM "CONTAJMMA1ION Ot POUVTION
We have conridtrod in SOSM dtcatl tht difficulties
and the respooat ol tht oil industry as an example of
an industry rnrnmUm under severe pressure caused by
pollution problem w t now m a to s o o t consider*,
tiorn primarily of concern to othtr induscrits. parties*
lariy tht eicharioa of coverage lor contamination or
pollution other than through oil or gas operations.
Underwriters d a t e that Endorsement 1H*G3SS.
tht Contamination or Pollution tadusion," dots not
take away any coverage that was formerly intended to
be providM and thai, in fact, tht endorsement is
inertly for clarification/ T h t endorsement specifies
that tht exclusion docs not apply if the discharge, die*
penal, release or escape is "sudden and accidental."

<

POIUfflON UIWATWN AN* U M U T W N
i p k of legal and coverate problems
by'mtrcury pollution alone is highlighted by
; litigation. Large rUminli have been made (for
leToytht Ohio Association of Commercial Fisha) for mercury pollnooo of a m s of Uke Erie.
Tht m«a*Y wobltm mamd governmental bans *n*
rtwictions on commercial Oekingjn certain areas.
It seems fairly certain that the ^9% «tll tee many

Tht

79

more of such <lMP- -Astronomical amounts in compensator? and punitive damages will bt involved:
large defense costs seeOT a certainty.' Whether manv
*«*rd% will actually be made is uncertain, but based
on che present social and political climate, some appear likelv.
The 70s will certainlv witness a number of new
laws, both state and federal, imposing greater iiabtl*»
oes on polluters. In the state of Illinois, as an exampie, we have the Environmental Protection Act.9 whose
purpose is to provide a unified ttate»wide program.
This act creates an environmental protection scene?
wuh the duty and authority to inspect, establish a
program of surveillance and investigate violations.
The act also creates a state water pollution agency
and a pollution control board. Recent examples of
federal concern include the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.1" the Clean Air Act41 and the Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970."
It seems certain that pollution claims will go bevond
outright claims for damages as a direct result of negligently caused pollution. Pollution de facto will be
alleged as a sufficient basis for liability. For example
last November a chartered airliner earning 37 members of the Marshall University football team plus
twelve members of the university staff and several
civic leaders approached the Huntington. West Virginia airport. The night was rainy and very poor
visibility prevailed — a not unusual condition in an
area subject to heavy fogs and industrial haae. The
plane crashed on the mountainside short of tht runway, with no survivors. A suit has subsequently been
filed on behalf of the estates of most of those killed
in that crash. The suit names as parties defendant
the twelve leading industrial firms of the Ashlandfronton area upwind from the airport, alleging that
the air pollution generated by these firms caused the
visibility which resulted in the airplane
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Each industrial concern can take certain item m
limit its risks and to minimise its potential insurance
and legal problems. The first step it to undertake a
thorough examination of the sources of pollution in
the operations of the company. After identifying
these risks, the risk manager should work wi<h the
operating management of the compant to ctiure
them insofar as they may be reduced. The risk m*t\.
agar should then be aMe to give management a dear
identification of what risks remain and the extent to
which they are self-assumed, as well as the extent to
which insurance might be applicable. Follo%m* th.v
management at every level has an obligation to the
company to remain involved in a continued effort «>
cope with the
probkmi in this Geld which the tornpany faces.u

This is no claim for mere property damage, nor it
We must perhaps (ace the fan that the result* oi
there any allegation that the rmiision of pollutants
pollution are. by and large, really not a subject oi
was sudden or accidental, although tht daim
insurance For one thing, the results of certain acmi
out of an accident allegedly caused by die poll
tics are fairly ioratctabk in many instances. Seconal*
This. then, lives nst to an interesting; area of iptculspollution may be viewed as a dynamic risk rather
(ion as to tht
meaning, of "accident" in relation
tht me
than a static risk. In this contest, we must realue that
pollution coverage.
a certain degree of pollution is inevitable m an* industrial society. The balance between die benefit <•>
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1. Motrin L. Senussrhays, do depose u follows:
1.1 began my aujerance career la 1951 tf a casualty agent for s u e Para bourne* Conujjeny.
In 19591 left Sane Para and joined an tmrtcrjeodent insurance agency in Salt Lake City, Utah.
1 joined the Stale of Utah Department of Insurance (the Department") in 1970 is the general
liability rates and forms analyst. I held that position until I retired in 1979.
2. We were a small drpartmrstt in those days. I handled all of the general nobility fDmgs
myself. I discussed these miners with Conunisrioner Ottesen, but bs always took sry
reccsnnienontJons. O v job was to protect die public. At the nunc time wc were mindful to
(TWiidcr proposed tartan filings flirty. (I use "Bureau" to mean the Insurance Rating Board
(1RB) which later chsiiged its onme to ISO.] We had sn on-going diaJogne with the local Bureau
office. If a problem developed over a Bureau matter I would just can sod work it out with them.
3. While 1 do not actually recall the "sodden and accidental" poOurJon exchnioa, it would have
been handetod by me. I have now reviewed that exclusion tod die Bureau's B«p»-«—»««*
4. Ta» p^iwi^* ^ t n * ^ H^ wwpititt^i — .httphi ^ ^ n ^ M ^ y ^ n
They used
language in 1970 that I was long familiar wirh. 'Sudden* was something "abrupt" or "quack" .<
An "accident* was a sudden event which happened by chance. An "occurrence" was defined in
the policy to cover gradual damage and also an "accident". 'Sudden and accidental" referred
to an "accident", not to an "occurrence-".
5. In 19701 would certainly have maWsfiwHl these rjoDudon exclusion dornmrnts in line with
the way I undcruuud the word! they used. The language was so obvious mere would have been
oo reason for OK to ssfc fe Boreeo office whet it meuisL Ctssrfy, coverage for gradual poBotion
discharges would be excluded. The only exception was coverage for "sudden and accidental"
poUntion discharges. The +fi-**»
also said the only thing now covered was a potturjon
"accident". It was the same thought
6. ItishBjdformetoufxiDTsimidttOwta
Toreadkany
a h a wiy a t t j n m d i a r e g J r i r ^ p ^
I can say without any leservadon mat I
would not have been misled by the Bureau*! * Y M , A " There ie no basis whatsoever for
anyone to think 1 was milled.
7. Whiklaeiasw pollution ww tatog
a pollution ejahB. I alwevt rteui>t repedtWe buahv»
The damage i caeeed would most ftnr/be ermected. The first senJence of the Esjfauttarj
indkaSM the Bureau Okought so also.
8. <Xcc*rsec*-tpsngbueine»j>cJ^^
expected damage. At stated hi urn fJTtmmmtiM (he exdusioo dearly "casrrAes" the existing
sfeatfiOQthttpoUationwrja^
Certainly the exclusion would ate) apply as well

to any xmrtpetmi gradual pollution discharges, if coy.
9. Snmonirastrictka of coverage to c«ly toddep pcilutkM tcddein did ac< nattyreducetbe
actual tmovtt of existing covenge under an "occurrence", no rate leduUton would have been
waxxiond. Wtt no tun capakine for pollution claims even under "occurrence* uaguagc, •
premlnm a d j w a e s for dw gradoaJ pollution exclusion would not have been considered.
10. My spprovil of this excJuskx helped conou^
Besides, hostesses did
oot expect to law pollubon coverage under their general Uabltty pottcks except (tar a tree
"accident". The exclusion was fair and appropriate for endorsement to puocfcs in Utah.

MBLVIN L. SUMMERHAYSf
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A CASE OF MISPLACED RELIANCE:
ANDERSON A MIDDLETOWN LUMBER COMPANY RFVTSITFn
By Victor C. Harwood, m

[Editor's Note: The author's New Jersey law firm, Harwood Lloyd, routinely represents
insurers in environmental insurance coverage litigation. The author's views are his own. The author
would like to thank his partner, Edward Zampino, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
Responses to this commentary are welcome.]

For policyholders to succeed in their battle for insurance coverage for their decades of
environmental pollution under post-1970 CGL policies, they must convince courts that the clear
language of the pollution exclusion says something it doesn't. One would expect that an insurance
clause excluding coverage for harms caused by pollution discharges, excepting only damage stemming
from a "sudden and accidental" pollution discharge, would not cover gradual
pollution discharge claims.1 However, policyholders have persuaded
some courts that the pollution exclusion is ambiguous. Their position is
that the pollution exclusion merely
restates the limitation of coverage under the occurrence definition to damage that is "neither expected
nor intended/*1 In other words, policyholders contend the pollution exclusion excludes exactly
nothing. The policyholder fallback position is, even if the "discharge" focus of the exclusion is to be
recognized, "sudden" must be interpreted as "unexpected," without according it any temporal
component

COMMENTARY

The partial success of the policyholders on the latter position has been made possible by one
segment of the judiciary's patent misuse of dictionaries, and by some courts accepting the meritless
argument that "sudden and accidental" had been construed as "unexpected" under boiler and
machinery policies prior to the drafting of die pollution exclusion in 1970.3 (Thus, the drafters of the
pollution exclusion are "presumed" to have intended to provide coverage in accord with this purported
judicially determined meaning.)4
In many respects, the main ingredient in this policyholder pollution coverage recipe has been
a single 1959 boiler and machinery case from the State of Washington, Anderson A Middletown
Lumber Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company. 333 P.2d 938 (Wash. 1959) (hereinafter

"Anderson").
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the Anderson analysis was factually and
fatally flawed, and that the assertions made by policyholders about it are unfounded. Most important,
the reliance in turn placed upon Anderson by various courts has been seriously misplaced, resulting
in a small but distressing body of unreliable law.
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A. Lexicographic Confusion
1. Misuse of Dictionaries
The factual scenario in Anderson involved a handsaw wheel that began to oscillate. Two days
later it started to vibrate. Three days later, the vibrations were so severe that the saw was shut down.
Inspection revealed cracks in the spokes. The boiler and machinery insurance policy covered loss
caused by "the sudden and accidental breaking" of the wheel.5 The carrier contended the breaking was
not sudden, rather it constituted a gradual process.6 The court agreed the breaking process was
not instantaneous, even though the last stage occurred in an instant."7 However, it still found coverage
for the insured.
The focus for Anderson's analysis of the "sudden and accidental" clause was grounded in a
purely academic inquiry. The court purported to accord policy language its "ordinary meaning" by
extracting one word, "sudden," and turning to dictionaries to elicit that ordinary meaning. Thus,
Anderson's lexicographic analysis was flawed at the outset.
First, dictionaries caution against examining the meaning of a word in a vacuum. They
emphasize contextual significance. For example, as dictionaries typically state:
Any effort to tailor all words to fit a rigid pattern of definition would
result in distortion rather than clarification of meaning. Instead of
following a standard formula for defining, the editors have constantly
kept in mind the need to study the meanings of words in phrases
*
Second, in their listing possible meanings of a word, dictionaries do not suggest that all such
listings reflect common usage. Rather, most dictionaries establish a time sequence for the ordering of
word meanings. Some dictionaries order meanings of a word by common usage (such as Funk &.
Wagnall's and Random House dictionariesV Thus, the common, ordinary meaning of a word is listed
first in those dictionaries. Other dictionaries (such as Mcrriam-Webster* s dictionaries) list meanings
of a word in the order of historical usage. Thus, the earliest known usage of a word would be listed
first in such dictionaries. The ordinary meaning of a word would follow the historical definitional entry
for the word.
The Anderson court was clearly unaware of the differing usage instructions set forth in the
dictionaries it referred to. Thus, it misapprehended the ordinary meaning of "sudden." It misfocused
on the (historical) "unforeseen" sense of "sudden" listed first in the historically-ordered Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). It downplayed the (ordinary meaning) temporal definition
listed first in the common meaning-ordered Funk & Wagnalt's Standard Dictionary Of The English
Language.9
There can be no disputing that the Webster's dictionary cited in Anderson (as with all McrriamWebstcr's dictionaries) advised its readers in its usage instructions that the order of arrangement of
senses was historical.
In general the arrangement of meanings of words of many meanings
in this dictionary has been according to the following practice. Jhs.
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earliest meaning ascertainable is always first wheth»r j | j 5 HtfinirY,
technical, historical, or obsolete. Meanings of later derivation are
arranged in the order shown to be most probable by dated citations and
semantic development.10
Thus, unbeknownst to the Anderson court, the ordinary temporal meaning of "sudden" was
actually set forth in sense number five of Webster's, which provides:
5. Hastily prepared, arranged, effected, etc.; very quickly made,
provided, or brought about; as a sudden cure, departure, trip, or
dinner.11
The common meaning-ordered Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary of the Fnglfah
Language International Edition confirms that the ordinary definition of "sudden" includes a temporal
element:
1. Happening quickly and without warning:
sudden death.12
Accordingly, even when taken in the abstract and out of context, "sudden" is clearly expressed
in the Anderson-cited dictionaries (and all dictionaries) as having an ordinary temporal meaning,
provided that the express usage instructions of those dictionaries are not ignored.13
2. Ltriwgrapbfc Lcmminga
Anderson's misapprehension of this lexicographic reality has, unfortunately, led the way for
other lemming-like decisions to parade into an ocean of semantical confusion.14
A few courts rely upon Anderson, but take dictionary misuse even a step further. In
lu&t, the Wisconsin Supreme Court compared Webster's and Random House's definitions,
commenting that " . . . [t]he very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the 'primary' definition
of 'sudden' is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous."1* Of course, when used properly,
these dictionaries do not ''differ.'* Rather, they corroborate that the ordinary meaning of "sudden" has
a temporal element17 Thus, it is simply not proper to ascribe more than one reasonable (common)
meaning to "sudden."11
15

Another pro-policyholder case, Hecta Mining." improperly utilized Webster's Third Nc^Y
International Dictionary and the Random House Dictionary of the English Language in the same
manner as did Just. The Colorado Supreme Court also erroneously assumed that major dictionaries
"differ" on the ordinary meaning of "sudden" when, if used correctly, they actually confirm the word's
ordinary temporal meaning.20 Accordingly, Hecla Mining's multiple "reasonable" meanings echo is
likewise flawed. fcLat 1092.
In Claussen.21 the Georgia Supreme Court misapprehended that the "primary" definition of
"sudden" is "unexpected," misciting Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986). This error
led that court to incorrectly characterize "sudden's" ordinary temporal meaning as only "secondary"
(even though the Court recognized the temporal meaning of "sudden" as ". . . common in the
vernacular").22
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In Broadwell.23 the New Jersey Appellate Division construed "sudden" to mean unexpected,
which the court inaccurately stated was ". . . consistent with the common meaning of the word in
everyday parlance."24 It cited and misused, as did Anderson, Webster's New International Dictionary
2nd ed. (1954).
An interesting situation has developed in Anderson's home, the State of Washington. The
Court of Appeals in Queen City Farms23 purported to follow Anderson, citing to it in great detail.
However, its analysis of "sudden" is unreliable.26 Queen Citv Farm* did not question the correctness
of Anderson's use of dictionaries (nor Anderson's comment on the purported "purpose," i.e. drafting
intent, of "sudden and accidental" language in boiler and machinery policies — $s& discussion, infra).
Queen Citv Farms cited C l a u s e as an example of courts which have found "sudden" to be
ambiguous ". . . in and of itself."27 However, as pointed out by the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme
Court in Sdkvilk, 2 8 Claussgn fell into error (as did Anderson, and Queen Citv fr^s which relied
upon Anderson) by construing "... Sudden' in isolation without recognizing the significance of the
companion word 'accidental.'"29
The Washington Supreme Court has granted certification.
B. The Drafting Intent Behind. And Public Understanding Of.
Coverage Provided In Boiler And Machinery Policies

l. Misplaced Reliance Upon Couch
Couch's treatise is often cited authoritatively by policyholders to fortify their position that the
primary meaning of "sudden" is "unexpected/* not "instantaneous/'30 However, Couch cites only
Anderson and a 1953 decision of the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court, New England Gas.31 to
support its statement. First, Couch merely paraphrases comments from those cases, echoing their joint
misuse of dictionaries as to what is obviously Webster's first listed "historical" definition of
"sudden."32 Couch made no independent analysis, mechanically perpetuating the dictionary misuse.33
Moreover, Couch inexplicably failed to cite the uniform construction of "sudden and
accidental" in many other boiler and machinery cases which accorded that language its temporal
limitation.34 Indeed, the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court has recently made clear that New
England Gas has no bearing on the interpretation of the pollution exclusion.35 (That court has also
interpreted the exclusion as constituting a temporal restriction of coverage for pollution discharges.)36
Thus, Anderson is the only boiler and machinery case in the country that is arguably inconsistent with
the reality that "sudden and accidental" expressed a temporal element.37 Applying the observations
of Couch on boiler cases to a pollution exclusion interpretation, as confirmed by the Massachusetts
Judicial Supreme Court, is simply wrong.
In fact, any court examining why and how "sudden and accidental" language was utilized and
understood in boiler and machinery policies would find that the goal of underwriters was to impose
a temporal restriction of coverage - and that this reality was clearly understood by the policyholder
community.
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2. Pre-Anderson Historical Perspective
The Anderson court was clearly unaware of the reasonable coverage expectations of corporate
insureds and insurers in the real world. It was also totally uninformed about the "purpose" or drafting
intent behind the boiler and machinery policy language, and its "assumption" on that score compounded its error.
"Sudden and accidental" has always been used in boiler policies to express the "classical
accident" concept - describing a quick and unexpected situation. The Anderson court inexplicably
felt, without any cited basis, that it was "more reasonable to assume" that "sudden" was not limited
to an instantaneous event, but would cover "a crack which developed over a period of time . . . as long
as its progress was undetectable."31
Four years before Anderson was decided, Walter R. White Jr., Second Vice President for
Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company (the defendant company in that case) wrote an article in the
National Insurance Buyer on boiler and machinery insurance for the benefit of policyholder purchasers.39 Therein he explained "sudden and accidental's" temporal context, and the lack of coverage for
"progressive," slowly developing "cracks."
Usually, though, such cracks [in a steam chest or cylinder head] are

progressive and not sudden and accidental and, therefore, are not
usually covered under the definition of accident, (emphasis added).40
The general expansion of coverage in boiler and machinery policies in 1961 to insure a
classical accident breakdown of the machinery from many new causes, including "cracking,"41 was
reflected in 1955 Bureau43 drafting minutes. It was pointed out that the proposed new "sudden and
accidental" coverage for cracks would still not cover those which developed gradually.
The Chairman distributed copies of a letter from a member asking that
consideration be given by the committee to broadening the definition
of Accident for Machinery Objects to include sudden and accidental
cracking. This member pointed out that at times cracking failures
occur which are of a sudden, unexpected and truly accidental nature
and not of a godlttl development, (emphasis added).43
That the element of temporal abruptness, characterized as "sudden," was always a prerequisite
for boiler and machinery coverage is also illustrated in an early treatise which explained old boiler
policies in England.44 Therein, it was clearly expressed that such policies covered liability "... due
to explosion or collapse as hereinafter defined of any boiler.. ."45 "Explosion" was defined to mean
the"... sudden and violent rending ortearing apart of the permanent structure of aboiler.. ."(emphasis
added).46 "Collapse" was defined to mean the ". .. sudden and dangerous distortion by bending or
crushing... by force of steam or fluid pressure... it shall not mean the alfladbt developing deformation
of a plate or plates due to any cause." (emphasis added).47 Specifically excepted from coverage were
gradual situations such as
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... [d]efects due to wearing away or wasting of the materials of a boiler
or other apparatus whether by leaking corrosion or by the action of the
fuel or otherwise the grooving . . . deterioration generally or the
development of cracks, blisters, laminations and other flaws; or for
fracture failures... (unless such defects, fractures or failures result in
'explosion' or 'collapse' as hereinafter defined). . . .4I
Thus, decades of temporal usage of "sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies
preceded Anderson- That historical usage convincingly refutes Anderson's erroneous "assumption''
that the only "purpose" for placing "sudden and accidental" in the insurance contract was the exclusion
of coverage for unforeseen (but not instantaneous) breaks.49
3. Post-Anderson Historical Perspective
Several years after Anderson was decided, policyholders were given a detailed explanation of
changes in boiler policies. At an address before the Annual Insurance Conference sponsored by
ASIM's Delaware Valley Chapter in October of 1961, risk managers were reminded that the "old
machinery definitions of accident" (the definition considered in Anderson^ required a "breaking into
two or more parts."50 The "intent" behind coverage was "... to limit the machinery accident to those
occurrences where there was actual breaking."51 The intent to provide limited coverage was
accomplished by utilizing the traditional insurance concept of the "classical accident," as expressed
in the language "sudden and accidental." Thisriskmanager/poiicyholder audience was told that, while
the new form granted coverage in more situations, it still required a precipitating "sudden accidental
breakdown." The temporal requirement for a covered event was highlighted in the new policy
definition, which specifically excluded coverage for gradual* undetected and unforeseen progressive
failures such as depreciation, deterioration, corrosion, erosion, wear and tear and leakage.52
In the 1970s, a small, select group of policyholders, "Highly Protected Risks" ("HPR"), were
offered a variety of property insurance coverage, including a different type of boiler policy, by
insurers. These policies afforded even broader coverage than that written under standard
policies. 53 These "HPR's" were "preferred" risks with "superior underwriting characteristics." They were provided ". . . broad coverage at reduced cost in exchange for minimal risk
of loss to the underwriter.. ."54 A key ingredient in qualifying as an "HPR" was"... management's
attitude toward loss prevention. A conscientious and systematic effort to protect property . [and]
reduce the chance of loss . . . is essential."55 The Factory Mutual boiler policy extended gradual
coverage on an "occurrence basis" for "undetectable" and "unforeseen" situations.56 These "unforeseen" situations are of the type Anderson had erroneously permitted to be covered under the earlier
"sudden and accidental tearing asunder" standard form.57
The fact that broad boiler "occurrence" coverage (where the only limitation was an "unforeseen" limitation) eventually came to be offered on a sekCiiYfi basis for special "HPR" policyholders
further refutes Anderson's "assumption" in 1959 that the temporal limitation expressed in the
traditional boiler policy could be ignored. The historical evidence also belies Anderson's assumption
that the underwriting risk (and cost of insurance) for all policyholders was the same whether the
breaking was instantaneous or merely undetected ". .. over a period of time."51
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Indeed, although the boiler policies purchased by most policyholders have undergone many
changes over the years to cover additional situations, standard coverage continues to be available on
a "classical accident" basis, and a policyholder may still obtain by special endorsement traditional
"Limited Coverage" that covers only boiler explosions.59
4. The Consistent Temporal Application Of "Sudden and
Accidental" In Diverse Underwriting Effort*
The historical "classical accident" basis for underwriting standard boiler and machinery
coverage, utilizing "sudden and accidental" language, was further recognized by insurers in their
exclusion of such losses in other types of property policies.
In 1983, one insurance trade publication explained:
Essentially, Boiler and Machinery insurance is designed to cover
losses resulting from: (1) explosion of boilers and other types of
pressure vessels... and (2) accidental breakdown of boilers and other
mechanical or electrical equipment. Such losses are not covered under
standard Property policies. Nor are they covered under most nonstandard "all-risk" contracts, such as a Difference in Conditions
policy, (emphasis added).60
Accordingly, the inter-relationship of special boiler coverage with other types of first-party property
coverages was always expressed with a recognition of the temporal "classical accident" feature of
boiler coverage.
Anderson has sometimes been used successfully by policyholders as providing a basis for
demonstrating how "sudden and accidental" was purportedly understood by the drafters of the
pollution exclusion when they picked up their pens in 1970. However, the contemporaneous pollution
exclusion drafting documents demonstrate that the express aim of utilizing "sudden and accidental"
language was to accomplish a restriction of coverage along the lines of the "boom" or "classical
accident" concept. The drafters' subsequent testimony also confirmed they were unaware in 1970 of
any court that purportedly interpreted "sudden and accidental*9 in a boiler policy without a temporal
element. This evidence has been addressed at length elsewhere.61
Moreover, the insurance world was always well aware that "sudden and accidental" operated
in the same temporal way in both boiler policies and in CGL policies containing a pollution exclusion.
For example, an insurance trade consultant in 1973 told its readers that the CGL covered pollution
which is both "sudden and accidental and unintentional." It also stated that the boiler policy could only
cover pollution losses caused by a "sudden and accidental breakdown of an insured object."*2
POLLUTIONLAWSAFFECTBOIlXR.MAanNERYPR(X3
The strong anti-pollution statutes that have been enacted in recent
years have created a number of problems for risk managers. One
major question, for example, is the extent to which Liability policies
cover pollution damage. We discussed this in depth in February 1970,
and our feeling then and now is that pollution damage which is sudden
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and accidental and unintentional on the part of the insured is covered
under the standard C.G.L. The pollution exclusion which became part
of the new Comprehensive General Liability policy in 1973 supports
this view. It states clearly that injury of damage caused by pollutants
is covered if the "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of such
pollutants is "sudden and accidental/*
There is also coverage of accidental pollution liability under Boiler
and Machinery contracts. We understand that the insurance companies subscribing to the Boiler and Machinery division of the Insurance
Services Office have taken the position (without issuing a formal
pronouncement) that pollution losses caused bv a sudden and accidental breakdown of an insured object are covered. The insured object
may be any type of equipment... not merely an anti-pollution device
or installation, (emphasis added).63
The insurance usage of "sudden and accidental'* language in the exception clause of the CGL's
"failure to perform" exclusion "(m)/' was also temporally oriented along "classical accident" lines. An
ISO Legal Review Committee memorandum in 1981 succinctly comments upon the drafting intent of
exclusion (m):
An exception to the exclusion [(m)] provides that it does not apply to
"loss of use of other tangible property resulting from the sudden and
accidental physical injury to or destruction of the named insured's
products or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured after
such products or work have been put to use by any person or
organization other than an insured."
The thought behind this exception is that if a dlMfc « t i # n l arises
out of the use of the named insured's products or work, then the loss
of use of other tangible property not physically injured or destroyed
is covered. On the other hand, no coverage is intended if the insured's
product or work gradually sustains physical injury resulting in the
loss of use of other tangible property that is not destroyed, (emphasis
added).64
Therefore, the history of "sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies, m the
CGL's pollution exclusion, and in the CGL's failure to perform exclusion, confirms a consistent
temporal usage and understanding of that phrase in all insurance underwriting efforts over many
decades.
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CONCLUSION
Anderson*s suggestion in 1959 that "sudden" has no temporal component was contrary to the
definition that the proper use of dictionaries would disclose. Further, Anderson was defective in its
considering the meaning of "sudden" in isolation and out of the contextual phrase within which it was
contained. The pro-policyholder pollution coverage cases which have subsequently used dictionaries
to ascertain the meaning of "sudden" have not given proper consideration to the correct usage of the
dictionaries upon which they purported to rely.
Anderson's conclusions were also contrary to the temporal drafting intent behind, and public
understanding of, the "sudden and accidental" language as used in boiler and machinery policies.
Indeed, Anderson's interpretation of "sudden and accidental" prior to 1970 constituted a unique
minority, and its ruling was unsupported by other boiler and machinery cases. Anderson's observations are further contrary to the temporal insurance usage of the phrase "sudden and accidental" in
policy language other than boiler and machinery policies, such as the CGL's pollution exclusion and
the CGL's "failure to perform" exclusion.
Understandably, Anderson continues to be heavily relied upon in the briefs of policyholders
and their ami£I submitted to courts across the country. Regrettably, some courts are being persuaded
that Anderson has an important bearing on how the pollution exclusion should be interpreted. For a
single boiler and machinery case decided in 19S9 to so greatly affect the litigation of environmental
insurance cases in the 1990s is more than a bit disconcerting. This is especially so when that cases
purported analysis of the ordinary meaning of "sudden," and the underwriting purpose behind "sudden
and accidental" language in boiler policies, was patently erroneous in so many respects.
Insurers are therefore encouraged to urge courts to reject the flawed boiler and machinery and
dictionary assumptions behind Anderson, and to reject Anderson's extension to a pollution exclusion
interpretation as wholly insupportable. The Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court has recognized that
its 1953 boiler case, New England Gas, was flawed and irrelevant in interpreting the pollution
exclusion. It is hoped that the Washington Supreme Court will take advantage of the opportunity
presented in Queen Citv Farms to do likewise.

ENDNOTES
1.) The text of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion states:
It is agreed that the insurance does not apply to bodily iniurv or property
damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke,
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the
atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not
apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
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2.) An ordinary speaker of the English language knows otherwise. Basic grammar and sentence structure
suggest only one conclusion. "It strains at logic" to perceive ambiguity in this clause. Waste Management r>f

Carolinas. Inc. Y, Peerless Insurance Company, 340 s.E.2d 374,379 (N.c. 1986). indeed, the "language is clear
and plain, something only a lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous." United Srargs Fidelity and Guaranty f ^
v, Star Fire CQalS, 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 19881 ouonng American MnrQmt*TnQ To v. Gen. Host Cnm 667
F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kansas 1987).
3.) Sfifi, £*£*, article of policyholder counsel, Anderson and Passannante, Insurance Industry Doublctallc:
The Real and Revisionist Meanings of "Sudden and Accidental." 12 Ins. Litig. Rptr. 186, 191 (May 1990)
(hereinafter t4Doubletalk"V
4.) Doubletalk at 191. This "presumption" has been convincingly rebutted by the contemporaneous
documents and subsequent testimony of the pollution exclusion drafters. Sfifi § B4, infra.

5.) Anderson, sucia, 333 P.2d at 939.
6.) LL at 940.
7.) Id*
8.) See Funk A Wagnall*s Standard Dictionary of the English Language International FH MQW ^r+rpt
from the "front matter'* usage instructions, "Semantic Change/' at VII.
9.) Anderson, supra- 333 P.2d at 937,938. Anderson does not identify the date or edition of the Funk &
Wag nail's it utilized, but merely refers to it as "Standard Dictionary of the English Language " ]& at 940.
However, Funk & Wagnail's published a dictionary with that title in 1898 which contains the same first listed
(ordinary meaning) definition of "sudden" (at 1796) which Anderson sets forth. "Happening quickly and without
warning; coming unexpectedly or in an instant; as sudden death; suddfin dismissal.** The front material of
explanatory information in that dictionary states: "If a word has two or more meanings, the most common
meaning has been given first; that is, preference is given to the order of usage over the historical order
. .. nothing has been permitted to stand between the vocabulary word and its most obvious or important
current meaning/* (original emphasis). Funk A Wagnall's Standard Dictionary of the English Language

(1898), Introductory page xi.
10.) Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, 2d Ed. Unabridged (1959),
"Introduction/* at xv (emphasis added).
11.) ^fibstta,SUDCiat2519.
12.) Funk A WagnalPs Standard Dictionary of the English Language International Ed. (1958) at 1252.
Even the second listed definition of "sudden** in the 1958 edition was grounded in temporality: "2. Hurriedly or
quickly construed, used or done; hasty.** IdL
13.) Anderson incorrectly concluded that sudden's ". . . primary meaning, in common usage, is not
instantaneous' but rather Unforeseen and unexpected.*** Id*, 333 P.2d at 941. According to Random House, the
search for a word*s "primary** meaning would entail ascertaining which of its meanings was the "first or highest
in rank of importance; chief; principal.** Sfifi Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2 ed.
unabridged) at 1537. (This dictionary lists definitions in order of frequency of usage, with "less common"
meanings following. Id* at xxxii.) Sfifi alSQ Webster's, supra, second listed (common meaning) of "primary":
"first in rank of importance'* (at 2519).
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According to Anderson's own stated approach, there can only be Qne, "primary" (common) meaning
for any word, and it is totally irrelevant that there may be other "secondary" meanings of that word.
The mere presence of multiple dictionary entries does not render a word ambiguous, as policyholders
also routinely assert Uniohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co 476 N.W.2d 392, 398 n.8 (Mich.
1991). Sfifi al&O discussion, info, n. 16.
14.) Some of die policyholder cases cite to Black's Law Dictionary to support their dictionary analysis.
However, it should be obvious that use of a specialty legal dictionary is not appropriate to determine the common
ordinary meaning of words. As the "Preface to the First Edition" (which is carried forward in all subsequent
editions) states: "It [the dictionary] does not invade the province of the text-books, nor attempt to supersede the
institutional writings. Nor does it trench upon the field of the English dictionary, although vernacular words and
phrases, so far as construed hv the couiti. are not excluded from its pages." (emphasis added). Id* at VIH Indeed,
the definition of "sudden" in Black's merely reflects one court's misuse of Webster's. Stt Black's law
Dictionary (1968 ed.), citing Hayaman v Manlev 42 P.2d 946,949 (Kan. 1935) (which in turn ignored the usage
instructions of Webster's New International Dictionary and chose the "historical" listed meaning for "sudden"
rather than its common meaning.)

15.) Just Y, Land Reclamation, Ltd,. 456 N.w.2d 570 (Wis. 1990).
16.) hL at 573. Although lull cites to Anderson's erroneous conclusion that the unambiguous common
meaning of "sudden" is "unforeseen," 456 N.W.2d at 576, lutf adds a new dimension to the lexicographer error.*
Just concludes that "sudden" has multiple primary meanings. lsLat573. The court concluded (unlike Andersonl

that "sudden" is ambiguous because it is "susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning." See also Queen q\[y

Eanm, infra, New Castle County v. Hartford Ace, and Ind. Co,. 933 F.2d 1162,1197-1198 (3rd Cir. 1991) and
CPC International. Inc. v. Northbrook Excess A Surplus Ins. Co.. 962 F.2d 77.94 f n.45193 (1 st Cir 1001V whirh
also erroneously cited to Anderson to support an analysis of the word's "ambiguity."
17.) ^evidence referred to in articles of insurer counsel The 'Frivolity' of PolicvholderGradual Pollution

Discharge Claims ("Frivoloua Pollution Claim"), 3 Metley's Ins. Lit Rpts, No. 40(Aug. 27,1991), at 24, and
The Emperor's Illusionist: Policyholders Retreat From Pollution Exclusion Extrinsic Evidence ("Emperors
Illusionist-PartTwo"l 6Mealey'sInt.Lit Rpts.No. 26(May 12,1992)at26-27 andn.U3.
18.) liiat 456 N.W.2d at 576.

19.) Hccla Mining Co. Y. New Hamp. Ina, Co.. s u P.2d 1083,1091 (Colo. 1991).
20.) Anderson's erroneous conclusion on sudden*s "primary meaning in common usage" was likewise
followed in Time Oil Co v Cigna Property A Cas Ins Co 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1408 (W.D. Wash. 1990).

21.) nm
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380 S.E.2d 686 (Ga. 1989).

22.) I£at68t.
23.) Broadwell Realty v Fidelity A Cas. Co. of NY.. 528 A.2d 76 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1987).
24.) 528 A.2d at 83. However, an earlier New Jersey Court without the confusion of a dictionary analysis,
noted that an "... occurrence need not be a sudden event but may be a process..." thereby highlighting "sudden' s"
commonly understood temporal meaning. Deodato v Hartford Ins. Co.. 363 A.2d 361,365 (NJ. Super. Law Div.
1976), af£4. 381 A.2d 354 (NJ. Super. App. Div. 1977).
25.) Queen City Farms. Inc v Central National Ins. Co.. 827 P.2d 1024 (Wash. App. 1992).
26.) hL at 1048-1049.
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27 ) 827 P.2d at 1048.
28.) Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville I n d i u m s Inc.. 555 N.E.2d 568 (Ma. 1990).
29 ) Id^, at 571. Likewise intentional discharge of pollutants cannot constitute an "accidental" discharge
even when there is no intent to cause environmental harm. To do so would improperly render the pollution
exclusion ". . . meaningless in context" SfiC Technicon Electronics Core, v American Home A«snr»nri» ^
542N.E.2d 1048, 1050-1051 (N.Y. 1989).
30.) See., fix, DpublcUlk at 190, citing G. Couch, 10A Cvclooedia of Insurance T aw 7H § 42.396 (1982).
"When coverage is limited to a sudden 'breaking* of machinery the word 'sudden' should be given its primary
meaning as a happening without previous notice, or as something coming or occurring unexpectedly, as
unforeseen or unprepared for."

31.) New England Gas & Elcctnc Ass'n y, Ocean Ace, ft Guar, Corp.. U6N.E.2d67i (Ma. 1983).
32.) Sfifi New England G M . supx*. 116 N.E.2d at 680.
33.) This Anderson/New England Gas/Couch rhetoric was repeated, also without any analysis, in &w.
C*&tle County, supra. 933 F.2d at U97, and \n CPC International, supra. % 2 F.2d at94, n.4S.
34.) Sfifi insurer article, Johnstone and Ansell, Insured Counsel Douhletalk: The Fallacies in Anderson and
Pa^annantes Arguments Concerning the Interpretation of "Sudden and Accidental" in Boiler and Machinery
Policies. 5 MeaJey's Ins. Litig. Rpts. No. 10 (Jan. IS, 1991). This article discusses numerous such boiler and
machinery cases.
35.) S t t Belleville, supia, 355 N.E.2d at 572.
36.) LL
37.) Sfifi Johnstone and Ansell, iUpH. ** 21 which suggests Anderson's lexicographic conclusion is "dicta."
The policyholder authors of Douhletalk also cite Cozen, inuring Real Property. } 503(2)(b) (1969) for the
proposition that boiler and machinery policies prior to 1970 had "uniformly" interpreted "sudden and accidental*'
to mean "unexpected and unintended.** However, Cozen cites no authority for that sweeping proposition, and no
case Cozen refers to supports i t Indeed, Cozen mentions only two cases which actually contain an (erroneous)
dictionary reference to "sudden9* as "unexpected/* Mew Fngland Gas, s u m , and CvclopsCorp. v. Home Ins. Co..
352 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pi. 1973). Significantly, and in spite of their error m dictionary usage, both cases contrast
"sudden" with "gradual." New England Gas. 116 N. W.2d at 680; Cvclops. 352 F Supp. at 937,933. Furthermore,
Cozen acknowledges " . . . [a]s a general rule, as long as the manifestation of the defect occurs quickly, the defect
itself may gy*«*ttv lead to failure" UL (emphasis added).
38.) Anderson, i u p n , 333 P.2d at 940 (emphasis added).
39 ) Walter R White Jr What i« Wrong With B o ^ r fnq"*nce Today. The National Insurance Buver (June
1955). This periodical (subsequenUy re-named Risk Management) was published by the American Society of
Insurance Management (ASIM), which subsequenUy changed its name to Risk and Insurance Management
Society (RIMS). RIMS is the nauonal policyholder risk-manager trade associauon. Mr. White addressed his
audience as "the buyers" of insurance. LL at 24.
40.) LLat 12.
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41.) U» at 34-35.
42.) The "Bureau" as used here means the Insurance Services Office (ISO) and its predecessor organizations, such as the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU).
43.) Minutes, Rating Committee of the Boiler and Machinery Division of the NBCU, December 7
1955. at 3.
44.) H.R. Sketch, Engineering Insurance (Second Ed.), Buckley Press Ltd., London (1935).
45.) Id. at 43.
46.) Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
47.) Id* at 49 (emphasis added).
48.) Id. at 44-45.
49.) Anderson,

SJJBQ,

333 P.2d at 940.

50.) George West, New Boiler and Machinerv Coverage*. The National Insurance Buyer (January 1962)
at 34. The author was Vice President of the Mutual Boiler and Machinery Insurance Company.
51.) Id. (emphasis added).
52.) Id. at 35.
53.) Sfifi Property Insurance for "Highly Protected Risks/* 12 The John Liner Letter No. 12 (November
1975) (last page).
54.) Id. at 1.
55.) Id. at 3.
56.) See New Boiler and Machinery Policies. 24 The John Liner Letter 8 (JuJv 1987) at 4: "Such coverage
does not require that there be visible evidence of damage at the time of the occurrence."
57.) 333 R2d at 940.
58.) JA
59.) See New Boiler and Machinery Policies, SJIQH, at 4:
"ACCIDENT DEFINED IN BASIC COVERAGE FORM
A covered "accident" under the new Boiler and Machinery Coverage form is defined in essentially the
same manner as it is under the older blanket group description schedules:
"Accident" means a sudden and accidental breakdown of the "object" or a part of the "object" At the
time the breakdown occurs, it must manifest itself by physical damage to the "object" that necessitates
repair or replacement
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The definition excludes losses resulting from such perils as common ^ a r and tear, breakdown of
computer equipment, leakage at valves, fittings, etc. Separate definitions of accidents to turbine units
are included in the endorsement used to provide coverage for losses stemming from such equipment.
Generally, underwriters use an alternate definition of "accident" to restrict coverage on older, cast-iron
boilers. This so-called "Limited Coverage" insures against only those losses arising out of explosion
- or the "sudden and accidental tearing asunder" - of the object Such limited protection was wntten
under the older policy as an optional blanket group description for boilers and other fired vessels. Under
the new Boiler program. Limited Coverage may be provided by separate endorsement/' (emphasis
added)
60.) Boiler and Machinery Insurance: An Update. 20 The John Liner Letter 11 (October 1983) at I.
61.) See Emperor's Illusionist - Part Two at 22-24. and Frivolous Pollution Claims at 21-25.
62.) See Timely Tips. 10The John Liner Letter No. 5 (April 1973). Insurance trade publications repeatedly
pointed out the temporal significance of the pollution exclusion's "sudden and accidental" language. Sfifi
discussion in Frivolous Pollution Claims at 32-34.

63.) Timely Tips, sagia at 1-2.
64.) The temporal history of the CGL's exclusion (m) is discussed in detail in Emperor's Illusionist (Part
Two), supra at 24-26. It was drafted in 1970, the same year as the pollution exclusion.

